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Matching markets are common methods to allocate resources around the
world. There are two kinds of matching market: centralized matching mar-
ket and decentralized matching market. In a centralized matching market,
there is a clearing house that functions to collect information from market
participants and uses the information to determine the allocation among
the participants. In a decentralized matching market, market participants
contact one another and possibly exchange information, and the allocation
is determined among the participants based on their agreement.
In my thesis, I study the matching markets that are two-sided. In a
two-sided matching market, participants are separated into two groups. For
example, men and women, schools and students, and so on. Such a market
is first studied by Gale and Shapley (1962). They study matching markets
between men and women and between colleges and students. Consider the
simples matching problem: the marriage problem, the problem of matching
between men and women. Each of them has a preference over the agents
on the opposite side and the option of remaining single. A central question
is: does a matching that is individual rational and no pair of agents from
different sides who are not matched together but rather be together exist?
(Such a matching is referred as a stable matching.) Gale and Shapley (1962)
show that the answer is affirmative with the introduction of the deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm. Since Gale and Shapley (1962), the concept of stability
and the application of deferred acceptance algorithm are widely used in the
literature of two-sided matching.
My thesis consists of four individual papers. Chapter 1, with the title
“When is the Boston Mechanism Dominance-Solvable?”, Chapter 2, with the
title “Undominated Strategies and the Boston Mechanism”, and Chapter 3,
with the title “Promoting Diversity of Talents: A Market Design Approach”,
are my own work. In these three chapters, I study the matching problems
between schools and students. Chapter 4, with the title “Platform Markets
ii
and Matching with Contracts”, is a joint work of Juan Fung and I. In this
chapter, we propose a model to study platform markets.
iii
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Abstract: This paper considers weaker notions of strategy-proofness and
use them to study the Boston mechanism. I propose a new solution concept,
dominance solvability*, which is stronger than dominance solvability while
weaker than strategy-proofness. First, I show that the Boston mechanism
satisfies the nonbossy condition and this makes the order of deleting weakly
dominated strategies irrelevant to the outcomes produced from the survived
strategy profiles. Then, I design the acyclic priority structure and show that
the Boston mechanism is dominance-solvable* or dominance-solvable if and
only if the priority structure is acyclic. Despite the dominance-solvable*
or dominance-solvable outcome under the Boston mechanism is stable and
efficient, I find the acyclic priority structure is very restrictive, which does
1Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Email:
hsu22@illinois.edu.
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not bring justification to the use of the Boston mechanism.
JEL: C72, C78, D47, D78, I20
Key Words: Dominance solvability*, dominance solvability, dominant
strategy, acyclic priority structure, nonbossy condition, Boston mechanism
1.1 Introduction
Centralized matching programs are commonly used for allocating students
to schools. The school choice problem by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003)
and Blinski and So¨nmez (1999) studies such matching problems. In this lit-
erature, the centralized matching mechanisms use students’ submitted pref-
erences and their priorities in schools to compute the outcome. In addition,
the schools are viewed as objects to consume and the welfare consideration
is on students.
Strategy-proofness has been advocated as a design objective instead of
an incentive compatibility constraint in the setting of school choice problem
(Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2006; Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013). This considera-
tion plays an important role of replacing the Boston mechanism with the
Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism (SOSM) of Gale and Shapley (1962) in
the public school matching program in Boston, since one important feature
of the Boston mechanism is that it is not strategy-proof (Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al., 2006). On the other hand, the SOSM is strategy-proof (Dubins and
Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982).
Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) show that the replacement of a manipulable
mechanism in Boston is not a single event. They show that there is a trend of
replacing manipulable mechanisms in US and UK. Despite the mechanisms
that replace the old mechanisms are still manipulable, Pathak and So¨nmez
(2013) show that the new mechanisms are less manipulable.2
2Note that the reasons that the new mechanisms are not strategy-proof is that there
are constraints on the number of schools choices students can declare in their submitted
preferences. As long as there is such a constraint, a strategy-proof mechanism does not
2
Having a strategy-proof mechanism also prevents a situation that some
students’ welfares are sacrificed due to their unawareness of the strategic
properties of the mechanisms. Pathak and So¨nmez (2008) consider an en-
vironment where there are sincere students and sophisticated students and
compare the welfare consequences of the Boston mechanism and the SOSM.
Sincere students are not aware of the strategic properties of the Boston
mechanism and always submit their true preferences, while sophisticated
students are fully aware of those properties and plan their strategies ac-
cordingly. Pathak and So¨nmez (2008) show that all sophisticated students
weakly prefer the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium outcome under the
Boston mechanism to the dominant-strategy outcome under the SOSM. In
addition, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006) find empirical evidence that shows
students have different levels of sophistication in the public school matching
program in Boston during 2000 and 2004, when the Boston mechanism is
still in use.
Despite the importance of strategy-proofness, there are some situations
when the market designers might want to consider a weaker notion of strategy-
proofness. Kesten (2010) shows that there does not exist an efficient and
strategy-proof mechanism that Pareto dominates the dominant-strategy out-
come of the SOSM. Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009) consider an environment
where there are ties in students’ priorities in schools and some random tie-
breaking rule is used to break the tie. They show for any tie-breaking rule,
there does not exist a mechanism that is strategy-proof and dominates the
SOSM.3 Both Kesten (2010) and Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009) show that it
exist. See also Haeringer and Klijn (2009) for the analysis of the SOSM, the TTCM
and the Boston mechanism in such an environment and Calsamglia et al. (2010) for an
experimental study.
3By Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009), a mechanism ν dominates another mechanism φ, if
when all students submit the true preferences under both ν and φ, all students weakly
prefer the outcome under ν to the outcome under φ, and some students strictly prefer the
outcome under ν to the outcome under φ.
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costs strategy-proofness to have a mechanism that dominates the SOSM.
Another situation that calls for a weaker notion of strategy-proofness is
when there is a constraint on the number of schools that a student can de-
clare in his or her submitted preference. In such an environment, a strategy-
proof mechanism does not exist. As shown in Pathak and So¨nmez (2013),
many school districts in US and UK have such a constraint.4 Although
Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) propose an important measure to compare the
vulnerability to manipulation between mechanisms, they did not provide any
design guideline regarding incentives when strategy-proofness is impossible
to achieve.
This paper considers weakening the requirement of strategy-proofness. A
natural candidate would be dominance solvability, since it gives an unique
prediction on the strategies used by the participants.5 Dominance solvbaility
is a natural candidate when one relaxes strategy-proofness. In particular,
in p. 80 of Moulin (1983), “dominance solvability is a generalization of
strategy-proofness.”
This paper proposes a new solution concept, the dominance solvability*.
Dominance sovability* requires that in the process of deleting weakly dom-
inated strategies, one can delete strategies only if there exists a dominant
strategy in that subgame. In other words, if a game is dominance-solvable*,
then there exits an ordering over the players so that each player can find some
dominant strategy in the subgame in a sequential manner starting from the
player with a highest ordering. Note that dominance solvability* is stronger
than dominance solvability, while it is weaker than strategy-proofness.
4For the school districts that Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) survey, the only school district
that uses strategy-proof mechanism and does not have a constraint on the number of school
choices that one can declare is Boston. See Table 1 in Pathak and So¨nmez (2013).
5Dominance solvbaility, introduced by Moulin (1979), requires the following: a game is
dominance-solvable if the outcomes produced by the strategy profiles that survive iterative
deletion of weakly dominated strategies are the same.
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This paper applies the solution concepts, dominance solvability* and
dominance solvability, to study the Boston mechanism. The Boston mech-
anism works in the following way.
• In the first round, each school uses its priority rule and admits the
students who rank it as their first choices up to its capacity constraint.
A student who is assigned to some school is inactive from the next
round on; otherwise he is active. Each school reduces its capacity
constraint by the number of students who are assigned to it after this
round.
• In the t-th round, each school uses its priority rule and admits the
active students who rank it as the t-th choices up to its capacity con-
straint. A student who is assigned to some school is inactive from the
next round on; otherwise he is active. Each school reduces its capacity
constraint by the number of students who are assigned to it after this
round.
The mechanism terminates when each student is either matched to some
school or all his acceptable schools6 reach their maximum capacity con-
straints.
Ergin and So¨nmez (2006) analyze the equilibrium properties of the pref-
erence revelation game induced by the Boston mechanism.7 In particular,
Ergin and So¨nmez (2006) show that all Nash equilibrium outcomes in the
Boston mechanism are stable matchings. Since the dominant strategy out-
come of the SOSM Pareto dominates all other stable matchings, it Pareto
dominates all (except one) Nash equilibrium outcomes in the Boston mech-
anism. Moreover, despite the Boston mechanism is efficient, efficiency is not
6A school is an acceptable school for a student, if attending that school is preferred to
the outside option.
7In the rest of the paper, I will simply refer the preference revelation game induced by
the Boston mechanism as the Boston mechanism.
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guaranteed in equilibrium in general.8
This paper observes that the multiplicity of Nash equilibrium outcomes
in the Boston mechanism in many cases results from using weakly domi-
nated strategies. In particular, if one performs iterative deletion of weakly
dominated strategies, the outcome resulted from the survived strategy pro-
files may be a desirable one. We use Example 2 in Ergin and So¨nmez (2006)
to illustrate this point.
Example 1. There are three students i1, i2, i3 and three schools s1, s2, s3.
Each school can admit at most one student. Students’ preferences and their
priorities in schools are as follows.9
Pi1 : s1, s2, s3 fs1 : i3 − i2 − i1
Pi2 : s2, s1, s3 fs2 : i1 − i3 − i2
Pi3 : s2, s3, s1 fs3 : i2 − i1 − i3
The setting of the school choice problem is the same as in Example 2 in
Ergin and So¨nmez (2006). As shown in Ergin and So¨nmez (2006), there are












Note that µ1 Pareto dominates µ2, and µ1 is the dominant strategy outcome
in the SOSM.
We show that the unique dominance-solvable outcome is µ1. For each
student, the submitted preference that does not rank the least preferred
8Note the student-optimal stable matching Pareto dominates other stable matchings,
and the student-optimal stable matching is not efficient in general. Therefore, efficiency
in equilibrium in the Boston mechanism is not guaranteed.
9It means that student i1 prefers school s1 to school s2, school s2 to school s3, and
school s3 to not being admitted to any schools. In addition, student i1 has the highest
priority in school s1, student i2 has the second highest priority in school s1, and student
i1 has the third highest priority in school s1.
10It means that student i1 is matched to school s2 in the matching µ1.
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school as the third school choice is weakly dominated. This is because
the sum of capacity constraints over all schools equals the total number of
students. Ranking all three schools as acceptable schools guarantees that
he will receive at least one school. Ranking the least preferred school as
the third school choice guarantees that he will receive a school that is at
least as good as the least preferred school. A strategy that ranks the least
preferred school as the first or the second school choice is weakly dominated
by a strategy that ranks the least preferred school as the third school choice.
After deleting all the strategies that do not rank the least preferred school as
the third school choice, we have the resulting payoff matrix in Figure 2. For
the ease of comparison, let a student obtain utility of 2 when he receives his
favorite school and utility of 1 with the second favorite school, and utility
of 0 with the third favorite school. Note that student i1 is the row player,
student i2 is the column player, and student i3 is the box player.
s2, s1, s3 s1, s2, s3
s1, s2, s3 0, 1, 2 2, 0, 2
s2, s1, s3 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
s2, s3, s1
s2, s1, s3 s1, s2, s3
s1, s2, s3 1, 1, 1 2, 2, 1
s2, s1, s3 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
s3, s2, s1
Figure 1.1: The payoff matrix after deleting the strategies that change the
ranking of the least preferred schools for all students.
From Figure 1.1, if one performs iterative deletion of weakly dominated
strategies for the remaining strategies, there is an unique outcome, which is
µ1. Therefore, the game is dominance-solvable. Note that µ1 is the matching
produced by the SOSM when all students submit the true preferences as
dominant strategies. Also note that one can find in the 6 × 6 × 6 payoff
matrix presented in Ergin and So¨mnez (2006, Fig. 2) that there are more
than one path of deleting weakly dominated strategies, and that all result
in the same outcome.
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The first result in this paper is that the Boston mechanism satisfies
the nonbossy condition.11 A mechanism is nonbossy if no student can affect
other students’ assignments without changing his own assignment by submit
a different preference. This condition prevents a version of manipulation.
This paper shows the nonbossy condition of the Boston mechanism cre-
ates a useful property in terms of investigating equilibrium strategies. It is
known that different orders of deleting weakly dominated strategies could
create different set of outcomes produced by the survived strategy profiles.
Marx and Swinkels (1997) propose the Transference Decisionmaker Indif-
ference (TDI) condition and show that if a game satisfies the TDI condition,
the order of deleting weakly dominated strategies does not affect the set of
outcomes produced by the survived strategy profiles.12 It turns out the TDI
condition is equivalent to the nonbossy condition in the setting of school
choice problem.13 Therefore, the order of deleting weakly dominated strate-
gies in the Boston mechanism does not matter.
It might be tempting to conclude that the Boston mechanism is dominance-
solvable. However, it is not true in general. In the following example, the
Boston mechanism is not dominance-solvable.
Example 2. There are three students i1, i2, i3 and three schools s1, s2, s3.
Each school can admit at most one student. The preference profile and
priority structure are as follows:
Pi1 : s2, s3, s1 fs1 : i1 − i3 − i2
Pi2 : s1, s2, s3 fs2 : i2 − i1 − i3
Pi3 : s3, s1, s2 fs3 : i1 − i3 − i2
11The nonbossy condition is proposed by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981).
12This result holds when no further weakly dominated strategies can be deleted.
13See also footnote 5 in Marx and Swinkels (1997).
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Using a similar reasoning as deleting the weakly dominated strategies in
Example 1, the remaining strategies and the associated payoff matrix are in
Figure 1.2. Again, a student obtains utility of 2, 1 and 0, if he receives his
first, second and third favorite schools, respectively. Student i1 is the row
players; student i2 is the column player; student i3 is the box player. It is
clear that there is no other weakly dominated strategies that can be deleted.
Therefore, the game is not dominance-solvable.
s1, s2, s3 s2, s1, s3
s2, s3, s1 2, 2, 2 0, 1, 2
s3, s2, s1 1, 2, 0 1, 1, 1
s3, s1, s2
s1, s2, s3 s2, s1, s3
s2, s3, s1 2, 0, 1 1, 1, 1
s3, s2, s1 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
s1, s3, s2
Figure 1.2: The payoff matrix after deleting the strategies that change the
ranking of the least preferred schools for all students.
This paper studies the environment in which the Boston mechanism is
dominance-solvable. In particular, I characterize the priority structure so
that the Boston mechanism is dominance-solvable if and only if the charac-
terization holds. This approach is along the line with the approach in the
literature of designing priority structure starting from Ergin (2002). In this
literature, the focus is designing the priority structure so that the deficiencies
of the mechanism under study can be circumvented.
A related paper in this literature is Kumano (2013). Kumano (2013)
shows that the Boston mechanism is stable or strategy-proof if and only if
the priority structure is Kumano-acyclic. Since dominance solvability is a
generalization of strategy-proofness, a result in this paper is a generalization
of a result in Kumano (2013). Another related paper is Haeringer and Klijn
(2009). Haeringer and Klijn (2009) show that all Nash equilibrium outcomes
in the Boston mechanism are efficient if and only if the priority structure
is strongly X-acyclic. I show that there is no logic relationship between the
strongly X-acyclic priority structure and the priority structure characterized
9
in this paper.14
This paper uses dominance solvability* to establish the main results.
The following example shows how dominance solvability* can be applied to
the Boston mechanism.
Example 3. There are three students i1, i2, i3 and three schools s1, s2, s3.
Each school can admit at most one student. The students’ preferences and
priorities in schools are as follows.
Pi1 : s1, s2, s3 fs1 : i1 − i2 − i3
Pi2 : s2, s3, s1 fs2 : i1 − i2 − i3
Pi3 : s1, s2, s3 fs3 : i2 − i3 − i1
In the beginning of the game, only student i1 has dominant strategies, which
are the strategies that rank school s1 as the first school choice. After stu-
dent i1 removes her weakly dominated strategies, student i2 finds dominant
strategies in the subgame, which are the strategies that rank school s2 as the
first school choice. Note that student i3 still cannot find dominant strategies
in this subgame. After student i2 removes her weakly dominated strategies,
student i3 finds dominant strategies, which are the strategies that rank s3
as the first school choice.
I characterize the acyclic priority structure and show that the Boston
mechanism is dominance-solvable* or dominance-solvable, if and only if the
priority structure is acyclic. To do so, I characterize an order of finding
dominant strategies and then characterize the priority structure so that it is
guaranteed that each student can find his dominant strategy in some stage.
In other words, when the characterization holds, the Boston mechanism is
dominance-solvable*. On the other hand, I show that when this charac-
terization does not hold, the Boston mechanism is not dominance-solvable.
In addition, I also consider an environment where the recourses are scarce
14See Figure 3 for this comparison.
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and characterize the priority structure so that the Boston mechanism is
dominance-solvable* or dominance-solvable if and only if the characteriza-
tion holds.
On the policy side, I find that despite the acyclic priority structure is
weaker than the Kumano-acyclic priority structure, it is still restrictive. In
particular, the acyclic priority structure is more restrictive than the Ergin-
priority structure. Therefore, the findings do not support the use of the
Boston mechanism.
1.1.1 Related Literature
Literature on Designing Priority Structure
Ergin (2002) shows that the SOSM is Pareto efficient, or group strategy-
proof, or consistent if and only if the priority structure is Ergin-acyclic.
Kesten (2006) shows that the TTCM and the SOSM are equivalent, or
the TTCM is stable, or resource monotonic, or population monotonic if
and only if the priority structure is Kesten-acyclic. Haeringer and Klijn
(2009) study an environment where there is a maximum number of school
choices, the quota, that students can declare in their submitted preferences.
They show that for any quota, all the Nash equilibrium outcomes under
the TTCM are Pareto efficient if and only if the priority structure is X-
acyclic. Moreover, they show that for any quota, the priority structure is
strongly X-acyclic if and only if the set of stable matchings is a singleton,
or the Nash equilibrium outcomes under the Boston mechanism are Pareto
efficient, or the Nash equilibrium outcomes under the SOSM are Pareto
efficient. Ehlers and Erdil (2010) consider an environment where there are
ties in students’ priorities and show that the SOSM is efficient or consistent
if and only if the priority structure is strongly acyclic. Kojima (2011) defines
robust stability and shows that the SOSM is robust stable if and only if the
priority structure is Ergin-acyclic. Hatfield et al. (2011) show the equivalence
between existence of a stable or Pareto efficient mechanism for students that
11
respects improvements of school qualities and the virtually homogeneous
school preference profile when there is at least one school that has a capacity
constraint that is larger than one. Kesten (2012) shows that the SOSM is
immune to manipulation via capacities if and only if the priority structures is
Ergin-acyclic.15 Kojima (2013) studies the environment where agents have
multi-unit demands and shows the equivalence of the existence of stable and
efficient mechanism, the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanism,
and the priority structure being essentially homogenous.
Literature on Nonbossy Condition
The nonbossy condition is proposed by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein
(1981). The study of the nonbossy condition in the literature of resource
allocation problem is the following. Svensson (1999) shows that an assign-
ment rule is strategy-proof, nonbossy and neutral if and only if it is a se-
rial dictatorship. Pa`pai (2000) proposes hierarchical exchange rules and
shows that an assignment rule is group strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and
reallocation-proof if and only if it is a hierarchical exchange rule. In ad-
dition, Pa`pai (2000) shows that an assignment rule is group strategy-proof
if and only if it is nonbossy and strategy-proof. Pycia and U¨nver (2014)
propose the Trading Cycles (TC) mechanism and show that a mechanism is
group strategy-proof and Pareto efficient if and only if it is a TC mechanism.
The study of nonbossy condition in the literature of two-sided matching
is the following. Kojima (2010) shows that there does not exist a matching
mechanism that is both stable and nonbossy. In school choice problem,
Ergin (2002) shows that if the SOSM is consistent, then it is nonbossy.16
Kumano and Watabe (2012) show that the SOSM satisfies a weaker version
of nonbossy condition, the weak nonbossiness. Haeringer and Klijn (2008)
point out that by Pa`pai (2000) the TTCM is nonbossy.17
15Manipulation via capacities is proposed by So¨nmez (1997).
16By Ergin (2002), when the priority structure is Ergin-acyclic, the SOSM is nonbossy.
17See footnote 27 in Haeringer and Klijn (2008).
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The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 1.2
presents the model. Section 1.3 presents the results. Section 1.4 contains
discussions. All proofs are presented in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 contains
example that show the relationships among different characterizations of
the priority structure.
1.2 Model
A school choice problem is a tuple (I, S, q, P, f) where
• I = {i1, ..., in} is the set of students.
• S = {s1, ..., sm} is the set of schools.
• q = (qs1 , ..., qsm) is the vector of capacity constraints for each school.
• P = (Pi1 , ..., Pin) is the preference profile, where Pi is student i’s
preference ranking over S ∪{∅}, and ∅ is the outside option. We will
use Ri as the weak preference relation associated with Pi, i.e., sRis
′ if
and only if sPis
′ or s = s′. A school s is acceptable for student i if
and only if sPi∅. For student i, let Pi(s) denote the ranking of school
s in Pi.
• f = (fs1 , ..., fsm) is the priority structure, where fs : I → {1, ..., |I|} is
school s’s ranking over I. For any two students i, j ∈ I, fs(i) < fs(j)
means student i has a higher priority than than j in school s.
We assume that each student has a strict preference over S ∪ {∅} and each
school’s priority over I is also strict. We will treat S, I, q, f as fixed, so we
will call P as a school choice problem as long as it is clear.
A matching µ : I → S ∪ {∅} is a function that assigns a student to
a school or the outside option such that each school is not assigned more
students than its capacity constraint.
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A matching µ Pareto dominates another matching ν if µ(i)Riν(i) for
all i ∈ I and µ(i)Piν(i) for some i ∈ I. A matching µ is Pareto efficient
if it is not Pareto dominated by another matching.
Definition 1. A matching µ is stable if it has the following three proper-
ties.18
• Individual rationality: µ(i)Ri∅ for each student i ∈ I.
• No blocking: there does not exist a student i and a school s such that
sPii and fs(i) < fs(j) for some student j ∈ µ−1(s).
• Non-wastefulness: sPiµ(i) implies that |µ−1(s)| = qs for each student
i ∈ I.
The student-optimal stable matching is a stable matching that
Pareto dominates all other stable matchings.
Given I, S, and q, let P be the set of all possible preference profiles and
M be the set of all possible matchings. A mechanism γ : P → M is a
function that specifies a matching for each submitted preference profile. For
student i, let γi : P → S ∪ {∅} be the function that indicates the school
or the outside option that student i receives for each submitted preference
profile. In this paper, we will let ϕ denote the Boston mechanism.
For each student, the set of strategies is equal to the set of possible
submitted preferences. We will use Qi as a generic strategy for student i
and Q−i as the generic strategy profile for students other than i. Denote
Q = (Qi, Q−i) as a generic strategy profile. Let Qi be the set of all possible
strategies for student i and let Q = ⋃i∈I Qi. Let the game induced by
mechanism γ with a school choice problem (I, S, q, P, f) be (Q, P, γ).
Next, we define several solution concepts. Given a game (Q, P, γ), a
strategy profile Q = (Qi, Q−i) is a Nash equilibrium if
γi(Qi, Q−i)Riγi(Q′i, Q−i)
18This definition is given by Blinski and So¨nmez (1999).
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for all Q′i ∈ Qi and for all i ∈ I.
We need some more notation for the analysis of how the set of undeleted
strategies evolves over iterations of deleting weakly dominated strategies.
Let W be a subset of Q. We say that W is a restriction of Q if the set of
each student’s available strategies in W is not empty, i.e., W⋂Qi 6= ∅ for
all i ∈ I.19
Consider a mechanism γ. Given a restrictionW, we say that Qi weakly
dominates Q′i on W if
γi(Qi, Q−i)Riγi(Q′i, Q−i)
for all Q−i ∈ W−i and
γi(Qi, Q−i)Piγi(Q′i, Q−i)
for some Q−i ∈ W−i. We say that Qi is a dominant strategy on Q if
γi(Qi, Q−i)Riγi(Q′i, Q−i)
for all Q′i ∈ Wi and for all Q−i ∈ W−i.
Given a restriction W, define Dγ(W) to be the subset of W obtained by
removing strategies from some student that are weakly dominated on W,
when mechanism γ is used.
Definition 2. The game (Q, P, γ) is dominance-solvable, if there exists
a sequence Q1,Q2, ...,Qk, where Q1 = Q and Qt = Dγ(Qt−1), such that for
any two strategy profiles Q,Q′ ∈ Qk we have γ(Q) = γ(Q′).
Note that by Moulin (1979), if a game is dominance-solvable, the sur-
vived strategy profile is also a Nash equilibrium.
1.3 Results
The results in this section are primarily in three groups. Section 1.3.1 and
Section 1.3.2 establish the result that the order of deleting weakly dominated
19I will use “a restriction” instead of “a restriction of Q” as long as it is clear.
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strategies does not affect the outcomes produced by the survived strategy
profiles. Section 1.3.3 and Section 1.3.4 characterize a particular order of
deleting weakly dominated strategies. Section 1.3.5 and Section 1.3.6 char-
acterize and study the priority structure such that it is dominance-solvable*
or dominance-solvable if and only if the characterization holds.
1.3.1 Nonbossiness
A mechanism γ is nonbossy, if ∀i ∈ I, ∀Qi,∀Q′i ∈ Qi and ∀Q−i ∈ Q−i, we
have
γi(Qi, Q−i) = γi(Q′i, Q−i)⇒ γ(Qi, Q−i) = γ(Q′i, Q−i).
A mechanism is nonbossy, if no student can change the assignments
to other students without affecting his own assignment by submitting a
different preference.
Theorem 1. The Boston mechanism is nonbossy.
The nonbossy condition prevents a version of manipulation. With the
nonbossiness of the Boston mechanism, we have the following result.
Theorem 2. The Boston mechanism is group strategy-proof if and only if
it is strategy-proof.
The proof of Theorem 2 is identical to Lemma 1 in Pa`pai (2000) and
is thus omitted. Theorem 2 generalizes part of results in Kumano (2013)
regarding strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness.20
20Kumano (2013) shows the equivalence of Kumano-acyclic priority structure, strategy-
proofness, and group strategy-proofness in the sense that under the Kumano-acyclic pri-
ority structure, the Boston mechanism is strategy-proof or group strategy-proof for all
possible preferences, and when the Kumano-acyclic structure is not satisfied, there ex-
ists a preference profile such that the Boston mechanism is not strategy-proof or group
strategy-proof. (See Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 in Kumano (2013).) Theorem 2 says that
for any school choice problem, if the Boston mechanism is strategy-proof, then it is group
strategy-proof, and vice versa. (Therefore, it is possible to have a school choice problem
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1.3.2 Order Independence
Marx and Swinkels (1997) show that if a game satisfies the TDI condition,
or the nonbossy condition in our setting, the order of deleting weakly dom-
inated strategies does not affect the outcomes produced by the survived
strategy profiles. Two definitions are introduced before we present a main
result in Marx and Swinkels (1997).
Definition 3 (Definition 3 of Marx and Swinkels (1997)). Let Q′ be a
restriction of Q and let Q′′ be a restriction of Q′.
• Q′′ is a reduction of Q′ by weak dominance if Q′′ = Q′ \
Q1, ...,Qm, where ∀k ∈ {1, ...,m}, Qk ⊂ Q, and Q′ \ Q1, ...,Qk =
Dγ(Q′ \ Q1, ...,Qk−1), where Q0 = ∅.
• Q′′ is a full reduction of Q′ by weak dominance if Q′′ is a reduc-
tion of Q′ by weak dominance and there does not exist a student who
has strategies in Q′′ that are weakly dominated on Q′′.
Definition 4 (Definition 5 of Marx and Swinkels (1997)). Let Q′ be a
restriction of Q, and let Qi, Q′i ∈ Q′i be two strategies of student i.
• Qi is redundant to Q′i on Q′ if ϕi(Qi, Q−i) = ϕi(Q′i, Q−i), ∀Q−i ∈
Q′−i.
• Qi is redundant on Q′ if there is a strategy Q′i ∈ Q′i \{Qi} such that
Qi is redundant to Q
′
i on Q′.
One of the main theorems in Marx and Swinkels (1997) is rephrased as
follows.
Theorem 3 (Corollary 1 of Marx and Swinkels (1997)). Let (Q, P, γ) satisfy
the nonbossy condition, and let Q′ and Q′′ be full reduction of Q by weak
(I, S, q, P, f) where f is not Kumano-acyclic, and the Boston mechanism is strategy-proof.
In such a case, there exists P ′, such that the Boston mechanism is not strategy-proof in
(I, S, q, P ′, f).)
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dominance. Then, Q′ and Q′′ are the same up to the addition or removal of
redundant strategies and a renaming of strategies.
The theorem says that if the game satisfies the TDI condition (or the
nonbossy condition), the sets of outcomes produced by two different paths of
iteratively deleting weakly dominated strategies are the same. In particular,
if players obtain two different sets of surviving strategies as a result of two
different paths of iteratively deleting weakly dominated strategies, then after
substituting strategies with redundant strategies or naming strategies in one
set of surviving strategies after the names of the strategies in the other set
(because they produce the same outcome), these two sets of strategies are
equivalent.
By Theorem 1, the Boston mechanism is nonbossy. With Theorem 3, we
have the following corollaries.
Corollary 1. The order of deleting weakly dominated strategies in the Boston
mechanism does not affect the outcomes produced by the survived strategy
profiles.
Corollary 2. When the Boson mechanism is dominance-solvable, regardless
of the order of deleting weakly dominated strategies, the outcomes produced
by the survived strategy profiles are the same.
Since the order of deletion in the Boston mechanism does not matter, I
will focus on one order of deletion introduced in the following sections.
1.3.3 Dominant Strategy
The first step in charactering the order of deleting weakly dominated strate-
gies considered in this paper is to characterize the the dominant strategies.
In this section, I characterize the dominant strategy in the Boston mecha-
nism.
Let
U(fs, k) = {i ∈ I : |{j ∈ I : fs(j) < fs(i)}| < k}.
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This is the set of students who are ranked higher than or equal to the k-th
position in fs. The following theorem identifies the three types of dominant
strategies in the game (Q, P, ϕ).
Theorem 4. A dominant strategy Qi for a student i in the game (Q, P, ϕ)
takes one of the following three forms.
1. The first school choice in Qi is s and s is the only acceptable school
for i according to Pi. Moreover, i /∈ U(fs, qs).
2. The first school choice in Qi is s and s is the favorite school choice
for i according to Pi. Moreover, i ∈ U(fs, qs).
3. The first two school choices in Qi are the same as the first two school
choices in Pi. Moreover, i /∈ U(fs, qs) and qs + qs′ ≥ |I|, where s and
s′ are the first and second favorite schools, respectively.
I will refer these three dominant strategies as type-1, type-2, and type-3
dominant strategies, respectively. When a student has a type-2 dominant
strategy, he will receive the first school choice in his dominant strategy for
sure. When a student has a type-3 dominant strategy, he will receive one of
the first two school choices in his dominant strategy.
Remark 1. The characterization of the dominant strategies requires no
information about other students’ preferences.
Remark 2. Suppose there is a constraint on the number of school choices
that a student can declare. As long as the constraint is larger than or equal
to two, Theorem 4 holds.
A corollary of Theorem 4 is the following.
Corollary 3. Consider a school choice problem (I, S, q, P, f). If qs+qs′ ≥ |I|
for any two schools s, s′ ∈ S, then the Boston mechanism is strategy-proof
in the school choice problem (I, S, q, P ′, f) for any P ′ ∈ P.
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Corollary 3 can be used to strengthen Proposition 1 in Kumano (2013).
Theorem 5 (Proposition 1 in Kumano (2013)). Consider a school choice
problem (I, S, q, P, f). If |I| ≥ 3 and |S| ≥ 2 and there are two schools, s
and s′, such that qs + qs′ ≤ |I| − 1, then f is not Kumano-acyclic.
Since Kumano (2013) shows that the Boston mechanism is strategy-proof
if and only if the priority structure is Kumano-acyclic, with Corollary 3 and
Theorem 5, we have the following corollary.21
Corollary 4. Consider a school choice problem (I, S, q, P, f). Suppose |I| ≥
3 and |S| ≥ 2. Then the priority structure f is Kumano-acyclic if and only
if qs + qs′ ≥ |I| for any two schools s, s′ ∈ S.
1.3.4 Dominance Solvability*
I propose a new solution concept, dominance solvability*. Roughly speaking,
dominance solvability* sequentially identifies dominant strategies for the
players. I propose the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies only
if there exists some dominant strategy as follows. Given a restriction W,
define D∗γ(W) to be the subset ofW obtained by removing weakly dominated
strategies on W by some student who has dominant strategies on W, when
mechanism γ is used.
Definition 5. The game (Q, P, γ) is dominance-solvable*, if there exists
a sequence Q1,Q2, ...,Qk, where Q1 = Q and Qt = D∗γ(Qt−1), such that for
any two strategy profiles Q,Q′ ∈ Qk we have γ(Q) = γ(Q′).
It is easy to see that dominance solvability* is stronger than dominance
solvabilty but is weaker than strategy-proofness.
Remark 3. If a game is dominance-solvable*, then it is dominance-solvable.
But the other direction may not be true.
21Since the establishment of Corollary 4 does not require the knowledge of the char-
acterization of the priority structure, I postpone the description of the Kumano-acyclic
priority structure to Section 1.3.5.
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This paper considers the following order of deleting weakly dominated
strategies. Consider an arbitrary stage t in the process of deleting weakly
dominated strategies. We remove a student in the beginning of stage t, if
the following happens. If in stage t − 1, there is some student who finds
a dominant strategy and the dominant strategy ensures that he will be
matched with the first school choice in the dominant strategy no matter
what strategies that the remaining students use, remove this student in
stage t. In addition, reduce the capacity constraint of the school that is the
first school choice in this student’s dominant strategy.
There are three situations that a student would delete his dominated
strategies in stage t. First, if he finds the most preferred school among
the schools that still have seats is the only acceptable school, than it is
a dominant strategy to report this school as the only acceptable school.
Second, if he finds that the most preferred school among the schools that still
have seats considers him as the top choice among the remaining students,
then ranking this school as the first school choice is a dominant strategy.
Third, if he finds that the sum of the remained seats in the most and second
preferred schools among the schools that still have seats is greater than or
equal to the number of remained students, then it is a dominant strategy to
ranks these two schools as the first and second school choice with the same
relative ranking as in the true preference.
The above process can be formally described with the following sequence.
{Γt}Tt=1 ≡ {(It, St, qt, P t, f t)}Tt=1.
Let Γ1 = (I, S, q, P, f). Each component in the sequence is defined as follows.
• It = It−1 \ {i ∈ It−1 : i ∈ U(f t−1s , qt−1s ) and P t−1i (s) = 1}, for t =
2, ..., T .
• qts = qt−1s − |{i ∈ It−1 : i ∈ U(f t−1s , qt−1s ) and P t−1i (s) = 1}|, for
s ∈ St−1 and t = 2, ..., T .
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• St = St−1 \ {s ∈ St−1 : qts = 0}, for t = 2, ..., T .
• f t = (fs)s∈St , where (1) f ts(i) < f ts(j) if and only if fs(i) < fs(j) for
i, j ∈ It, and (2) f ts(i) < f ts(j) for i ∈ It and j ∈ I \ It, for t = 2, ..., T .
• P t = (P ti )i∈It , where (1) sP ti s′ if and only if sPis′ for s, s′ ∈ St, and
(2) ∅P ti s if s ∈ S \ St.
We have the following observations.
Observation 1. For i ∈ It and s ∈ St, if i ∈ U(f t′s , qt
′





for t′ < t′′ and t′′ ∈ {1, ..., t}.
Observation 2. For s, s′ ∈ St, if qt′s + qt
′
s′ ≤ |It




t′ < t′′ and t′′ ∈ {1, ..., t}.
Let Qti = Qi, Qt−i =
⋃
i∈I\{i}Qti, and Qt =
⋃
i∈It Qi.
Lemma 1. For i ∈ It and s ∈ St, if sP ti s′ and ∅P ti s′ for all s′ ∈ St \ {s},
then it is a dominant strategy for i to rank s as the only acceptable school
choice in Γt
′
, for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}. Moreover, if for i ∈ It, ∅P ti s′′ for all
s′′ ∈ St, then it is a dominant strategy to rank ∅ as the first school choice
in Γt
′
for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}.
Lemma 1 says that if there is a student i who finds that there is only
one acceptable school in the school choice problem Γt, then it is a dominant
strategy to rank that school as the only acceptable school in the school
choice problem Γt
′
, for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}. If a student finds that all schools in
St are not acceptable, then it is a dominant strategy to rank ∅ as the first
school choice in Γt
′
, for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}.
Lemma 2. For i ∈ It and s ∈ St, if sP ti s′ for all s′ ∈ St and i ∈ U(f ts, qts),
then it is a dominant strategy for student i to rank s as the first school choice
in the school choice problem Γt
′
, for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}. Moreover, ϕi(Qi, Q−i) =
s for all Q−i ∈ Qt′−i and for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}, where Qi is a strategy that ranks
s as the first school choice.
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Lemma 2 says that if there is a student i who finds her most preferred
school according to P ti considers her as the top choice according to f
t
i in the
school choice problem Γt, then it is a dominant strategy for her to rank s
as the first school choice in the school choice problem Γt
′
, for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}.
Moreover, as long as she uses a strategy that ranks s as the first school
choice, she will obtain a seat in s for sure in the school choice problem Γt
′
for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}.
Lemma 3. For i ∈ It and s, s′ ∈ St, if sP ti s′P ti s′′ for all s′′ ∈ St \ {s, s′},
and qts + q
t
s′ ≥ |It|, then it is a dominant strategy for student i to rank s
as the first school choice and s′ as the second school choice in the school
choice problem Γt
′
, for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}. Moreover, ϕi(Qi, Q−i) ∈ {s, s′} for
all Q−i ∈ Qt′−i and for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}, where Qi is a strategy that ranks s as
the first school choice and s′ as the second school choice.
Lemma 3 says that if there is student i who finds her most preferred
school s and second preferred school s′ according to P ti have the property
that the sum of qts and q
t
s′ is greater than or equal to |It|, then it is a
dominant strategy to rank s as the first school choice and s′ as the second
school choice. Moreover, as long as she ranks s as the first school choice
and s′ as the second school choice, she will obtain a seat in one of these two
schools in the school choice problem Γt
′
for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}.
The following theorem gives a general description of the dominant strate-
gies in school chocie problem Γt.
Theorem 6. Consider the sequence of school choice problems {Γt}Tt=1. If
a student i finds a dominant strategy Qi in the school choice problem Γ
t, it
takes one of the following three forms.
1. The first school choice in Qi is s, and s is the only acceptable school
for i according to P ti . Moreover, i /∈ U(f ts, qts).
2. The first school choice in Qi is s, and s is the favorite school choice
for i according to P ti . Moreover, i ∈ U(f ts, qts).
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3. The first school choice in Qi is s, and the second school choice in Qi
is s′. The first school choice in P ti , and the second school choice in P
t
i
is s′. Moreover, i /∈ U(f ts, qts) and qts + qts′ ≥ |It|.
Refer the above three dominant strategies as the type-1, type-2, and type-
3 dominant strategy in the school choice problem Γt. If Qi is a type-1 or
type-3 dominant strategy for student i in the school choice problem Γt, then
it is a dominant strategy for student i in the school choice problem Γt
′
, for
t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}. If Qi is a type-2 dominant strategy for student i in the school
choice problem Γt, ϕi(Qi, Q−i) = s for all Q−i ∈ Qt′−i for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}.
Remark 4. Suppose there is a constraint on the number of school choices
that a student can declare. As long as the constraint is larger than or equal
to two, Theorem 19 holds.
One property of the dominance-solvable* outcome when the Boston
mechanism is used is the following.
Theorem 7. When a game (Q, P, ϕ) is dominance-solvable*, the dominance-
solvable* outcome is Pareto efficient.
1.3.5 Acyclic Priority Structure
Let Ufs (i) = {j ∈ I : fs(j) < fs(i)}. This is the set of students who are
ranked higher than student i in fs.
An α-cycle is defined as follows. There exist two students i, j and two
schools s, s′ such that the following two conditions hold:
• Cycle condition 1: fs(i) < fs(j) and fs′(j) < fs′(i).
• Scarcity condition 1: there exist two disjoint sets Ii ⊆ I \ {j} and
Ij ⊆ Ij \ {i} such that Ii ⊆ Ufs′(i), Ij ⊆ Ufs (j), |Ii| = |qs′ − qs| and
|Ij | = min{qs, qs′} − 1.
A priority structure f is α-acyclic if there is no α-cycle.
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A quasi-cycle22 is defined as follows. There exist three students i, j, k
and two schools s, s′ such that the following two conditions hold:
• Cycle condition 2: fs(i) < fs(j) and fs′(j) < fs′(k).
• Scarcity condition 2: there exist two disjoint sets Ii, Ij ⊆ I \ {i, j, k}
such that Ij ⊆ Ufs (j), Ik ⊆ Ufs′(k), |Ij | = qs − 1 and |Ik| = qs′ − 1.
A priority structure f is Kumano-acyclic if there is no quasi-cycle.
We are ready to define the acyclic priority structure. A priority structure
f has a cycle, if we perform the following two-step procedure to any two
schools and find that there is a quasi-cycle in Step 2.
• Step 0: Consider two schools s, s′.
• Step 1: If there exist two students i, j such that together with s, s′
they constitute an α-cycle, then proceed to Step 2. If there does not
exist any two students that can form an α-cycle with s, s′, stop at this
step.
• Step 2: If there exist three students i, j, k such that together with
s, s′ they constitute a quasi-cycle, then there is a cycle in the priority
structure f .
A priority structure f is acyclic, if there is no cycle. In other words, a
priority structure f is acyclic, if we perform the above two-step procedure
to any two schools and find that either the procedure stops at Step 1 or
there is no quasi-cycle at Step 2.
The following example gives an example in which the priority structure
is acyclic.
Example 4. Let the set of schools be S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6}, the set of
students be I = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7, i8, i9, i10}, and the vector of capacity
22This is defined in Kumano (2013).
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constraints be q = (2, 3, 4, 8, 8, 9). The following diagram represents the
possible construction of the priority structure f . Each “•” in the diagram
represents a student.
fs6 : • − • − • − • − • − • − • − • − • − •︸ ︷︷ ︸
A6
fs5 : • − • − • − • − • − • − • − • − • − •︸ ︷︷ ︸
A5
fs4 : • − • − • − • − • − • − • − • − • − •︸ ︷︷ ︸
A4
fs3 : • − • − • − •︸ ︷︷ ︸
A3
− • − • − • − • − • −•︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3




− • − • − • − • − • −•︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2






− • − • − • − • − • −•︸ ︷︷ ︸
D1
The priority structure f is acyclic if the following conditions hold: (1)
A1 ⊂ A2 ⊂ A3; (2) for any i ∈ B1, we have i ∈ A2; (3) for any i ∈ C1, we
have i ∈ B2; (4) for any i ∈ D1, we have fs1(i) = fs2(i) = fs3(i); (5) there
is no restriction on the ordering of students in A4, A5, and A6.
Note that |A1| = qs1 , |A2| = qs2 , |A3| = qs3 , |A4| = qs1 + qs4 , |A5| ≥
qs1 + qs4 , and |A6| ≥ qs1 + qs4 . In particular, notice that qs1 + qs4 = |I|.
A priority structure that satisfies the above requirement is the following.
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fs6 :i3 − i8 − i1 − i5 − i7 − i4 − i1 − i10 − i2 − i9
fs5 :i7 − i6 − i5 − i4 − i10 − i9 − i8 − i3 − i2 − i1
fs4 :i10 − i9 − i8 − i7 − i6 − i5 − i4 − i3 − i1 − i2
fs3 :i4 − i3 − i1 − i2 − i5 − i6 − i7 − i8 − i9 − i10
fs2 :i3 − i1 − i2 − i4 − i5 − i6 − i7 − i8 − i9 − i10
fs1 :i1 − i2 − i3 − i4 − i5 − i6 − i7 − i8 − i9 − i10
The following theorem says that the Boston mechanism is dominance-
solvable* or dominance-solvable if and only if the priority structure is acyclic.
Theorem 8. The following statements are equivalent.
1. The priority structure f is acyclic.
2. For every P , the Boston mechanism is dominance-solvable*.
3. For every P , the Boston mechanism is dominance-solvable.
We have the following corollary.
Corollary 5. When the priority structure is acyclic, the Boston mechanism
is dominance-solvable* or dominance-solvable. Moreover, the dominance-
solvable* or dominance-solvable outcome is stable and Pareto efficient.
Consider an environment where |S| ≥ 3 and ∑s∈S qs ≤ |I|, i.e., the
resources are very scarce. In such an environment, the sufficient and nec-
essary condition of the priority structure for the Boston mechanism to be
dominance-solvable is reduced to the α-acyclic priority structure.
Theorem 9. Suppose |S| ≥ 3 and ∑s∈S qs ≤ |I|. The following statements
are equivalent.
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1. The priority structure f is α-acyclic.
2. For every P , the Boston mechanism is dominance-solvable*.
3. For every P , the Boston mechanism is dominance-solvable.
Using a similar reasoning as in Corollary 5, we have the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 6. Suppose |S| ≥ 3 and ∑s∈S qs ≤ |I|. When the priority struc-
ture is α-acyclic, the Boston mechanism is dominance-solvable. Moreover,
the dominance-solvable outcome is stable and Pareto efficient.
Notice that |S| ≥ 3 and ∑s∈S qs ≤ |I| imply that for any two schools
s, s′, we have qs + qs′ < |I|. By Kumano (2013), the priority structure will
never be Kumano-acyclic in such an environment.
1.3.6 Comparison with Other Characterizations of the Pri-
ority Structure
In this section, we compare the acyclic priority structure with several other
types of priority structure related to the SOSM and the Boston mechanism.
A priority structure f has an Ergin cycle23 if there exist three students
i, j, k and two schools s, s′ such that the following conditions hold:
• Cycle condition 3: fs(i) < fs(j) < fs(k) < fs′(i).
• Scarcity condition 3: there exist disjoint sets of agents Ii, Ij ⊆ I \
{i, j, k} such that Ij ⊆ Ufs (j), Ii ⊆ Ufs′(i), |Ij | = qs − 1, and |Ii| =
qs′ − 1.
A priority structure f is Ergin-acyclic if f does not have an Ergin cycle.
23This is defined in Ergin (2002).
28
A priority structure f has a weak X-cycle24 if there exist two students
i, j and two schools s, s′ such that the following conditions hold.
• Cycle condition 4: fs(i) < fs(j) and fs′(j) < fs′(i).
• Scarcity condition 4: there exist disjoint sets Ii ⊆ I\{j} and Ij ⊆ I\{i}
such that Ii ⊆ Ufs′(i), Ij ⊆ Ufs (j), |Ii| = qs′ − 1 and |Ij | = qs − 1.
A priority structure f is strongly X-acyclic if f does not have a weak
X-cycle.
The following theorem shows the restrictiveness of acyclic priority struc-
ture and α-acyclic priority structure.
Theorem 10. When the priority structure f is acyclic or α-acyclic, the
priority structure f is also Ergin-acyclic.






Figure 1.3: The relationship among four domains of priority structure
The examples that show the relationship in Figure 1 are contained in
Section 1.6.
24This is defined in Haeringer and Klijn (2009).
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Both acyclic and α-acyclic priority structures turn out to be very restric-
tive. For a priority structure to be acyclic, it has the following requirement.
First, schools are separated into two disjoint sets S1 and S2 such that (1)
any school in S2 has a larger capacity constraint than any school in S1, and
(2) the sum of capacity constraints of the school with the smallest capacity
constraint in S1 and the school with the smallest capacity constraint in S2 is
greater than or equal to |I|. The requirement is that for any two schools s, s′
in S1 with qs′ ≥ qs, a student who is ranked lower than the qs′-th position in
one of the schools has the same ranking in both schools. Note that if there
does not exist two schools such that the sum of their capacity constraints is
greater than or equal to |I|, then all schools are treated as in S1. The proof
of this characterization is in Lemma 5 in Section 1.5. For a priority struc-
ture to be α-acyclic, it requires that for any two schools s, s′ with qs′ ≥ qs,
a student who is ranked lower than the qs′-th position in one of the school
has the same ranking in both schools. The proof of this characterization is
in Lemma 4 in Section 1.5. Therefore, both types of priority structure are
very restrictive.
Table 1 shows the performance of the SOSM and the Boston mechanism
under four different domains of priority structure. With appropriately cho-
sen solution concepts and domains of priority structure, there is no trade-off
between stability and efficiency in equilibrium for the SOSM and the Boston
mechanism.
If the designer wants to achieve both stability and efficiency in equilib-
rium, the SOSM gives the designer the greatest freedom of designing the
priority structure. The SOSM in this sense outperforms the Boson mecha-
nism.
1.4 Discussions
In this paper, I propose a new solution concept, dominance solvability*, and
use the solution concepts, dominance solvability* and dominance solvability,
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Priority Solution Concept S.E. P.E.









Table 1.1: A comparison of the equilibrium performance of the SOSM and
the Boston mechanism under four different domains of priority structure.
Note that BM stands for Boston mechanism, S.E. for stability in equilib-
rium, and P.E. for Pareto efficiency in equilibrium. In addition, SP stands
for strategy-proofness, NE for Nash equilibrium, DS* for dominance solv-
ability*, and DS for dominance solvability. The mark “
√
” represents the
solution concept that is applied and whether stability or Pareto efficiency in
equilibrium is satisfied.
to analyze the widely-used Boston mechanism. I find the Boston mechanism
is nonbossy, and this property makes the order of deleting weakly dominated
strategies irrelevant to the outcomes produced by the survived strategy pro-
files. Then, I characterize the acyclic priority structure, so that the Boston
mechanism is dominance-solvable* or dominance-solvable, if and only if the
priority structure is acyclic. I also consider an environment where the re-
sources are scarce and characterize the priority structure, so that the Boston
mechanism is dominance-solvable* or dominance-solvable, if and only if the
priority structure is α-acyclic. Moreover, when the priority structure is
acyclic or α-acyclic, the dominance-solvable outcome is stable and efficient.
However, both the acyclic priority structure and the α-acyclic priority struc-
ture are very restrictive, and such restrictions make it difficult to achieve in
reality. In other words, the findings do not bring justification to the use the
Boston mechanism.
Despite the results from weakening strategy-proofness does not justify
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the use of the Boston mechanism, the methodology developed in this pa-
per could be useful for designing matching mechanisms or investigating the
properties of the matching mechanisms. As mentioned in the introduction,
there are some situations that make any matching mechanism impossible to
be strategy-proof. I argue that if the first best solution concept, strategy-
proofness, cannot be fulfilled in any matching mechanism, we could develop
the second best solution concept, so that the incentives properties of the
matching mechanisms in such environment still have some tractability. The
solution concept proposed in this paper, dominance solvability*, could be a
suitable candidate in such an environment.
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1.5 Proofs
This section contains all the proofs. Note that the proof of Theorem 9 is
presented before the proof of Theorem 8, because the proof of Theorem 8
uses some of the proof of Theorem 9.
1.5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider any two strategy profiles Q and Q′. Suppose there is a student
j who submits the same preference Qj in both Q and Q
′. If student j
receives different schools under Q and Q′, then the algorithm of the Boston
mechanism implies that there must be another student who also receives
different schools in Q and Q′. Therefore, if ϕi(Qi, Q−i) = ϕi(Q′i, Q−i),
since student i is the only student who submits different preferences in both
strategy profiles, then other students also receive the same schools in both
strategy profiles.
1.5.2 Proof of Theorem 4
The proof has two parts.
Part 1: I show that the strategies of each form listed in the statement of
Lemma 4 are dominant strategies.
When student i’s favorite school is s, and either s is the only acceptable
school, or i ∈ U(fs, qs), then it is clear that the dominant strategy is to
report s as the first school choice.
Next, suppose there are more than two acceptable schools for student i.
Let s and s′ be his first and second favorite schools, respectively. We further
assume as in the statement that i /∈ U(fs, qs) and qs + qs′ ≥ |I|.
Consider Q−i. Q−i belongs to one of the two cases.
Case 1: the number of students other than i who report s as their first
school choices and have higher priority than i in fs is less than qs. Then
ϕi(Qi, Q−i) = s. Since s is student i’s favorite school, there does not exist
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any other strategy that makes student i strictly better off.
Case 2: the number of students other than i who reports s as the first
school choices and have higher priority than i in fs is greater than or equal
to qs. Then ϕi(Qi, Q−i) = s′. This is because qs + qs′ ≥ |I|. If the number
of students who report s as the first school choices is greater than or equal
to qs, then the number of students who can report s
′ as the first or second
school choice must be less than qs′ . Therefore, student i will receive s
′. Since
(1) there does not exist another strategy that can make student i receive
s and (2) s′ is student i’s second favorite school, submitting Qi is weakly
better than all other strategies given Q−i.
Therefore, Qi is a dominant strategy.
Part 2: I show that there does not exist a dominant strategy that does
not take one of the forms listed in Lemma 4.
Let student i’s favorite school to be s. If s is the only acceptable school,
or i ∈ U(fs, qs), it is a weakly dominated strategy to report a school other
than s as the first school choice.
Next, consider the case that student i has at least two acceptable schools.
If i ∈ U(fs, qs), then student i has a type-2 dominant strategy by reporting
s as the first school choice.
Let s′ be student i’s second favorite school. If qs+qs′ ≥ |I|, then student
i has a type-3 dominant strategy by reporting s and s′ truthfully.
Assume that student i has at least two acceptable schools, i /∈ U(fs, qs),
and qs + qs′ < |I|. I show that there is no dominant strategy for student i.
Suppose on the contrary there exists a dominant strategy, and the dom-
inant strategy takes the form
Qi : s1, s2, s3, ....
There are three sub-cases to consider: (1): s1 is student i’s favorite school
and s2 is student i’s second favorite school; (2): s1 is student i’s favorite
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school but s2 is not student i’s second favorite school; (3): s1 is not student
i’s favorite school.
In Case 1, by assumption, i /∈ U(fs1 , qs1) and qs1 + qs2 < |I|. Construct
Q−i is the following way. Let students in U(fs1 , qs1) submit s1 as the first
school choice and let students not in U(fs1 , qs1) ∪ {i} submit s2 as the first
school choice. Since i /∈ U(fs1 , qs1) and qs1 +qs2 < |I|, we have ϕi(Qi, Q−i) /∈




i, Q−i) = s2. This contradicts Qi being a dominant strategy.
In Case 2, construct Q−i such that students other than i submit s1 as
the only school choice. Since i /∈ U(fs1 , qs1), we have ϕi(Qi, Q−i) = s2.





i, Q−i) = s
′, which is a contradiction.
In Case 3, construct Q−i such that students other than i do not report
s1 or s as the acceptable schools. Then ϕi(Qi, Q−i) = s1. Consider the
strategy Q′i such that
Q′i : s.
Then, ϕi(Qi, Q−i) = s. This is a contradiction.
It is easy to verify the above reasoning holds, if we replace any of s1, s2,
or s3 with ∅ in Qi.
1.5.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider student i. By construction of {Γt}Tt=1, if there exists Γt
′
with
t′ ∈ {1, ..., T} where sP t′i ∅P t
′
i s
′ for some s ∈ St′ and for all s′ ∈ St′ \ {s},
then there does not exist Γt
′′
with t′′ ∈ {t′+ 1, ..., T} where s′P t′′i ∅ for some
s′ ∈ St′′ and s′ 6= s. Therefore, if there exists Γt′ such that s ∈ St′ is the
only acceptable school according to P t
′
i , then it is a dominant strategy to
rank s as the only acceptable school choice in Γt
′′
for t′′ ∈ {t′, ..., T}.
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1.5.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider student i. By construction of {Γt}Tt=1, if there exists Γt
′
with
t′ ∈ {1, ..., T} where sP t′i ∅ and sP t
′
i s
′ for some s ∈ St′ and for all s′ ∈ St′\{s}
and i ∈ U(f t′s , qt
′
s ), then there does not exist Γ
t′′ with t′′ ∈ {t′ + 1, ..., T}
where s′P t′′i s for some s ∈ St
′′








′ for some s′ ∈ St′ and for all s′ ∈ St′ \ {s′} and i ∈ U(f t′s , qt
′
s ),
then it is a dominant strategy for i to rank s as the first school choice in
Γt
′
. Note that when such Γt
′
exists, there are at most qt
′
s − 1 number of
students in It
′




s . Also note
that by construction of {Γt}Tt=1, for any j ∈ I \ {It
′}, we have s¯P t¯j∅ and
s¯P t¯j sˆ for some s¯ ∈ S t¯ and for all sˆ ∈ S s¯ \ {sˆ} and j ∈ U(f t¯s¯, qt¯s¯) in some Γt¯
where t¯ ∈ {1, ..., t′ − 1}. Therefore, ϕi(Qi, Q−i) = s for all Q−i ∈ Qt′′−i with
t′′ ∈ {t′, ..., T}, where Qi is a strategy that ranks s as the first school choice.
1.5.5 Proof of Lemma 3
Consider i ∈ It and s, s′ ∈ St. Suppose sP ti s′P ti s′′ for all s′′ ∈ St \ {s, s′}
and qts+q
t





′ | for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}. With
a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 4, submitting a strategy that
ranks s and s′ as the first and second choices, respectively, is a dominant
strategy in Γt
′
for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}. Moreover, qt′s + qt
′
s′ ≥ |It
′ | implies that
ϕi(Qi, Q−i) ∈ {s, s′} for all Q−i ∈ Qt′−i for t′ ∈ {t, ..., T}, where Qi is a
strategy that ranks s and s′ as the first and second choices, respectively.25
1.5.6 Proof of Theorem 7
Observe that when a student i finds his dominant strategy, all schools that
are strictly better than the first school choice in student i’s dominant strat-
25Note that it there exists t′′ ∈ {t, ..., T} such that qt′′s = 0, submitting a strategy that
ranks s and s′ as the first and second choices, respectively, is still a dominant strategy
in Γt
′′
. This is because in this case qt
′′
s′ ≥ |It
′′ | and ϕi(Qi, Q−i) = s′ for all Q−i ∈ Qt′′−i,
where Qi is a strategy that ranks s, s
′ as the first and second choices, respectively.
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egy do not have vacant seat. In other words, those seats are received by
other students who have type-2 dominant strategies and have that school as
the first school choice. Notice that the first school choice in the dominant
strategy is the favorite school among those schools that have vacant seat
and the second school choice in the type-3 dominant strategy is the second
favorite school among those schools that have vacant seats. Suppose the
first school choice in the dominant strategy is s.
If a student has a type-1 dominant strategy, then he will receive either the
first school choice of the dominant strategy or the outside option. When he
receives the outside option, it means that there are a number of qs students
who rank school s as the first school choice and have higher priority than
student i in fs.
If a student has a type-2 dominant strategy, then he will receive the first
school choice of the dominant strategy for sure.
If a student has a type-3 dominant strategy, then he/she will receive one
of the first school choice and the second school choice. When he receives the
second school choice, it means there are a number of qs students who rank
school s as the first school choice and have higher priority than student i in
fs.
Therefore, for a student to receive a strictly better school than the school
he receives in the dominance-solvable* outcome, there must be a student who
receives a strictly worse school than his dominance-solvable* outcome. In
other words, the dominance-solvable* outcome is Pareto efficient.
1.5.7 Proof of Theorem 9
(1)⇒ (2) and (1)⇒ (3):
I prove that when the priority structure f is α-acyclic, the game is
dominance-solvable*. Thus, it is dominance-solvable.
Lemma 4. A priority structure f is α-acyclic, if and only if the following
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two statements hold for any two schools s, s′ with qs ≤ qs′: (1) for i ∈
U(fs, qs), we have i ∈ U(fs′ , qs′); (2) for j /∈ U(fs, qs′) or j /∈ U(fs′ , qs′), we
have fs(j) = fs′(j).
Proof. If part: Suppose the priority structure f has an α-cycle. Let i, j, s, s′
be the students and schools that constitute the α-cycle and let them play
the same roles as in the definition of an α-cycle in the text. Observe that the
Cycle condition 2 in the definition of an α-cycle implies that either fs(i) 6=
fs′(i), fs(j) 6= fs′(j), or both. For part (1), assume that i ∈ U(fs, qs).
We prove that i /∈ U(fs′ , qs′). Since Ii ⊆ I \ {j}, fs′(j) < fs′(i), Ii ⊆
Ufs′(i), if i ∈ U(fs′ , qs′), there cannot be disjoint sets Ii, Ij ⊆ I \ {i, j} that
make |Ii| = |qs − qs′ | and |Ij | = qs − 1 happen. Note that (1) implies that
U(fs, qs′) = U(fs′ , qs′). For part (2), suppose i /∈ U(fs, qs′). If fs(i) = fs′(i),
then the Cycle condition 2 implies that fs(j) 6= fs′(j). Therefore, one of i
and j has different ranking in fs and fs′ .
Only if part: First, suppose there is a student i ∈ U(fs, qs) and i /∈
U(fs′ , qs′). Then there exists another student j ∈ U(fs′ , qs′) and j /∈
U(fs, qs). Then i, j, s, s
′ constitute an α-cycle. Second, suppose there is a
student j /∈ U(fs, qs′) and fs(j) 6= fs′(j). Without loss of generality, assume
that fs′(j) < fs(j). There exists another student i such that fs(i) < fs(j),
fs′(j) < fs′(i) and i /∈ U(fs′ , qs′). Then i, j, s, s′ constitute an α-cycle.
Re-index the schools so that for any two schools st, st′ , we have t ≤ t′
if and only if qst ≤ qst′ . Notice that the largest index is m. After the
re-indexing, Lemma 4 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 7. If the priority structure f is α-acyclic, then the following
statements hold:
1. U(fst , qst) ⊆ U(fst′ , qst′ ) for any t′ > t.
2. U(fst , qst′ ) \ U(fst , qst) ⊆ U(fst′ , qst′ ) for any t′ > t.
3. For i /∈ U(fs1 , qsm), we have fst(i) = fst′ (i) for any t, t′.
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We are ready to prove the main theorem.
Re-index students in the following way. Divide students into m disjoint
sets {Ir}mr=1 so that I =
⋃m
r=1 Ir and the following conditions hold.
• |I1| = qs1 .
• |Ir| = qsr − qsr−1 for r = 2, ...,m− 1.
• |Im| = |I| − qsm−1 .
• Consider student i.
– If fs1(i) ∈ {1, ..., qs1}, then i ∈ I1.
– If fs1(i) ∈ {qsr −qsr−1 +1, ..., qsr} for r = 2, ...,m−1, then i ∈ Ir.
– If fs1(i) ∈ {|I| − qsm−1 + 1, ..., |I|}, then i ∈ Im.
• For two students i, j in the set Ir, i has a smaller index than j if i has
a higher priority than j in fs1 .
Note that Ir could be empty for some r ∈ {2, ...,m}.
The order of deleting weakly dominated strategies only if there exists
dominant strategies are as follows.
• Step 1: Consider students in J1.
– Consider an arbitrary student i ∈ J1. Suppose his most preferred
school is st. Then it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the first
school choice. (By Corollary 7, fst(i) ≤ qst . By Lemma 2, the
strategy specified is a dominant strategy.)
– Simultaneously delete the weakly dominated strategies for stu-
dents in J1.
– For each school s ∈ {s1, ..., sk−1}, reduce its capacity qs by the
number of students who rank it as the first school choice. Call
the new vector of capacity constraint as q2,1. Let S2,1 be the set
of schools that still have positive capacities.
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• Step 2: Consider students in J2. (If J2 is empty, move to Step 3.)
Consider the students in J2 sequentially according to their indexes
from low to high.
– Step 2.1: Consider the student with the lowest index in J2. Call
this student i2,1.
∗ Suppose all schools in S2,1 are not acceptable, then it is a
dominant strategy to submit ∅ as the first school choice.
∗ Suppose his most preferred acceptable schools over S2,1 is st.
Then it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the first school
choice. (Suppose t ∈ {2, ...,m}. By Corollary 7, fst ≤ qst .
By Lemma 2, the strategy specified is a dominant strategy.
Suppose t = 1. The fact that s1 still has a positive capacity
means that the number of students who have lower indexes
than i and rank s1 as the first choice is smaller than qs1 . By
Lemma 2, the strategy specified is a dominant strategy.)
∗ Deleted all the weakly dominated strategies.
∗ If the most preferred acceptable school in S2,1 is st, then
reduce the capacity of school st in q2,1 by one. Call the new
vector of capacity constraints as q2,2. Let S2,2 be the set of
schools that still have positive capacities.
– Step 2.l: Consider the student with the l-th lowest index in J2.
Call this student i2,l.
∗ Repeat the procedure in Step 2.1 for student i2,l with the
replacement of S2,1 with S2,l, S2,2 with S2,l+1, and q2,2 with
q2,l+1 in the statement of the procedure.
– Suppose the end of this stage is Step 2.p. At the end of Step 2.p,
call S2,p as S3,1 and q2,p as q3,1.
• Step r: Consider students in Jr. (If Jr is empty, move to Step r + 1.)
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Consider the students in Jr sequentially according to their indexes
from low to high.
– Step r.1: Consider the student with the lowest index in Jr. Call
this student ir,1.
∗ Suppose all schools in Sr,1 are not acceptable, then it is a
dominant strategy to submit ∅ as the first school choice.
∗ Suppose his most preferred acceptable schools over Sr,1 is
st. Then it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the first
school choice. (Suppose t ∈ {r + 1, ...,m}. By Corollary 7,
fst ≤ qst . By Lemma 2, the strategy specified is a dominant
strategy. Suppose t ∈ {1, ..., r}. The fact that st still has
a positive capacity means that the number of students who
have lower indexes than i and rank st as the first choice is
smaller than qst . By Lemma 2, the strategy specified is a
dominant strategy.)
∗ Deleted all the weakly dominated strategies.
∗ If the most preferred acceptable school in Sr,1 is st, then
reduce the capacity of school st in qr,1 by one. Call the new
vector of capacity constraints as qr,2. Let Sr,2 be the set of
schools that still have positive capacities.
– Step r.l: Consider the student with the l-th lowest index in Jr.
Call this student ir,l.
∗ Repeat the procedure in Step r.1 for student ir,l with the
replacement of Sr,1 with Sr,l, Sr,2 with Sr,l+1, and qr,2 with
qr,l+1 in the statement of the procedure.
– Suppose the end of this stage is Step r.p. At the end of Step r.p,
call Sr,p as Sr+1,1 and qr,p as qr+1,1.
The above procedure shows that the Boston mechanism is dominance-
solvable* and thus dominance-solvable.
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(2)⇒ (1) and (3)⇒ (1):
Suppose |S| ≥ 3 and ∑s∈S qs ≤ |I|. Given a priority structure f such
that it is not α-acyclic, I construct a preference profile P such that the
game induced by the Boston mechanism is neither dominance-solvable nor
dominance-solvable*.
Re-index schools so that for any two schools st, st′ , we have t ≤ t′ if and
only if qst ≤ qst′ . Then, re-index students so that
{i1, ..., iqs2} = U(fs2 , qs2), and
{iqs2+1, ..., ik} = U(fs1 , k) \ U(fs2 , qs2),
where k = qs1 + qs2 .
When the priority structure f is not α-acyclic, there are two cases to con-
sider. In the first case, there is a student in U(fs1 , qs1) but not in U(fs2 , qs2).
In the second case, U(fs1 , qs1) ⊆ U(fs2 , qs2).
Consider the first case, where there is a student in U(fs1 , qs1) but not
in U(fs2 , qs). Let this student be ik. The case also implies that there is
a student in U(fs2 , qs2) but not in U(fs1 , qs1). Let this student to be iqs2 .
Construct P as follows:
Pi1 · · · Piq2−1 Piq2 Piq2+1 · · · Pik−1 Pik Pik+1 Pik+2 · · · Pin
s2 · · · s2 s1 s1 · · · s1 s2 s1 ∅ · · · ∅
s1 · · · s1 s2 s2 · · · s2 s1 s2
Notice that the construction requires that the number of students is at least
qs1 +qs2 +1. This is guaranteed by |S| ≥ 3 and
∑
s∈S qs ≤ |I|, which implies
that qs1 + qs2 < |I|.
Consider the following iterations of deleting weakly dominated strategies.
In the first iteration, all students in U(fs2 , qs2)\{iqs2} have dominant strate-
gies of reporting s2 as the first school choice. All students in {iqs2+1, ..., ik−1}
have dominant strategies of reporting s1 as the first school choice. All stu-
dents in
(
U(fs2 , qs2) \ {iqs2}
) ∪ {iqs2+1, ..., ik−1} will be matched with the
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favorite schools in their true preferences, regardless of the strategies that
other students submit.
In the second iteration, all students but iqs2 , ik, ik+1 find dominant strate-
gies. Each of schools s1 and s2 has one seat remained from the second
iteration. The priority of iqs2 , ik, ik+1 in schools s1 and s2 are as follows:
fs1(ik) < fs1(iqs2 ) and fs1(ik+1);
fs2(iqs2 ) < fs2(ik) and fs2(ik+1).
The payoff matrix of these three students are as follows. Note that iqs2 is
the row player, ik is the column player, and ik+1 is the box player.
s1, s2 s2, s1
s1, s2 s2, s1,∅ s1[∅], s2,∅[s1]
s2, s1 s2, s1,∅ s2,∅, s1
s1, s2
s1, s2 s2, s1
s1, s2 ∅, s1, s2 s1, s2(∅),∅(s2)
s2, s1 s2, s1,∅ s2, s1,∅
s2, s1
The entries are based on fs1(iqs2 ) < fs1(ik+1) and fs2(ik) < fs2(ik+1).
The entries in [·] are based on fs1(ik+1) < fs1(iqs2 ). The entries in (·) are
based on fs2(ik+1) < fs2(ik).
There are no weakly dominated strategies for these students. Therefore,
the game is not dominance-solvable.
In the second case, we have U(fs1 , qs1) ⊆ U(fs2 , qs2). Since f is not
α-acyclic, there are two students ir, it such that ir /∈ U(fs1 , qs1), fs1(ir) 6=
fs2(ir), fs1(ir) < fs1(it) and fs2(it) < fs2(ir).
If ir ∈ {iqs2+1, ..., ik} and it ∈ U(fs2 , qs2), then denote ir as ik and denote
it as iqs2 . The follow-up analysis is the same as in the first case.
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If ir /∈ {iqs2+1, ..., ik} and it ∈ U(fs2 , qs2), then denote it as iqs2 . Con-
struct P ′ as follows. All students other than i1 and iqs2+1 have the same





If ir ∈ {iqs2+1, ..., ik} and it /∈ U(fs2 , qs2), then denote ir as ik. Construct
P ′′ as follows. All students other than i1 and it have the same preferences






If ir /∈ {iqs2+1, ..., ik} and it /∈ U(fs2 , qs2). Construct P ′′′ as follows. All
students other than i1, iqs2+1, ir, it have the same preferences as in P . The
follow-up analysis is the same as in the first case.
Pi1 Piqs2 +1 Pr Pt
∅ ∅ s2 s1
s1 s2
The follow-up analyses are the same as in the first case. Therefore, the
game is neither dominance-solvable nor dominance-solvable*.
1.5.8 Proof of Theorem 8
(1)⇒ (2) and (1)⇒ (3):
I prove that when the priority structure f is acyclic, then the game is
dominance-solvable*. It implies that the game is dominance-solvable.
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Re-index the schools so that for any two schools st, st′ , we have qst ≤ qst′
if and only if t < t′.
Lemma 5. When the priority structure f is acyclic, either: (1) there exists
a school sk such that for any index k
′ ≥ k, we have qs1 + qsk′ ≥ |I| and for
school sk′′ with k
′′ < k, there is no α-cycle between s1 and sk′′, or (2) the
priority structure f is α-acyclic.
Proof. Suppose the priority structure f is acyclic. Consider a school st such
that qs1 + qst ≥ |I|. Find the smallest t with this property and let t = k.
Then, for any two schools sr, sr′ with r, r
′ ≥ k, we have qsr + qsr′ ≥ |I|.
Moreover, there is no Kumano cycle between schools sr and sr′ . This is
because a Kumano cycle requires at least qs + qs′ + 1 number of students.
For k′′ < k, we have qs1 + qsk′′ < |I|. To make the priority structure f to be
acyclic, it is required that there is no α-cycle in schools s1, sk′′ .
If for any two schools, Kumano cycles always exist, then for the priority
structure f to be acyclic, f must be α-acyclic.
Lemma 6. Suppose there exists a school sk such that for k
′ ≥ k, we have
qs1 + qsk′ ≥ |I|. The priority structure f is acyclic, if and only if for t, t′
such that t < t′ < k, we have (1) for i ∈ U(fst , qst), we have i ∈ U(fst′ , qst′ );
(2) for j /∈ U(fst , qst′ ) or j /∈ U(fst′ , qst′ ), we have fst(j) = fst′ (j).
Proof. As pointed out in the proof of Lemma 5, for two schools sr, sr′ with
r, r′ ≥ k, there is no Kumano cycle between these two schools. The priority
structure f is acyclic if and only if for t < t′ < k, there is no α-cycle for
schools st, st′ . The remaining proof is the same as the proof in Lemma 4.
Lemma 6 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 8. Suppose there exists a school sk such that for k
′ ≥ k we have
qs1 + qsk′ ≥ |I|. If the priority structure f is acyclic, we have the following:
1. U(fst , qst) ⊆ U(fst′ , qst′ ) for any t < t′ < k.
45
2. U(fst , qst′ ) \ U(fst , qst) ⊆ U(fst′ , qst′ ) for any t < t′ < k.
3. For i /∈ U(fs1 , qsm), we have fst(i) = fst′ (i), for any t, t′ < k.
We are ready to prove the main theorem. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: there exists a school sk such that for k
′ ≥ k, qs1 + qsk′ ≥ |I|; Case
2: there does not exist such a school.
We first consider Case 1. We have the following observation.
Observation 3. Suppose there exists a school sk such that for k
′ ≥ k we
have qs1 + qsk′ ≥ |I|. Then, for any two schools sr, sr′ such that r′ ≥ k we
have qsr + qsr′ ≥ |I|.
Re-index students in the following way. Divide students into k disjoint
sets {Ir}kr=1 so that I =
⋃k
r=1 Ir and the following conditions hold.
• |I1| = qs1 .
• |Ir| = qsr − qsr−1 for r = 2, ..., k − 1.
• |Ik| = |I| − qsk−1 .
• Consider student i.
– If fs1(i) ∈ {1, ..., qs1}, then i ∈ I1.
– If fs1(i) ∈ {qsr − qsr−1 + 1, ..., qsr} for r = 2, ..., k− 1, then i ∈ Ir.
– If fs1(i) ∈ {|I| − qsk−1 + 1, ..., |I|}, then i ∈ Ik.
• For two students i, j in the set Ir, i has a smaller index than j if i has
a higher priority than j in fs1 .
Note that Ir could be empty for some r ∈ {2, ..., k}.
The order of deleting weakly dominated strategies only if there exists
dominant strategies are as follows.
• Step 1: Consider students in J1.
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– Consider an arbitrary student i ∈ J1. Suppose his most preferred
school is st and his second most preferred school is st′ . (Or,
suppose his only acceptable school is st.)
∗ If t ≥ k, then it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the
first and second school choice and st′ as the second school
choice. (By Lemma 3, the strategy specified is a dominant
strategy.) (Or, it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the
only acceptable school, if st is the only acceptable school.
By Lemma 1, the strategy specified is a dominant strategy.)
∗ If t < k, then it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the first
school choice. (By Corollary 8, fst(i) ≤ qst . By Lemma 2,
the strategy specified is a dominant strategy.)
– Simultaneously delete the weakly dominated strategies for stu-
dents in J1.
– For each school s ∈ {s1, ..., sk−1}, reduce its capacity qs by the
number of students who rank it as the first school choice. Call
the new vector of capacity constraint as q2,1. Let S2,1 be the set
of schools that still have positive capacities.
• Step 2: Consider students in J2. (If J2 is empty, move to Step 3.)
Consider the students in J2 sequentially according to their indexes
from low to high.
– Step 2.1: Consider the student with the lowest index in J2. Call
this student i2,1.
∗ Suppose all schools in S2,1 are not acceptable, then it is a
dominant strategy to submit ∅ as the first school choice.
∗ Suppose his most preferred acceptable schools over S2,1 is st
and the second most preferred acceptable school over S2,1 is
st′ . (Or, suppose the only acceptable school in S2,1 is st.)
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· If t ≥ k, then it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the
first school choice and st′ as the second school choice.
(Or, it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the only ac-
ceptable school choice, if st is the only acceptable school
in S2,1.) (By Lemma 3, the strategy specified is a domi-
nant strategy.)
· If t ∈ {2, ...k− 1}, then it is a dominant strategy to rank
st as the first school choice. (By Corollary 8, fst(i) ≤
qst . By Lemma 2, the strategy specified is a dominant
strategy.)
· If t = 1, then it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the
first school choice. (The fact that s1 still has a positive
capacity means that the number of students who have
lower indexes than i and rank s1 as the first choice is
smaller than qs1 . By Lemma 2, the strategy specified is
a dominant strategy.)
∗ Deleted all the weakly dominated strategies.
∗ If the most preferred acceptable school in S2,1 is st and t ≤ k,
then reduce the capacity of school st in q2,1 by one. Call the
new vector of capacity constraints as q2,2. Let S2,2 be the set
of schools that still have positive capacities.
– Step 2.l: Consider the student with the l-th lowest index in J2.
Call this student i2,l.
∗ Repeat the procedure in Step 2.1 for student i2,l with the
replacement of S2,1 with S2,l, S2,2 with S2,l+1, and q2,2 with
q2,l+1 in the statement of the procedure.
– Suppose the end of this stage is Step 2.p. At the end of Step 2.p,
call S2,p as S3,1 and q2,p as q3,1.
• Step r: Consider students in Jr. (If Jr is empty, move to Step r + 1.)
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Consider the students in Jr sequentially according to their indexes
from low to high.
– Step r.1: Consider the student with the lowest index in Jr. Call
this student ir,1.
∗ Suppose all schools in Sr,1 are not acceptable, then it is a
dominant strategy to submit ∅ as the first school choice.
∗ Suppose his most preferred acceptable schools over Sr,1 is st
and the second most preferred acceptable school over Sr,1 is
st′ . (Or, suppose the only acceptable school in Sr,1 is st.)
· If t ≥ k, then it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the
first school choice and st′ as the second school choice.
(Or, it is a dominant strategy to rank st as the only ac-
ceptable school choice, if st is the only acceptable school
in Sr,1.) (By Lemma 3, the strategy specified is a domi-
nant strategy.)
· If t ∈ {r, ...k− 1}, then it is a dominant strategy to rank
st as the first school choice. (By Corollary 8, fst(i) ≤
qst . By Lemma 2, the strategy specified is a dominant
strategy.)
· If t ∈ {1, ..., r−1}, then it is a dominant strategy to rank
st as the first school choice. (The fact that st still has a
positive capacity means that the number of students who
have lower indexes than i and rank st as the first choice
is smaller than qst . By Lemma 2, the strategy specified
is a dominant strategy.)
∗ Deleted all the weakly dominated strategies.
∗ If the most preferred acceptable school in Sr,1 is st and t ≤ k,
then reduce the capacity of school st in qr,1 by one. Call the
new vector of capacity constraints as qr,2. Let Sr,2 be the set
of schools that still have positive capacities.
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– Step r.l: Consider the student with the l-th lowest index in Jr.
Call this student ir,l.
∗ Repeat the procedure in Step r.1 for student ir,l with the
replacement of Sr,1 with Sr,l, Sr,2 with Sr,l+1, and qr,2 with
qr,l+1 in the statement of the procedure.
– Suppose the end of this stage is Step r.p. At the end of Step r.p,
call Sr,p as Sr+1,1 and qr,p as qr+1,1.
The above procedure shows that the Boston mechanism is dominance-
solvable* and thus dominance-solvable.
Next, consider the Case 2, where there does not exist a school sk such
that for k′ ≥ k, qs1 + qsk′ ≥ |I|. Then the priority structure must also
be α-acyclic. By Theorem 4, the game is dominance-solvable* and thus
dominance-
(2)⇒ (1) and (3)⇒ (1):
Suppose the priority structure f is not acyclic, I show that there exists
a preference profile P such that the game is neither dominance-solvable nor
dominance-solvable*.
Lemma 7. When the priority structure f is not acyclic, then there exists
at least two schools s and s′ such that qs + qs′ < |I|.
Proof. Suppose for any two schools s, s′, we have qs + qs′ ≥ |I|, then as
pointed out in the proof of Lemma 5 the priority structure is Kumano-
acyclic, and thus acyclic. Therefore, the statement holds.
Lemma 7 implies that qs1 + qs2 < |I|, since there is no other school that
has a smaller capacity constraint than school s1 or school s2. This allows
constructing P in the same way as the construction of P in the part of
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(2) ⇒ (1) and (3) ⇒ (1) in the proof of Theorem 9.26 The remainder of
the proof is the same as in the part of (2) ⇒ (1) and (3) ⇒ (1) in the
proof of Theorem 9. Therefore, the game is neither dominance-solvable nor
dominance-solvable*.
1.5.9 Proof of Theorem 10
By Theorem 2 of Ergin (2002), a priority structure is Ergin-acyclic if and
only if for any two schools s, s′ the priority of the students who are ranked
lower than qs + qs′ in one of the schools cannot differ by more than one in
these two schools.
By Lemma 4, when the priority structure is α-acyclic, for any two schools
s, s′, a student who is ranked lower than max{qs, qs′} in one of the schools
need to have the same priority ranking in both schools. Therefore, when a
priority structure is α-acyclic, it is also Ergin-acyclic.
Suppose a priority structure is acyclic. Re-index the schools as in the
proof of Theorem 8. Suppose there exists a school sk such that for k
′ ≥ k,
qs1 + qsk′ ≥ |I|. This implies that for any two schools st, st′ such that
t, t′ ≥ k, we have qst +qst′ ≥ |I|. Therefore, there does not exist any student
who is ranked lower than qst + qst′ in one of the schools. By Lemma 5, for
any two schools sr, sr′ such that r, r
′ < k, the student who is ranked lower
than max{qsr , qsr′} has the same priority in both schools. If there does not
exist such sk, then the priority structure is α-acyclic. Therefore, when the
priority structure is acyclic, it is also Ergin-acyclic.
1.6 Examples
Example 5 (A priority structure that is Ergin-acyclic, strongly X-acyclic,
Kumano-acyclic and acyclic.). The example is from Kumano (2013).
26Recall that the construction of P in the proof of Theorem 9 requires that the number
of students is at least qs1 + qs2 + 1.
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I = {i1, i2}, S = {s1, s2} and qs1 = qs2 = 1. The priority structure is as
follows.
fs1 : i1 − i2,
fs2 : i1 − i2.
Example 6 (A priority structure that is Ergin-acyclic, strongly X-acyclic
and acyclic, but is not Kumano-acyclic.). The example is from Kumano
(2013).
I = {i1, i2, i3}, S = {s1, s2, s3}, qs1 = qs2 = 1 and qs3 = 3. The priority
structure is as follows.
fs1 : i1 − i2 − i3,
fs2 : i1 − i2 − i3,
fs3 : i3 − i1 − i2.
Example 7 (A priority structure that is Ergin-acyclic and strongly X-a-
cyclic, but is not Kumano-acyclic nor acyclic.). I = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5}, S =
{s1, s2} and qs1 = qs2 = 2. The priority structure is as follows.
fs1 : i1 − i2 − i3 − i4 − i5,
fs2 : i1 − i3 − i2 − i4 − i5.
Example 8 (A priority structure that is Ergin-acyclic, Kumano-acyclic and
acyclic, but is not strongly X-acyclic.). The example is from Haeringer and
Klijn (2008).
I = {i1, i2}, S = {s1, s2}, qs1 = 1 and qs2 = 1. The priority structure is
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as follows.
fs1 : i1 − i2,
fs2 : i2 − i1.
Example 9 (A priority structure that is Ergin-acyclic and acyclic but is not
strongly X-acyclic nor Kumano-acyclic.). I = {i1, i2, i3, i4}, S = {s1, s2},
qs1 = qs2 = 1 and qs3 = 3. The priority structure is as follows.
fs1 : i1 − i2 − i3 − i4,
fs2 : i1 − i2 − i3 − i4,
fs3 : i1 − i2 − i4 − i3.
Example 10 (A priority structure that is Ergin-acyclic but is not strongly
X-acyclic nor Kumano-acyclic nor acyclic.). The example is from Kumano
(2013).
I = {i1, i2, i3}, S = {s1, s2}, qs1 = 1 and qs2 = 1. The priority structure
is as follows.
fs1 : i1 − i2 − i3,
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preserving monotonic transformation, γ-algorithm, School choice problem.
2.1 Introduction
Centralized matching mechanisms are frequently employed when it comes
to allocating students to schools. The matching problem is formulated as
the student placement problem by Blinski and So¨nmez (1999) or the school
choice problem by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003).2 In this problem,
students submit their preferences over schools and the option of not being
matched to the schools participating in the program. Then, the mechanism
computes the matching between students and schools by using students’
submitted preferences and their priorities in schools.3
Since Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) introduce the school choice
problem, there has been debates for what is the best mechanism for allo-
cating students to schools. Primarily, the debates focus on three mecha-
nisms: the Student Optimal Stable Mechanism (SOSM) proposed by Gale
and Shapley (1962), the Top-Trading Cycles Mechanism (TTCM) proposed
by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003), and the Boston mechanism intro-
duced by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003). The SOSM and the TTCM
have their own theoretic grounds for using them, while the Boston mech-
anism has been used in practice around the world. In these debates, a
significant emphasis is on the Boston mechanism.
Before 2005, the Boston mechanism was used in Boston and was re-
placed by the SOSM. (See Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003), Abdulka-
dirog˘lu et al. (2005), and Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006) for the description of
the program and the transition.) Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) point
out three important criteria to evaluate a matching mechanism: stability,
2The difference is that in student placement problem the priories of students are de-
termined by their exam scores, while in school choice problem, the priorities may depend
on other factors.
3In this paper, I use submitted preferences and strategies interchangeably.
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efficiency, and strategy-proofness. They show that the SOSM is stable and
strategy-proof, and the TTCM is efficient and strategy-proof. In addition,
they show that the Boston mechanism does not satisfy any of these three cri-
teria. Ergin and So¨nmez (2006) show that despite the Boston mechanism is
not stable, the Nash equilibrium outcomes are stable.4 However, they show
that there are usually multiple Nash equilibrium in the Boston mechanism,
and the dominant-strategy outcome of the SOSM Pareto dominates all Nash
equilibrium outcomes except the outcome that is identical to it. This result
gives rationale for replacing the Boston mechanism with the SOSM from the
welfare perspective.
In the transition in Boston, Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006) indicate the
importance of considering incentive constraints as a design goal instead
of merely a constraint. Pathak and So¨nmez (2008) indicate the criterion,
strategy-proofness, “levels the playing field.” They show that in the Boston
mechanism, the students who are not aware of the manipulation opportu-
nity, i.e., the students who always submit the true preferences, may suffer
welfare loss. Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) show that there is a trend in the
US and the UK that the mechanisms that are vulnerable to manipulation
are replaced with mechanisms that are less vulnerable to manipulation.
In this paper, instead of showing whether the Boston mechanism is a
better or worse mechanism, I study the strategic properties of the Boston
mechanism. Since the Boston mechanism is a popular mechanism, its pop-
ularity suggests further investigation is worthwhile.
I characterize the undominated strategies and the weakly dominated
strategies in the Boston mechanism. The characterization has two steps.
In the first step, I define a critical school choice for each student, the most
preferred guaranteed school. A guaranteed school for a student is defined to
be a school such that he will never be matched to a school that is strictly
worse than that school, if he submits the true preference. The most preferred
4Note that the definition of a stable mechanism says that a mechanism is stable if it
produces a stable outcome if all participants submit the true preferences.
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guaranteed school is the most preferred school among all the guaranteed
schools.
In the second step, I define the rank preserving monotonic transforma-
tion. A strategy that is a rank preserving monotonic transformation of a
school s if the ranking of school s in the strategy is the same as in the true
preference, while all the schools that are preferred to school s according to
the true preference have higher ranking than school s in the strategy.
I show that if a student’s strategy satisfies (1) rank preserving monotonic
transformation of the most preferred guaranteed school and (2) the condition
that if this student is considered as the top choice5 for the first school choice
in this strategy, there does not exist another school that is preferred to the
first school choice in the strategy and also considers him as the top choice,
then it is an undominated strategy. On the other hand, if a school as the first
school choice in a student’s strategy does not consider her as the top choice
and it is not a rank preserving monotonic transformation of most preferred
guaranteed school, then the strategy is a weakly dominated strategy.
In addition, I show that it requires little information to identify whether
a strategy is an undominated strategy. The information required is (1)
whether a student is a top choice for her acceptable schools and (2) the
total number of students. Note that the identification does not require the
information of other students’ preferences.
The characterization of the undominated strategies also have implica-
tions for equilibrium analysis. I show that in any Nash equilibrium, a student
will not be matched to a school that is strictly worse than the most preferred
guaranteed school. I further show that in any undominated Nash equilib-
rium, it is unlikely for all students to be matched with the most preferred
guaranteed schools. To show this, I show that all students are matched to
the most preferred guaranteed schools in each undominated Nash equilib-
5A school is said to consider a student as the top choice if the student’s ranking in the
school’s priority is within its capacity.
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rium if and only if the school choice problem is nested.6 A nested school
choice problem is a very restrictive requirement, which makes it difficult to
satisfy in reality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
model. Section 2.3 contains the main results. Section 2.4 concludes. An
example of the γ-algorithm is in Section 2.5. Omitted proofs in the main
text are in Section 2.6.
2.2 Model
There are five components in a school choice problem (S, I, q, P, f). S is
the set of schools and the outside option denoted as s0.
7 I is the set of
students. q = (qs)s∈S is the vector of capacity for each school, where qs is
the maximum number of students that school s ∈ S can admit. Assume
qs0 ≥ |I|. P = (Pi)i∈I is the preference profile of students, where Pi is
the strict preference of student i ∈ I over S. A school s is acceptable for
student i, if sPis0. f = (fs)s∈S is the priority structure, where fs denotes
the priority rule of school s ∈ S that is used to assign the priority of each
student in school s ∈ S \{s0}, such that fs(i) ∈ {1, ..., |I|} and fs(i) 6= fs(j)
for any i, j ∈ I. We say student i has a higher priority than student j in
a school s ∈ S \ {s0}, if and only if fs(i) < fs(j). For student i, let Ri be
the weak preference relation associated with Pi, so that sRis
′ if and only if
sPis
′ or s = s′. For S′ ⊆ S, let Chi(S′) be the most preferred school in S′
according to Pi.
Consider student i. Denote Qi a generic strategy of i and Qi the set
of all strategies. Similarly, denote Q−i be the set of all strategy profiles of
6This result holds under an assumption. As discussed in Section 2.3.5, if this assump-
tion does not hold, then some students could obtain schools that are better than their
most preferred guaranteed schools in undominated Nash equilibria.
7To reduce the amount of notation, I include s0 in S. In the rest of the paper, when I
refer some school s ∈ S, s could be some real school or the outside option.
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student i’s opponents. Q = (Qi, Q−i) is a strategy profile when i submits
Qi and all students other than i submit Q−i.
A matching µ is a function µ : I → S such that no schools in S \ {s0}
admit more students than its capacity. Denote µ(i) as the school that is
matched to student i under µ. A stable matching µ is a matching such
that (1) µ(i)Ris0 for all i ∈ I, (2) there does not exist two students i, j
and a school s such that sPiµ(i) and fs(i) < fs(j) and (3) sPiµ(i) implies
|µ−1(s)| = qs for all i ∈ I. A matching µ Pareto dominates another
matching ν if µ(i)Riν(i) for all i ∈ I and µ(i)Piν(i) for some i ∈ I.
Let ϕ be the Boston mechanism, which is described as follows.
• In the first iteration, each school uses its priority rule and admits
the students who consider it as the first choice up to the capacity.
A student who is assigned to some school is inactive from the next
iteration; otherwise she is active. Each school reduces its capacity by
the number of students who are assigned to it from the next iteration.
• In the t-th iteration, each school uses its priority rule and admits the
active students who consider it as the t-th choice up to the capacity
A student who is assigned to some school is inactive from the next
iteration; otherwise she is active. Each school reduces its capacity by
the number of students who are assigned to it from the next iteration.
The algorithm terminates when all students are assigned to some real
schools or the outside option.
Denote ϕ(Qi, Q−i) as the matching produced by the Boston mechanism
with the strategy profile (Qi, Q−i). Denote ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) the assignment to
student i with the strategy profile (Qi, Q−i).






for all Q−i ∈ Q−i, and
ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i)Piϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i)
for some Q−i ∈ Q−i. We say Qi very weakly dominates Q′i, if
ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i)Riϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i)
for all Q−i ∈ Q−i. A strategy Qi is a (weakly) undominated strategy
if there does not exist another strategy that weakly dominates Qi.
A strategy profile Q is a Nash equilibrium if
ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i)Riϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i), ∀i ∈ I.
A strategy profile Q is a undominated Nash equilibrium if no student
uses dominated strategy in Q.
The following notation is frequently used in the rest of the paper. Let
Pi(s) as the ranking of s in Pi and let Qi(s) as the ranking of s in Qi. Let
P−1i (t) be the t-th ranked school choice in Pi and let Q
−1
i (t) be the t-th
ranked school choice in Qi, for t = 1, ..., |S|. Let UPi(s) = {s′ ∈ S : s′Ris}.
Similarly, let UQi(s) = {s′ ∈ S : Qi(s′) ≤ Qi(s)}. In addition, let V Pi(s) =
{s′ ∈ S : s′Pis} and let V Qi(s) = {s′ ∈ S : Qi(s′) < Qi(s)}. In other words,
UPi(s) = V Pi(s) ∪ {s} and UQi(s) = V Qi ∪ {s}.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Two Strategic Properties of the Boston Mechanism
The following two lemmas are about the properties of the Boston mechanism.
Lemma 8. Consider a student i and two of her strategies Qi and Q˜i. Fix
a strategy profile of her opponents Q−i. Suppose ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = s˜. Denote
Ŝ = {s ∈ S : Qi(s) < Qi(s˜) and Qi(s) = Q˜i(s)}. Then ϕ(Q˜i, Q−i)(i) /∈ Ŝ.
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Consider a strategy Qi such that (Qi, Q−i)(i) = s for some Q−i. Suppose
Qi(s) = k. If we replace Qi with another strategy Q
′
i, then under (Q
′
i, Q−i),
student i will not be matched to any school s′ such that it is ranked higher
than the k-th position and it has the same ranking in both Qi and Q
′
i. For
example, consider a strategy Qi:
Qi : s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s0.
Suppose ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = s5. Consider another strategy Q′i:
Q′i : s6, s2, s3, s5, s4, s1, s0.
Then ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) /∈ {s2, s3}.
Lemma 9. Consider a student i and two of her strategies Qi and Q˜i. Fix a
strategy profile of her opponents Q−i. Suppose ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = ŝ. If Q˜i(ŝ) ≤
Qi(ŝ) and ϕ(Q˜i, Q−i)(i) /∈ U Q˜i(ŝ) \ {ŝ}, then we have ϕ(Q˜i, Q−i)(i) = s˜.
Consider a strategy Qi such that ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = s. Suppose Qi(s) = k.
Next, consider another strategy Q′i such that Q
′
i(s) = k
′ with k′ ≤ k. Then,
under (Q′i, Q−i), if student i is not matched with any school that is ranked
higher than s in Q′i, she will be matched with s. For example, consider a
strategy Qi:
Qi : s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s0.
Suppose ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = s5. Consider another strategy Q′i:
Q′i : s2, s6, s5, s4, s3, s1, s0.
If ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) /∈ {s2, s6}, then ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = s5.
Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 are crucial for proving the γ-algorithm produces
a strategy that very weakly dominates another strategy as the input.8
8This refers to the proofs in Theorem 13, Theorem 14 and Theorem 15.
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2.3.2 The Most Preferred Guaranteed School
In this section, we define and characterize a critical school, the most pre-
ferred guaranteed school. First, we define a guaranteed school.
Definition 6. A school s is a guaranteed school for student i if
ϕ(Pi, Q−i)(i)Ris, ∀Q−i ∈ Q−i.
In other words, if a school s is a guaranteed school for student i, then i
would obtain a school that is weakly preferred to school s no matter what
other students’ submitted preferences, as long as i submit the true preference
Pi.
Clearly, there are more than one guaranteed school in general. A school is
the most preferred guaranteed school if it is the most preferred school
among all guaranteed schools. For the rest of the paper, I will use s∗(i)
to denote the most preferred guaranteed school. The following theorem
characterizes this critical school choice.
Theorem 11. The most preferred guaranteed school s∗(i) can be character-
ized in the following way.
s∗(i) =
{
Pi(1) if fP−1i (1)
(i) ≤ qP−1i (1);
Chi({s ∈ S :
∑
s′∈UPi (s) qs′ ≤ |I| − 1}) otherwise.
Note that to characterize a student i’s most preferred guaranteed school,
it only requires the information of whether she is the top choice for her
most preferred school, the capacity of each school, and the total number of
students. It does not require the information of other students’ preferences.
Next, consider a special case where the number of students is equal to the
total capacities of all real schools and all real schools are acceptable. The
characterization of the most preferred guaranteed school can be simplified




s∈S\{s0} qs = |I| and sRjs0 for all s ∈ S and for
all j ∈ I. Consider student i. Let the least preferred school choice other
than s0 to be ŝ. Then
s∗(i) =
{
Pi(1) if fP−1i (1)
(i) ≤ qP−1i (1);
ŝ otherwise.
With the setting considered in Theorem 12, the characterization of a
student i’s most preferred guaranteed school only requires the information
of whether he is considered as the top choice for his most preferred school
and the knowledge of his worst acceptable school.
2.3.3 Rank Preserving Monotonic Transformation
In this section, we consider a class of strategies, the strategies that satisfy the
rank-preserving monotonic transformation of the most preferred guaranteed
school. First, we define the strategy that is a rank-preserving monotonic
transformation of a school s.
Definition 7. Given a strategy Qi, we say that Qi satisfies the rank pre-
serving monotonic transformation of s if
(∀s′ ∈ S \ {s}) Qi(s′) < Qi(s)⇔ Pi(s′) < Pi(s). (2.1)
If a strategy Qi satisfies equation (2.1), then the rankings of s in Qi and
Pi are the same and sets of the school choices that are ranked higher than
s in Qi and Pi are the same, i.e., Qi(s) = Pi(s) and U
Qi(s) = UPi(s).
In the following analysis, we focus on the strategies that are the rank pre-
serving monotonic transformation of the most preferred guaranteed school.
In other words, we focus on the strategy Qi such that the following holds.
(∀s ∈ S \ {s∗(i)}) Qi(s) < Qi(s∗(i))⇔ Pi(s) < Pi(s∗(i)). (2.2)
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Lemma 10. Suppose Qi makes satisfies rank-preserving monotonic trans-
formation of the most preferred guaranteed school, then ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i)Ris∗(i)
for all Q−i ∈ Q−i.
Note that Lemma 10 does not hold, if we replace s∗(i) with an arbitrary
school s in the statement.
2.3.4 Undominated Strategies and Weakly Dominated Strate-
gies
In this section, we present the main results.
Theorem 13. Consider student i and one of his strategies Qi. If Qi is not a
rank-preserving monotonic transformation of the most preferred guaranteed
school, then there exists another strategy Q′i that very weakly dominates Qi.
To prove Theorem 13, I develop the following algorithm, the γ-algorithm.
For a strategy Qi, the γ-algorithm creates a strategy that very weakly dom-
inates Qi. The algorithm is the following.
γ-algorithm: Consider some strategy Qi. Let the most preferred guar-
anteed school be s∗(i). Denote the strategy created by this algorithm to be
Q′i. This algorithm specifies a school choice to Q
′
i step by step.
• For r = 1,




Qi(r), if Qi(r) ∈ A(r);
Chi(A(r)), otherwise.
• In general, for r = 2, ..., P (s∗(i)),





Qi(r), if Qi(r) ∈ A(r);
Chi(A(r)), otherwise.
• In general, for r = P (s∗(i)) + 1, ..., |S|,
– Let A(r) = S \ UQ′i(Q′−1i (r − 1)).
– Let Q′i(r) = Chi(A(r)).
Note that if Qi satisfies equation (2.2), the γ-algorithm creates a strategy
that is identical to Qi. An example of how the γ-algorithm works is in
Section 2.5.
The next theorem characterizes the undominated strategies.
Theorem 14. Consider student i and one of his strategies Qi. Suppose
the first school choice in Qi is s¯. If Qi satisfies both of the following two
conditions, then Qi is an undominated strategies.
1. It is either (1) fs¯(i) > qs¯ or (2) fs¯(i) ≤ qs¯ and there does not exist
another school s such that sPss¯ and fs ≤ qs.
2. Qi is a rank-preservation monotonic transformation of the most pre-
ferred guaranteed school.
Suppose a student is considered as the top choice for the first school
choice in a strategy, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 9. Consider a strategy Qi. Let the first school choice in Qi be s1.
Suppose fs1(i) ≤ qs1. If one of the following conditions holds: (1) s1Pis∗(i)
and there does not exists another school s such that sPis1 and fs(i) ≤ qs or
(2) s1 = s
∗(i), then Qi is an undominated strategy.
The above corollary says that if the first school choice in a strategy
satisfies the condition in the statement, then it is an undominated strategy
no matter how other school choices are ranked in the strategy.9
9The reasoning of this corollary is the following. Suppose condition (1) in the statement
holds. Consider another strategy Q′i such that its first school choice is s1 and it satisfies
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The next theorem characterizes the weakly dominated strategies.
Theorem 15. Consider student i and one of his strategies Qi. Suppose
the first school choice in Qi is s¯. If Qi satisfies one of the following two
conditions, then Qi is a weakly dominated strategies.
1. fs¯(i) ≤ qs¯ and there exists another school s such that sPis∗(i), sPis¯
and fs(i) ≤ qs.
2. fs¯(i) > qs¯ and Qi is not a rank-preserving monotonic transformation
of the most preferred guaranteed school.
2.3.5 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we provide some equilibrium analysis. The following theorem
says that the most preferred guaranteed school provides a lower bound for
the school that a student may obtain in any Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 16. Consider student i. In any Nash equilibrium, she would not
be matched with a school that is worse than s∗(i).
The implication is that we should not expect a student obtain a school
that is worse than her most preferred guaranteed school in Nash equilib-
ria. The following analysis shows that if we consider undominated Nash
equilibria instead of Nash equilibria, then the implication would be even
stronger.
It is easy to see that a student might obtain a school that is better than
his most preferred guaranteed school if he uses an undominated strategy if
the following condition holds. Suppose this student is a top choice for a
school s that is better than his most preferred guaranteed school and there
equation (2.2), then by Theorem 14, Q′i is an undominated strategy. Since ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) =
ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = s1 for all Q−i ∈ Q−i, Qi is also an undominated strategy. If condition
(2) in the statement holds, by Theorem 14, it is straightforward that it is an undominated
strategy.
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is no other school that is preferred to this school and also considers him as
the top choice.10 Clearly, if this student submits a strategy that ranks s as
the first school choice, then he will obtain s no matter how other students
submit their preferences. To rule out this situation, we impose the following
assumption, Assumption 1, for the rest of the analysis in this section.11
Assumption 1. For every student i, one of the following conditions holds:
(1) fP−1i (1)
(i) ≤ qP−1i (1) or (2) fs(i) > qs for sPis0.
I show that under Assumption 1, for all students to obtain their most
preferred guaranteed schools in undominated Nash equilibria, a very restric-
tive requirement, the nested school choice problem, must be satisfied. In
other words, such requirement is difficult to be satisfied in reality. Since
by Theorem 16, students cannot obtain schools that are worse than their
most preferred guaranteed schools in any Nash equilibrium, this suggests in
reality a fraction of students would obtain schools that are preferred to their
most preferred guaranteed schools in undominated Nash equilibria.
The definition of the nested school choice is as follows.
Definition 8. A school choice problem is nested, if for any student i, the
following holds. Let st be P
−1
i (t) for t = 1, ..., |S|. There exists qt number of
students (other than i) who consider st as their most preferred guaranteed
schools, for t = 1, ..., Pi(s
∗(i))− 1.
For a school choice problem to be nested, it requires that there is a
precise number of students who consider a particular school as their most
preferred guaranteed school. Therefore, the requirement is very restrictive.
The following theorem states some property of a nested school choice
problem.
Theorem 17. Suppose the school choice problem is nested, then there is an
unique undominated Nash equilibrium outcome, but not vice versa.
10Note that this implies that s is not his most preferred guaranteed school.
11This assumption is used in Theorem 17 and Theorem 18.
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The next theorem says that all students obtain their most preferred
guaranteed schools if and only if the school choice problem is nested.
Theorem 18. The following two statements are equivalent.
1. The school choice problem is nested.
2. All students are matched with their most preferred guaranteed schools
in every undominated Nash equilibrium.
2.3.6 A General Characterization of the Most Preferred Guar-
anteed School
In this section, we give a general characterization of the most preferred
guaranteed school. The characterization of the most preferred guaranteed
school in Section 2.3.2 is based on an assumption that there is no restriction
on the preferences that students can submit. In other words, if |S| = n,
then each student has n! ways of submitting his preference in the original
model. In reality, this might not be the case. One example is that a student
can declare a school as acceptable only if he has some qualification for that
school. Another example is that there is a geographical restriction on stu-
dents’ submitted preferences, i.e., students can only declare schools that are
close to their residence as acceptable schools. In both examples, students
cannot declare arbitrary set of schools as the set of acceptable schools in
their submitted preferences.
Let a restrictionW be a subset of Q. In addition, letWi = Qi∩W and
W−i = Q−i ∩W. Formally, a school choice problem with restriction
W is a school choice problem such that the submitted preference profile can
only be in W.
We impose an additional assumption for the following analysis. For every
student i, we have Pi ∈ Wi.12
12One can read this interpretation in the following way. Consider student i and his
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Given Q−i, define the set of student i’s actual competitors to school
s for Qi to be
IQi(s|Q−i) = {j ∈ I : ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = s}.
Theorem 19. Consider student i. The most preferred guaranteed school














In this paper, I study the undominated strategies and the weakly dominated
strategies in the Boston mechanism. Two important components in this
characterization are the characterization of the most preferred guaranteed
school and the characterization of the rank-preserving monotonic transfor-
mation of the most preferred guaranteed school. I further show that the
characterization of the undominated strategies and the weakly dominated
strategies requires little information. In particular, it does not require the
information of other students’ preferences in order to identify whether a
strategy is an undomianted strategy for a student. Finally, I provide equi-
librium analysis and show that it is unlikely that all students obtain their
most preferred guaranteed schools in the undominated Nash equilibria. In
other words, a fraction of students would obtain schools that are strictly
preferred to their most preferred guaranteed schools in the undominated
Nash equilibria.
preference Pi. Remove all schools such that student i is not qualified for or not close
to from the set of acceptable schools. Call the set of remained acceptable schools as S¯.
Create an updated preference P¯i so that the relative ordering over schools in S¯ is the same
as in Pi. Then we treat P¯i as if it is the true preference.
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2.5 An Example of the γ-Algorithm
There are 11 schools. Consider student i and her strategy Qi.
Pi :s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s
∗(i), s9, s10;
Qi :s7, s9, s2, s1, s10, s6, s8, s4, s
∗(i), s3, s5.
The iterations of the γ-algorithm with Qi as the input are as follows.
• r = 1,
– A(1) = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s∗(i)}.
– Since Q−1i (1) ∈ A(1), we have Q′−1i (1) = Q−1i (1) = s7.
• r = 2,
– A(2) = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s8, s∗(i)}.
– Since Q−1i (1) /∈ A(2), we have Q′−1i (2) = Chi(A(2)) = s1.
• r = 3,
– A(3) = {s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s8, s∗(i)}.
– Since Q−1i (1) ∈ A(3), we have Q′−1i (3) = Q−1i (3) = s2.
• r = 4,
– A(4) = {s3, s4, s5, s6, s8, s∗(i)}.
– Since Q−1i (4) /∈ A(4), we have Q′−1i (4) = Chi(A(4)) = s3.
• r = 5,
– A(5) = {s4, s5, s6, s8, s∗(i)}.
– Since Q−1i (5) /∈ A(5), we have Q′−1i (5) = Chi(A(5)) = s4.
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• r = 6,
– A(6) = {s5, s6, s8, s∗(i)}.
– Since Q−1i (6) ∈ A(6), we have Q′−1i (6) = Q−1i (6) = s6.
• r = 7,
– A(7) = {s5, s8, s∗(i)}.
– Since Q−1i (7) ∈ A(7), we have Q′−1i (7) = Q−1i (7) = s8.
• r = 8,
– A(8) = {s5, s∗(i)}.
– Since Q−1i (8) /∈ A(8), we have Q′−1i (8) = Chi(A(8)) = s5.
• r = 9,
– A(9) = {s∗(i)}.
– Since Q−1i (9) ∈ A(9), we have Q′−1i (9) = Q−1i (9) = s∗(i).
Therefore, we have Q′i. Strategy Q
′
i and the original strategy Qi are as
follows.
Qi =s7, s9, s2, s1, s10, s6, s8, s4, s
∗(i), s3, s5;
Q′i =s7, s1, s2, s3, s4, s6, s8, s5, s
∗(i), s9, s10.
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2.6 Omitted Proofs in the Main Text
2.6.1 Proof of Lemma 8
Choose an arbitrary school ŝ ∈ Ŝ. Assume Qi(ŝ) = k.
Consider the strategy profile (Qi, Q−i). The event that ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) 6= ŝ
means under (Qi, Q−i) either (1) before iteration k, the capacity of ŝ is full,
or (2) when iteration k begins, there are q˜ŝ capacity remained, with q˜ŝ ≤ qŝ,
and the number of students such that (i) she ranks ŝ as the k-th choice, and
that (ii) she is not matched with any school when iteration k begins, and
that (iii) she has a higher priority than i for ŝ, is greater than or equal to
q˜ŝ.
Now, consider the strategy profile (Q˜i, Q−i). Suppose i is not matched
with ϕ(Q˜i, Q−i)(i) in the first k − 1 iterations. Then one of condition (1)
and condition (2) from above still holds.
Suppose i is matched with ϕ(Q˜i, Q−i)(i) in the first k−1 iterations. Since
i ranks ŝ as the k-th choice, i cannot be matched with ŝ under (Q˜i, Q−i).
Therefore, ϕ(Q˜i, Q−i)(i) 6= ŝ. Since the above argument holds for all ŝ ∈ Ŝ,
we have ϕ(Q˜i, Q−i)(i) /∈ Ŝ.
2.6.2 Proof of Lemma 9
Suppose Qi(s) = t and Q˜
′
i(s) = t
′, with t′ ≤ t.
Consider the strategy profile (Qi, Q−i). The event that ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = ŝ
means that (1) i is not matched with any school in the first t− 1 iterations,
and that (2) suppose when iteration t begins, the remaining capacity for s is
q˜s, the number of other students such that (i) she ranks ŝ as the t-th choice,
and that (ii) she is not matched with any school in the first t− 1 iterations,
and that (iii) she has a higher priority than i for ŝ, is less than q˜ŝ.
Now, consider the strategy profile (Q˜i, Q−i). If i is not matched with
any school in the first t′ − 1 iterations, then condition (2) from above still
holds if t is replaced with t′ in the argument. Call this new condition as
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condition (3).
The event that i is not matched with any school in the first t′ − 1 itera-
tions and condition (3) make it sufficient for i to be matched with ŝ under
(Q˜i, Q−i).
2.6.3 Proof of Theorem 11
It is easy to see the statement holds when fPi(1)(i) ≤ qsPi(1) . Suppose
fPi(1)(i) > qsPi(1) . Let Pi(1) = ŝ. Let Î be the set of students whose
priority in fŝ is smaller than or equal to qŝ, i.e., Î = {j ∈ I : |k ∈ I :
fŝ(k) < fŝ(j)| < qŝ}. Let I ′ = I \ (Î ∪ {i}). For a school st ∈ S, call t as
the index of school st. Re-index the schools in S \ {ŝ, s0}, so that (1) no
two schools has the same index and (2) any index is smaller than or equal
to |S| − 2 and is larger than zero. Pick qs1 number of students from I ′ and
call them the set of students I1. Pick qs2 number of students from I
′ \ I1
and call them the set of students I2. In general, pick qst number of students
from I ′ \⋃t′=1,...,t−1 It′ and call them the set of students It. If there are any
remaining students, call them the set of such students I0. Let j ∈ Î submit
ŝ as the first school choice in Q−i. Let k ∈ It submit st as the first school
choice in Q−i. For students in I0, let they submit some arbitrary prefer-
ences. It is clear that ϕ(Pi, Q−i)(i) = Chi(s ∈ S :
∑
s′∈UPi(s) qs′ ≤ |I| − 1).
Since this is the worst school choice that i can obtain when he submits Pi,
this is the most preferred guaranteed school.
2.6.4 Proof of Theorem 12
Consider student i. Let ŝ be her least preferred acceptable school. With the
setting considered in the statement, Chi({s ∈ S :
∑
s′∈UPi (s) qs′ ≤ |I|−1}) =
ŝ. Therefore, Theorem 12 is a direct result of Theorem 11.
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2.6.5 Proof of Lemma 10
Since Qi satisfies equation (2.2), the total capacities in the set of schools
UQi(s∗(i)) is the same as the total capacities in the set of schools UPi(s∗(i)).
By the definition of s∗(i), ϕ(Pi, Q−i)(i)Ris∗(i) for all Q−i, it means that stu-
dent i takes one of the seat in the total seats in the set of schools UQi(s∗(i))
no matter what strategies other student use.
Since
∑
s∈UQi (s∗(i)) qs =
∑
s∈UPi (s∗(i)) qs, then i must have a seat in the
seats of the set of schools UQi(s∗(i)) by the algorithm of the Boston mech-
anism.
2.6.6 Proof of Theorem 13
Claims 1 and 2
Given Qi. Let Q
′
i be the strategy that is created by the γ-algorithm. The
following two claims state the properties of Q′i. Both are direct consequences
of the γ-algorithm.
Claim 1. Q′i satisfies equation (2.2).
Claim 2. Compare Qi and Q
′
i. Let S˜ = {s ∈ S : s ∈ UPi(s∗(i)) and Q′i(s) 6=
Qi(s)}. First, for s ∈ S˜, we have Q′i(s) < Qi(s). Second, for s ∈ S˜ and
s′ ∈ UQ′i(s∗(i)), we have Q′i(s) < Q′i(s′) implies sPis′. Third, for s, s′ ∈ S˜,
we have Q′i(s) < Q
′
i(s
′) if and only if sPis′.
The Proof
Consider a strategy Qi.
Let Q′i be the strategy produced by the γ-algorithm. The proof is to
analyze each possible Q−i and show that ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i)Riϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i).
Case 1: Consider Q−i such that ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) ∈ S \ UPi(s∗(i)). By
Claim 1 and Lemma 10, we have ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) ∈ UPi(s∗(i)). Therefore,
ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i)Piϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i).
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Case 2: Consider Q−i such that ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) := s ∈ UPi(s∗(i)). Note
that if Q′i(s) 6= Qi(s), by Claim 2, we have Q′i(s) < Qi(s). In other words,
Q′i(s) ≤ Qi(s). Let ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) := s′. By Lemma 9, s′ ∈ UQ
′
i(s).
Let Ŝ = {ŝ ∈ S : Q′i(ŝ) < Q′i(s) and Qi(ŝ) 6= Q′i(ŝ)}. Claim 2 implies
that for s′ ∈ Ŝ, we have s′Pis. Let S˜ = {s˜ ∈ S : Q′i(s˜) < Q′i(s) and Qi(s˜) =
Q′i(s˜)}. By Lemma 8, s′ /∈ S˜. By Claim 2, if s′ ∈ Ŝ, then s′Pis. Therefore,
if s′ 6= s, then s′ ∈ Ŝ. In other words, ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i)Riϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i).
This completes the proof of Theorem 13.
Proof of Theorem 14
Lemmas 11 and 12
Before proving Theorem 14, we need the following two lemmas.
We say that a school s is achievable by strategy Qi, if there exists
Q−i such that ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = s.
Lemma 11. Consider Qi. If s is achievable by Qi, then schools in U
Qi(s)
are achievable by Qi.
Proof. Suppose Q−i is such that ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = s. Consider a school s′ ∈
V Qi(s). Then another Q′−i can be constructed so that all students other
than i submit their preferences in the same way as in Q−i except they





Lemma 12. Consider Qi. Suppose there is a strategy Q
′
i that weakly dom-
inates Qi. Then if there is a school s that is achievable by Q
′
i and Qi(s) 6=
Q′i(s), we have
Q′i(s) < Qi(s)⇒ sPiQ−1i (Q′i(s)). (2.3)
Proof. Let Ŝ be the set of schools such that schools in this set have different
rankings in Qi and Q
′




s ∈ Ŝ is the school that has the highest ranking in Q′i among all schools in
Ŝ.




s′ has the following properties: s′ is the school with the highest ranking in
Qi that has different rankings in Qi and Q
′
i. Since if it does not hold, then
there exists another school s′′ that has a higher ranking than s′ in Qi, and s′′
has different ranking in Qi and Q
′
i. This implies Q
′−1
i (Qi(s
′′)) := s′′′ 6= s′′.
By this construction, Q′i(s
′′′) < Qi(s). By Lemma 11, since s is achievable
by Q′i, then s
′′′ is achievable by Q′i. However, this violates the construction
that s has the highest ranking in Q′i among all other schools in Ŝ.
Since s 6= s′, this implies that Q′i(s) < Qi(s). The statement that
equation (2.3) does not hold implies that s′Pis.
Since all school that have higher rankings than s in Qi have the same
ranking in Qi and Q
′
i, the assumption that Q
′
i weakly dominates Qi implies
that there exists Q−i such that ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) and ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) do not be-
long to those schools. Denote S = {s ∈ S : Qi(s) < Qi(s)}. Construct Q′−i
by transforming Q−i in the following way. Let all students who are matched
with schools in S submit the schools they are matched with under (Qi, Q−i)
as the first school choice. All other students rank s and s′ as unaccept-
able. Therefore, ϕ(Qi, Q
′
−i)(i) = s
′ and ϕ(Q′i, Q
′
−i)(i) = s. Therefore, the
statement that Q′i weakly dominates Qi does not hold.
The Proof
Let Qi be a strategy such that make equation (2.2) hold. Suppose there is
another strategy Q′i that weakly dominates Qi.
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: Q−1i (1) is such that fQ−1i (1)(i) > qQ−1i (1).
Let s be the lowest ranked achievable school by Q′i.
Suppose Q′i(s) > Qi(s
∗(i)). Then there exists some school s′ ∈ UQ′i(s)
76
such that s∗(i)Pis′. By Lemma 11, s′ is an achievable school. Therefore, Q′i
cannot weakly dominate Qi.
Suppose Q′i(s) = Qi(s
∗(i)). If there is a school s′ ∈ UQ′i(s) such that
s∗(i)Pis′. Then Q′i cannot weakly dominate Qi by Lemma 11. If U
Q′i(s) =
UQi(s∗(i)), it is impossible for equation (??) to hold. Therefore, Q′i cannot
weakly dominate Qi.
Suppose Q′i(s) < Qi(s
∗(i)). Further, suppose there is a school s′ ∈
UQ
′
i(s) such that ŝPis
′ for some ŝ ∈ UQi(Q−1i (Qi(s))). Then by Lemma
12, Q′i cannot weakly dominate Qi. Therefore, for s
′ ∈ UQ′i(s) and ŝ ∈
UQi(Q−1i (Qi(s))), we must have s
′Riŝ. This implies that s∗(i) /∈ UQi(s).
Note that s 6= P−1i (1), since otherwise P−1i (1) would be the most preferred
guaranteed school, and there cannot exist any other strategy that weakly
dominate Qi. Construct Q−i in the following way. Denote st = Qi(t) for
t = 1, ..., |S|. Pick qs1 number of students who have higher priority than i
in school s1. Call this set of student I1. Then, pick qs2 number of students
from I \ I1 and call them I2. Then, pick qs3 number of students from
I \ ∪t=1,2It and call them I3. Proceed this assignment until all students in
I \{i} belong to some group It. For a student j in It, let her submit st as the
first school choice. The definition of the most preferred school s∗(i) implies
that there are at least
∑Pi(s∗(i))
l=1 qsl−1 number of students. Denote Ŝ = {s ∈
S : sRis





s′′∈S qs′′ for any S˜ ⊂ Ŝ, the construction of Q−i implies
ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) /∈ UQi(s). This contradicts s is the least preferred achievable
school by Q′i.
Case 2: Q−1i (1) is such that fQ−1i (1)(i) ≤ qQ−1i (1).
Let Q−1i (1) = s1 and Q
′−1
i (1) = s
′
1. Note that in this case, we have
ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = s1 for all Q−i ∈ Q−i. If fs′1(i) ≤ qs′1 , then by condition





cannot weakly dominate Qi, since ϕ(Q
′
i, Q−i)(i) = s
′
1 for all Q−i ∈ Q−i.
Then, fs′1(i) > qs′1 . Note that with the condition (1) in the statement of the
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theorem, if P−1i (s
∗(i)) 6= 1, then s1 6= s∗(i).
Let the lowest ranked achievable school in Q′i be s. If for any school s¯ ∈
UQ
′
i(s), we have s¯Ris1, then s must be the s
∗(i). However, this possibility is
ruled out as indicated before. Therefore, there exists sˆ ∈ UQi(s) such that
s1Pisˆ. Since s is achievable by Q
′
i, then by Lemma 11, sˆ is achievable by
Q′i. Therefore, Q
′
i cannot weakly dominate Qi.
This completes the proof of Theorem 14.
Proof of Theorem 15
Lemmas 13 and 14
Lemma 13. Consider student i. There exists a strategy profile of her op-
ponent Q−i such that ϕ(Pi, Q−i)(i) = s∗(i).
Proof. Suppose this is not true. Since s∗(i) is one of the guaranteed schools,
this means that for any Q−i, ϕ(Pi, Q−i)(i)Pis∗(i). Pick Q−i that pro-
duces the less preferred school for i under Pi and call this school as s
′, i.e.,
ϕ(Pi, Q−i)(i) = s′. Then it means s′ instead of s∗(i) is the most preferred
guaranteed school.
Lemma 14. Consider a strategy Qi that satisfies the rank-preserving mono-
tonic transformation of the most preferred guaranteed school, Let the first
school choice in Qi be s. Suppose fs(i) > qs. Then there exists Q−i such
that ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) = s∗(i).
Proof. By Lemma 13, there exists Q−i such that ϕ(Pi, Q−i)(i) = s∗(i).
Construct Q′−i in the following way. Let st = Qi(t) for t = 1, ..., |S|. Pick
qs1 number of students who have higher priority than i in fs1 and call them
I1. Pick qs2 number of students and call them as I2, and so on. Let j in It









It is straightforward to see that if Qi satisfies condition 1 in the statement,
Qi is a weakly dominated strategy.
Suppose Qi satisfies condition 2 in the statement. I follow the structure
of the proof in Theorem 13. Recall that Q′i is a strategy created by the
γ-algorithm. Also recall that ϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) := s and ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) := s
′.
By Theorem 13, ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i)Riϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i) for all Q−i ∈ Q−i. I show
that there always exists some Q−i such that ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i)Piϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i).
It is clear that in Case 1, ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i)Piϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i). In Case 2, I show
that there always exists Q−i such that ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i)Piϕ(Qi, Q−i)(i). There
are two sub-cases to consider.
Sub-case 1: There exists s ∈ UQi(s) such that s∗(i)Pis. By Lemma 14,
there exists Q−i such that ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = s
∗(i). Construct Q′−i in the fol-
lowing way. For students other than i who are not matched with s under
(Q′i, Q−i), let them submit their match as the first school choices in Q
′
−i. For
students other than i who are matched with s under (Qi, Q−i), let them sub-
mit s0 as the first choices in Q
′












Sub-case 2: There does not exists any school s ∈ UQi(s) such that
s∗(i)Pis. By construction, this implies Qi(s∗(i)) 6= Q′i(s∗(i)), otherwise
both Qi and Q
′
i satisfy equation (3). This further implies that there exists
s˜ ∈ UQ′i(s∗(i)) such that s˜ /∈ UQi(s∗(i)). By Lemma 14, there exists Q−i
such that ϕ(Q′i, Q−i)(i) = s
∗(i). Construct Q′−i in the following way. For
students other than i who are not matched with s∗(i) or s˜ under (Q′i, Q−i),
let them submit the schools they are matched with as the first school choices
in Q′−i. For students other than i who are matched with s
∗(i) or s˜ under
(Q′i, Q−i), let them submit s0 as the the first school choice in Q
′
−i. Since














2.6.7 Proof of Theorem 16
Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium Q such that student i obtains a school
that is worse than s∗(i), then by Lemma 10, Qi does not satisfy equation
(2.2). Then, student i can profitably deviate to another strategy that satis-
fies equation (2.2).
2.6.8 Proof of Theorem 17
Suppose the school choice problem is nested. Let I(t) be the set of students
whose most preferred guaranteed schools are ranked as the t-th positions in
their true preferences for t = 1, ..., |S|. Students in I(1) will obtain their
most preferred schools if they submit strategies that satisfy equation (2.2).
Students in I(2) will obtain their most preferred guaranteed schools if they
submit strategies that satisfy equation (2.2), since all the schools that are
better than their most preferred guaranteed schools are obtained by students
in I(1). Students in I(k) will obtain their most preferred guaranteed schools
if they submit strategies that satisfy equation (2.2), since all schools that
are better than their most preferred guaranteed schools are obtained by
students in
⋃
t=1,...,k−1 It. Therefore, all students obtain their most preferred
guaranteed schools.
On the other hand, note that the school choice problem in Example 1 is
not nested, but there is an unique undominated Nash equilibrium.
2.6.9 Proof of Theorem 18
Lemma 15
The following lemma is a direct result of the definition of nested school
choice problem.
Lemma 15. Suppose the school choice problem is nested. Consider student
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i. The following holds for s ∈ V Pi(s∗(i)).∑
s′∈UPi (s)
qs′ =
∣∣∣{j ∈ I \ {i} : s∗(j) ∈ UPi(s)}∣∣∣.
The Proof
(1) ⇒ (2): Consider student i. By Lemma 15, the total number of students
who consider schools that i prefers to s∗(i) as the most preferred guaranteed
schools are equal to the total capacities of those schools. Therefore, if all
students use undominated strategies, student i cannot obtain the school
that is preferred to s∗(i). Let It = {j ∈ I : Pj(s∗(j)) = t}. With the above
reasoning, all students in It obtains their most preferred guaranteed schools
if they submit any undominated strategies.
(2) ⇒ (1): Pick one of the first students in the algorithm of the Boston
mechanism who obtain schools other than their most preferred guaranteed
schools. Call this student i. Clearly, i obtains a school that is better than his
most preferred guaranteed school. Since there does not exist other students
who obtain a school different from his most preferred guaranteed school
earlier than i in the algorithm, all students who obtain schools earlier than
i in the algorithm are matched to their most preferred guaranteed schools.
Therefore, the only possibility that i obtains a school better than his most
preferred guaranteed school is that there are fewer students who obtains
schools as their most preferred guaranteed schools in earlier iteration than
the total quotas of all schools that are weakly better than the school that i
obtains. However, this violates the equation in Lemma 15. In other words,
the school choice problem is not nested.
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2.6.10 Proof of Theorem 19






Then there exists some Q−i such that ϕ(Pi, Q−i)(i) /∈ UPi(s). In other
words, school s is not a guaranteed school for i. This means that if there is










After choosing from the most preferred school that satisfies equation (2.5),




Talents: A Market Design
Approach
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Abstract: I model a centralized matching problem between students
and schools where students’ priorities in schools are endogenous in terms of
their efforts. I show that the consideration of endogenous aspects of stu-
dents’ priorities opens a new dimension of evaluating a matching system.
An ill designed system could discourage students from pursuing the knowl-
edge/skill in the skill categories that they are talented at. I propose four
criteria of promoting diversity of talents: respecting versatility of talents,
respecting versatility of talents with minimum efforts, respecting unique tal-
ents, and respecting unique talents with minimum efforts. These criteria are
used to evaluate whether a matching system encourages students to pursue
the knowledge/skill in the skill categories that they are talented at. Then, I
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propose four matching systems that accomplish these four criteria, respec-
tively. The model in this paper could be applied to Taiwanese High School
Match, Specialized High School matching program in New York City, Se-
lective Enrollment High Schools matching program in Chicago, and Exam
Schools matching program in Boston.
In 2014, the Taiwanese High School Match uses a new centralized match-
ing program to allocate students to schools. I show that the unique features
in this program either makes a matching system lose some desirable prop-
erties or fails the criteria of promoting diversity of talents defined in this
paper.
JEL: C72, C78
Key Words: Diversity of talents, endogenous priority structure, school
choice problem.
3.1 Introduction
Centralized matching mechanisms are commonly used for allocating stu-
dents to schools. The school choice problem, formulated by Abdulkadirog˘lu
and So¨nmez (2003) and Blinski and So¨nmez (1999), considers several criteria
to evaluate the performances of such mechanisms.2 Most criteria surround
two important issues: the properties of the matching outcomes of the mech-
anisms and the incentives students face when they submit their preferences
over schools. Despite the importance of all these criteria, there is one im-
portant aspect that has been missing in this literature: the analysis of the
distribution of students’ effort inputs across different categories, which are
the aspects where students are evaluated. In this paper, I propose sev-
eral criteria to evaluate the performances of a matching system3 in terms of
2Notable, these criteria include stability, efficiency and strategy-proofness. See Section
3.4 for formal definitions.
3I refer a matching system as a matching process which involves students’ decision on
the distribution of effort inputs and a matching mechanism that uses students’ submitted
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whether it induces a desirable distribution of the effort inputs from students.
I consider an environment in which students’ performances are evaluated
in several categories. A simple example is a set of exam subjects. Students
have limited time endowments that they can allocate on different categories.
A student receives a higher evaluation in a category, if she spends more
time in that category. At the meantime, she faces trade-offs among different
categories, because spending more time on one category means less time
could be spent on others. Moreover, it is common that a student is more
talented in one category but less talented in others. Under this framework,
there are several possible ideologies that an education planner could have.
The followings are the ideologies considered in this paper. First, a student
could be encouraged to pursue the knowledge/skill in the category that she
is most talented at. Second, a student could be encouraged to pursue the
maximum of knowledge/skill across different categories. Third, a student
could be encouraged to have minimum knowledge/skill across all categories.
In addition to the proposition of criteria that captures the above ideologies,
I propose several matching systems that satisfy these criteria and use these
criteria to evaluate the Taiwanese High School Match.
The framework of this paper is built upon the basic framework of the
school choice problem. Students care about which high schools they will at-
tend after middle school.4 A matching mechanism then uses students’ stated
preferences over schools and their priorities in schools to determine a match-
ing between students and schools. The priorities of students in a school are
used to determine which student is more entitled for being admitted to a
school than other students. An example of determining priority is using
exam scores so that a student with a higher score has a higher priority in a
school. Since in this paper, students’ priorities depend on their effort inputs,
preferences and priorities resulted from their effort inputs to create a matching. See
Section 3.4 for the formal definition of a matching system. Also see footnote 27.
4In the rest of the paper, I will simply call a high school as a school.
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the priorities of students are endogenous.5 The choice of a matching mech-
anism also plays an important role. There are three matching mechanisms
that are widely studied: the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism (SOSM),
the Top-Trading Cycles Mechanism (TTCM) and the Boston mechanism.6
The way I design the matching systems that satisfy the criteria proposed
in this paper is by designing the priority system and choosing a matching
mechanism that respects improvement of priority,7 so that a student whose
distribution of effort inputs fits better into the education planner’s ideol-
ogy has a higher priority in all schools and, as a result of a higher priority,
obtains a weakly better school.
In 2014, the Taiwanese High School Match employs a new centralized
matching program. The priorities of students are computed by summing
up the numeric values from several categories. Those values either depend
on how a student ranks schools in her submitted preference or a student’s
performances in middle school and exams. A student with higher total
numeric values has a higher priority. After students submit their preferences,
the Boston mechanism is used to create a matching. In 2014, there are at
least 200,347 students who participate in this matching program.8
5There is another dimension of endogenicity in Taiwanese High School Match. That is,
if a student ranks a school higher, then her priority in that school is weakly improved. To
my knowledge, this is the first paper that considers the environment where the priorities
of students are endogenous in terms of their efforts and the way they rank the schools.
Dur (2011) considers a dynamic school choice problem, where parents may have more than
one child and they could strategically place one child in a school so that the priority of
the second child is improved in that school.
6The Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism is proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962). The
Top-Trading Cycles Mechanism is proposed by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003). See
Section 3.4 for descriptions of these three mechanisms.
7A mechanism respects improvement of priority if a student receives a weaker better
school when her priority in all schools improves.
8This makes the Taiwanese High School Match the largest matching program that uses
the Boston mechanism to allocate students to schools. Note that by Abdulkadirog˘lu et al.
(2005), the largest district that uses a priority mechanism at the time is Hillsborough
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The followings are the key features in the Taiwanese High School Match.
Feature 1 If a student ranks a school higher, she has a (weakly) higher priority
in that school.
Feature 2 The numeric value that a student receives in each category is “coarse”
in terms of her effort.9
Feature 3 The tie-breaking rule (essentially) uses a lexicographic ordering of cat-
egories to break a tie.10
Feature 1 says that students’ submitted preferences influence a matching
system in two ways. First, a mechanism uses the reported preferences to
compute the outcome. Second, if a student has higher priority in a school if
she ranks a school higher. It is tempting to think that a design with Feature
1 could improve the performance of a matching system, since it intensifies
students’ claims for desired schools. However, I find that such design actually
undermines a matching system in terms of fairness, stability, efficiency, and
strategy-proofness, when the mechanisms is one of the SOSM, the TTCM,
and the Boston mechanism.
I show that Feature 2 and Feature 3 influence students’ decisions on
allocating efforts among different categories. Feature 2 and Feature 3 create
an environment where the priority of a student is determined by (1) the
number of better letter grades that she has comparing to other students11
and (2) the better scores in the categories with a higher ordering in the
County School District in Tampa-St. Petersburg, where there are 170,000 students. Also
note that the Boston mechanism belongs to the class of priority mechanisms.
9Some categories are exams in different subjects. Note that the letter grades instead
of the original exam scores are used for determining the numeric values for the categories.
10Suppose there are only two categories t1 and t2, and t1 has a higher ordering than t2
in the tie-breaking rule. When there is a tie between two students, the tie-breaking rule
first compares the scores in the category t1 and then the scores in the category t2. The
student with a higher score in t1 has a higher priority. If there is a tie in the scores in t1,
then the student with a higher score in t2 has a higher priority.
11Suppose there are six categories. A student with six As has a higher priority than
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lexicographic tie-breaking rule comparing to other students. Since Feature
2 could frequently create ties, such environment gives students incentives to
allocate more time in the category with a higher ordering in the lexicographic
tie-breaking rule.
Beside the Taiwanese High School Match, the model in this paper can
also be applied to Specialized High School matching program in New York
City, Selective Enrollment High Schools matching program in Chicago, and
Exam Schools matching program in Boston. In this three matching pro-
grams, the priorities of students are based on exam scores and grades. Brief
descriptions of these matching programs are as follows. The Specialized High
School matching program in New York City uses students’ exam scores in
Specialized High School Admissions Test (SHSAT) to determine students’
priorities and then uses the serial dictatorship mechanism to determine the
assignments.The Selective Enrollment High Schools matching program in
Chicago uses students’ exam scores in Selective Enrollment High Schools
admissions test and their grades to determine students’ priorities and then
use the serial dictatorship mechanism to determine the assignments. The
Exam Schools matching program in Boston uses students’ exam scores in
the Independent Schools Entrance Exam (ISEE), their grade point average
(GPA), and their submitted school choices to determine the assignments.
Note that all three exams have more than one skill categories.
The results of this paper are divided into two parts. In the first part,
I propose four criteria of promoting diversity of talents. These four cri-
teria are categorized in two dimensions: (1) whether a matching system
respects versatility of talents or unique talents and (2) whether a match-
ing system promotes minimum efforts or not. The first dimension captures
an education planner’s ideology on whether a student should be encour-
another students with five As and one B, if both students rank the schools in the same
way.
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aged to pursue the “breadth” or “depth” of her knowledge. A matching
system respects versatility of talents if it encourages students to explore ev-
ery learning possibilities among all categories. A matching system respects
unique talents if it encourages students to pursue the knowledge/skill in the
category that they are most talented at. The second dimension captures
an education planner’s ideology on encouraging students to have minimum
knowledge/skill across all categories. Note that the combination of these two
dimensions creates four criteria. With these criteria, I design four matching
systems that achieve each criteria, respectively.
In the second part, I show that a matching system that has the features
in the Taiwanese High School Match could produce undesirable outcomes
in terms of the distribution of students’ effort inputs. In particular, such a
matching system could discourage students from pursuing knowledge/skill
in the categories that they are most talented at. First, I analyze a priority
system that has Feature 1. My analysis suggests such feature should be
removed completely. Then, I study a priority system that has Feature 2
and Feature 3. I show that a matching system with such a priority system
does not achieve any of the four criteria of promoting diversity of talents
mentioned above, when the mechanism is strategy-proof and stable or the
TTCM.
The most relevant paper to this paper is Hatfield et al. (2014), who
consider an important problem in which agents value differently on the out-
come of the game, or the alternative, which is partly determined by agents’
investments on their human capitals. They study the mechanism that in-
duces efficient ex ante investment on human capitals and achieves ex post
efficient. In the setting of labor market matching, the agents are firms and
workers and the outcome of the game is the matching between firms and
workers.12 There are many differences in their paper and this paper. The
primary difference is the following. The welfare consideration in the design
12See Section II in Hatfield et al. (2014).
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goal of a mechanism in Hatfield et al. (2014) is to maximize the ex post
social welfare, which is the sum of each agent’s valuation on the realized
alternative. In this paper, the welfare consideration in this paper has two
parts. From students’ point of view, the welfare consideration depends on
the schools that are matched to them.13 On the other hand, the educa-
tion planner has her ideology on the desirable distribution of effort inputs
across different categories from the students. The ideology of an education
planner might reflect the ideology of the society. Since students’ valuations
on the education outcome may not be consistent with the society’s valua-
tion on the distribution of students’ effort inputs, such separation of welfare
consideration is necessary in the education setting.
Other related literatures include the choice of mechanism, effort distor-
tion resulted from the design of mechanisms, and designing priority. These
literatures are contained in Section 3.8.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section 3.2,
I describe the Taiwanese High School Match. In Section 3.3, I present a
motivating example. Section 3.4 presents the model. Section 3.5 presents
the first part of the main results. Section 3.6 presents the second part
of the main results. Section 3.8 contains the related literatures that are
not contained in the introduction. Section 3.9 presents the details of the
Taiwanese High School Match that are not contained in Section 3.2. Section
3.10 presents the proofs omitted in the main text.
3.2 Taiwanese High School Match
In 2014, the Taiwanese High School Match employs a new centralized match-
ing program. The whole area is divided into fifteen school zones. Each school
zone holds its own matching program. Similar to the school matching in
13Such welfare consideration is the standard welfare consideration in school choice prob-
lem following Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) and Blinski and So¨nmez (1999).
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Boston, the schools have no control on the priority of students. The educa-
tion administration in each school zone decides the method that determines
the priority to students in schools.14
The Taiwanese High School Match includes a centralized matching pro-
gram and individual entrance held by individual schools.15 The schools
need to announce the capacity for the centralized matching and the capac-
ity for the individual entrance before the matching takes place. The cen-
tralized matching program has two identical stages. Before the first-stage
centralized matching program, there is a centralized exam that consists of
several subjects. The exam scores are parts of the components that are
used to determine students’ priority. In the first-stage centralized matching
program, students submit their preferences overs schools and the matching
mechanism uses the submitted preferences and students’ priority to compute
the matching. After the first-stage centralized matching program, students
who are admitted by some schools can either accept the admissions or re-
ject them. Once a student accepts an admission, she cannot participate
the following individual entrance and the second-stage centralized match-
ing program. Students who accept admissions from the individual entrance
cannot participate the second-stage centralized matching program. Schools
can participate the second-stage centralized matching program only if there
is some residual capacities left from the first-stage centralized matching pro-
gram. The second-stage centralized matching operates in the same way as
the first-stage centralized matching. Students submit their preferences over
schools and the mechanism uses their preferences and the priority in the
schools to compute the matching.16
The method of determining students’ priorities in Keelung and Taipei
district is described as follows. There are three grand categories that de-
14There are some differences in the methods for determining students’ priority in dif-
ferent school zones. Within a school zone the method applies uniformly to all schools.
15In this paper, I focus on the centralized matching process.
16To my knowledge, the centralized matching program will only have one stage in 2015.
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termine a student’s priority in schools: the way a student ranks schools,
the performances of students in middle school and the exam scores.17 Each
grand category gives a student a numeric value,18 and a student’s priority
is determined by the sum of these three numeric values, so that a student
with a higher total numeric value has a higher priority. In the first grand
category, a school choice receives a (weakly) higher numeric value if a stu-
dent ranks that school higher.19 The second grand category consists of the
evaluations of students’ performances in middle school. The third grand
category is the scores from a centralized exam that consists of several sub-
jects. The scores in each subject are then transformed to letter grades,
A++, A+, A,B++, B+, B,C. Each letter grade has its own numeric value.
The numeric value from the third grand category is computed by summing
up the numeric values from the letter grades. If there is a tie, the tie-breaking
rule uses a pre-determined ordering over numeric values in different grand
categories or categories withing these three grand categories, so that the
priority is given to the students with a higher numeric value in the grand
category or category with a higher ordering. The details of how students’
priority is determined are in Section 3.9.
3.3 A Motivating Example
Let the set of students be I = {i1, i2} and the set of schools be S = {s1, s2}.
Suppose there are two categories that are used to evaluate students, math-
ematics and literature, which are denoted as tm and tl, respectively. The
students’ preferences over schools are the following.20
17Within the second and third grand categories, there are several categories.
18The numeric value from the second and third grand categories is computed by sum-
ming up the numeric value in each category within the grand category.
19For most school choices, the school that is ranked higher receives a strictly higher
higher numeric value.




Suppose the time endowment is L¯ = 10. Each student can choose how
















The superscripts represent the categories and the subscripts represent
the identities of students. If a student i ∈ {i1, i2} spends time l ∈ [0, 10]
on subject t ∈ {tm, tl}, he will receive a grade Lti(l) for category t. Assume
that the maximum score in both categories is 10.
The priorities of the students are determined in the following way. The
priority system sets thresholds in both subjects so that a student receives
an A if his grade in that subject passes the threshold and a B if otherwise.
An A worths 10 points and a B worths 5 points. Let the threshold in both
subjects be 3. The student who has a higher total points from both subjects
has a higher priority. If there is a tie on total points, use the following rule
to break the tie. The priority system first compares the grades in subject
tl and whoever has a higher grade in tl is given the higher priority. If there
is still a tie, then the system compares the grades in subject tm and the
priority is given to the student with a higher grade in tm. If there is still
a tie, then use the students’ age to break the tie. Assume the threshold in
subject tm is 1 and the threshold in subject tl is 3.
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After the students decide their time allocations, they submit their pref-
erences over schools. Let the matching mechanism be the Student-Optimal
Stable Mechanism. Therefore, there are two components of a student’s strat-
egy: the time allocation and the submitted preference over schools. Note
that we consider an environment where students only care about the schools
that they will be admitted at.
The following strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. Student i1’s time
endowment is (154 ,
25
4 ),
21 and she submits a preference that s1 is preferred to
s2. Student i2’s time allocation is (1, 3), and she submits a preference that
s1 is preferred to s2. The resulted matching is that student i1 is matched
to school s1, her favorite school, and student i2 is matched to school s2, her
less favored school. Although there are other Nash equilibria, there does not
exist a Nash equilibrium where student i1 spends more than
15
4 on subject
tm, the subject that she is most talented at.
Next, consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, the students are en-
couraged to allocate their time so that they pass the thresholds and pursue
the knowledge in the subject that they are talented at. In the second sce-
nario, the students are encouraged to allocate their time so that they pass
the minimum thresholds and maximize their knowledge across both sub-
jects. Assume that in both scenarios, the students do not fully understand
their time allocations would have an effect on the schools that they will be
admitted at.22 In the first scenario, student i1 will have the time allocation
(314 ,
9
4), and student i2 will have the time allocation (1, 9). In the second




13), and student i2
will have the time allocation (9034 ,
250
34 ). Let both students submit their true
preferences. In both scenarios, student i1 is matched to school s2, and stu-
21This notation represents that student i1 spends
15
4




22This assumption is along the line with Pathak and So¨nmez (2008). Pathak and So¨nmez
(2008) analyze the Boston mechanism and show that the welfare of students who are not
aware of the properties of the Boston mechanism would be undermined.
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dent i2 is matched to school s2. Despite student i1 is more productive in
both subjects, in both scenario, student i1 is matched to her less preferred
school, s2.
3.4 General Framework
Let I = {i1, ..., in} be the set of students and S = {s1, ..., sm} the set of
schools. Each student i has a strict preference Pi over S ∪ {∅}, where ∅
represents the outside option. Let P = (Pi)i∈I be the preference profile.
Let Ri be the weak preference relation associated with preference Pi, so that
sRis
′ if and only if sPis′ or s = s′. A school s is acceptable for student
i if sPi∅. Each school s has a capacity qs. Let q = (qs)s∈S be the vector
of capacities. A student i is assigned with her priority fs(i) in school s.
For two students i, j, if fs(i) < fs(j), then student i has a higher priority in
school s. Let f = (fs)s∈S be the priority structure. Let T = {t1, ..., tr} be
the set of skill categories. Let τi = (τ
t1
i , ..., τ
tr
i ) be the vector of scores
for student i, where τ tki ∈ [0, τ¯ ] is the student i’s score for skill category
tk. Let τ
T
i be the total scores of student i when her score vector is τi. Let
τ = (τi)i∈I be the score profile. For most parts of analysis in this paper, the
score profile is not directly used for determining students’ priorities. There
could be some transformation of a score profile that determines students’
priorities. A grading rule, ξ : [0, τ¯ ]|I||T | → [0, τ¯ ]|I|, is a function that
transforms the score profile into final grades. The final grade of a student
partly determines her priority in a school. I assume that if a student’s score
in one skill category is improved, then her final grade in each school is weakly
improved.23 In order to have more flexibility and wider applications of this
model, I assume that each student i is endowed with a merit score msi
23In other words, consider a student i with two of her score profiles τi =
(τ t1i , ..., τ
tk
i , ..., τ
tr
i ) and τˆi = (τˆ
t1
i , ..., τˆ
tk
i , ..., τˆ
tr









t ∈ T \ {tk}. Then for any grading rule ξ and score profile of her opponents τ−i, we
have ξi(τˆ) ≥ ξi(τ), where τ = (τi, τ−i) and τˆ = (τˆi, τ−i).
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for school s, which represents how much student i is entitled to school s.
This merit score is fixed and cannot be changed by students or schools. Let
mi = (m
s
i )s∈S be the vector of merit scores for student i.
24
A matching µ : I → S ∪ {∅} is a function that assigns students to
schools or the outside option so that the number of students that are assigned
to a school does not exceed its capacity. LetM be the set of all matchings.
A matching µ is fair if there does not exist two students i, j and a school








j . A matching µ is
individually rational if µ(i)Ri∅ for all i ∈ I. A matching µ respects
priority if there does not exist two students i, j and a school s such that
sPiµ(i), µ(j) = s, and fs(i) < fs(j).
25 A matching µ is nonwasteful if
sPiµ(i) implies |µ−1(s)| = qs. A matching µ is stable if it is individually
rational, respects priority and is nonwasteful. A matching µ is efficient if
there does not exist another matching ν such that ν(i)Riµ(i) for all i ∈ I
and ν(i)Piµ(i) for some i ∈ I.
24I introduce this construction merely for the flexibility of the model and wider ap-
plications. One possible situation that this merit score applies is when the proximity of
students’ residence to schools is used for determining student’s priority. In such a case, the
priority of students is a hybrid of their proximity and final grades. Note that all results
in this paper, unless mentioned otherwise, hold when there is no such merit scores.
There are two categories for merit score in Taiwanese High School Match: the merit
score for minority students and the merit score for students who live in the same district
as the district that he or she participates in the matching program. Not all the districts
have the feature of merit scores. The districts that use merit score for minority students
include Tsinchu and Miaoli district, Taichung and Nantou district, Changhua district,
Yunlin district, Pingtung district, and Hualien district. The districts that use merit score
for students who live in the same district as the district that he or she participates the
matching program include Taoyuan district, Tsinchu and Miaoli district, Taichung and
Nantou district, Changhua district, Yunlin district, Tainan district, Yilan district, and
Kinmen district.
25In the following sections except Section 3.6.1, I assume that fs(i) < fs(j) if and only
if ξi(τ) + m
s
i > ξj(τ) + m
s
j . In Section 3.6.1, I assume that fs(i) < fs(j) if and only if
τTi +m
s








Let Qi be the set of all submitted preferences for student i and let Q−i
be the set of all submitted preference profile for students other than i. Let
Q be the set of all submitted preference profiles.
A mechanism ω is a systematic method that uses P , f and q to create
a matching. Let ω(Q) be the matching created by mechanism ϕ when the
strategy profile is Q. Let ωi(Q) be the school or the outside option that
is matched to student i when the strategy profile is Q. A mechanism ϕ is
stable (efficient, or far) if ϕ(P ) is stable (efficient, or fair).26
Next, I describe three mechanisms. When there is a tie between two
students’ priorities, a tie-breaking rule is used. I delay the introduction of
several tie-breaking rules until next two sections. The Student-Optimal
Stable Mechanism (SOSM) is described as follows.
Step 1 Each student proposes to her most preferred acceptable school. Each
school tentatively holds the set of students with highest priorities up
to its capacity out of the students who propose to it. The students
that are not tentatively held by any school are rejected.
Step t Each student that is not tentatively held by any school at step t − 1
proposes to her most preferred acceptable school out of the schools
that have not rejected her. Each school tentatively holds the set of
students with highest priorities out of the students who propose to it
at this set together with the students that are tentatively held in step
t − 1. The students that are not tentatively held by any school are
rejected.
The algorithm terminates when each student is tentatively held by some
schools or rejected by all acceptable schools.
26With some abuse of notion, the strategy profile (Pi, Q−i) refers to the profile where i
submits the true preference and other students submit Q−i. The strategy profile (Pi, P−i)
refers to the profile where every student submits the true preference.
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The Top-Trading Cycles Mechanism (TTCM) is described as fol-
lows.
Step 1 Each student points to her most preferred acceptable school. Each
school points to the student with the highest priority. When there is a
cycle among students and schools, the student in the cycle is matched
to the school that she points to, and that school reduces its capacity
by one.
Step t Each student that is not matched in any previous steps points to the
most preferred acceptable school that still has a positive capacity.
Each school that still has a positive capacity points to the student
with the highest priority out of the students that are not matched
with any schools in the previous steps. When there is a cycle among
students and schools, the student in the cycle is matched to the school
that she points to, and that school reduces its capacity by one.
The algorithm terminates when each student is matched to some school or
rejected by all acceptable schools.
The Boston mechanism is described as follows.
Step 1 Each student proposes to her most preferred acceptable school. Each
school accepts the set of students with highest priorities up to its
capacity out of the students who propose to it. Moreover, each school
reduces its capacity by the number of students it accepts. Students
that are not accepted by any school are rejected.
Step t Each student that is not accepted by any school in previous steps
proposes to her most preferred acceptable school out of the schools
that have not rejected her. Each school accepts the set of students with
highest priorities up to its capacity out of the students who propose
to it. Moreover, each school reduces its capacity by the number of
students it accepts. Students that are not accepted by any school are
rejected.
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The algorithm terminates when each student is accepted by some school
or rejected by all acceptable schools.
A mechanism ω is strategy-proof, if
ωi(Pi, Q−i)Riωi(Qi, Q−i),
for any i ∈ I, Qi ∈ Qi, and Q−i ∈ Q−i.
A matching system is a strategy space S = Si1×, · · · ,×Sin associated
with an outcome function g : S →M.27
Each student is endowed with an amount of time L¯ for their disposal.
They decide the time allocation (or, equivalently, their efforts) on each skill
category. The effort on each skill category is directly reflected on the score
in that skill category. Let Lti : [0, L¯]→ [0, τ¯ ] be student i’s learning curve
on the skill category t.28 If student i spends time l ∈ [0, L] on the skill
category t, then her score on t would be Lti(l). Assume that ddlLti(l) ≥ 0 and
d2
dl2
Lti(l) ≤ 0 for l ∈ (0, L) and for all t ∈ T and i ∈ I. Moreover, assume
that Lti(0) = 0 for all i ∈ I and t ∈ T . Let Li = (Lti)t∈T be student i’s time




i ≤ L¯, where Lti is
the amount of time that student i spends on subject t. Let time allocation
profile be L = (Li)i∈I . Let Π be the set of all possible time allocations for
each student. With slightly abuse of notation, I write Lti(Li), where Li is a
time allocation, to represent Lti(Lti).
Let θti(Li) be the score on subject t for student i when the time allocation
is Li. Let θ
T
i (Li) be the total scores for student i when the time allocation
is Li.
27The definition of a matching system here is equivalent to the definition of a mechanism
in So¨nmez and Switzer (2013). In this paper, I use the terminology “matching system”
instead of “mechanism” in order to avoid confusion, since I reserve the terminology “mech-
anism” for the SOSM, the TTCM, and the Boston mechanism.
28Note that although I model the learning cures in a deterministic manner, one can
imagine a learning curve to be an estimation of the output when a student makes the
decision of how much time to allocate on a skill category.
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Let a priority system with endogenous efforts F be a system-
atic method to create a priority structure f with input of L. Let ϕFω :
[0, L¯]|I||T | × Q → M be a matching system with endogenous efforts
to be a systematic method to create a matching with the procedure that it
first creates a priority structure by F and then the mechanism ω uses the
priority structure and the submitted preferences to produce a matching.29
Let ϕFω,i[(L,Q)] be the school that student i obtains when the strategy
profile is (L,Q).
A dominant strategy (Li, Qi) for student i is a strategy such that







for all (L′i, Q
′
i) ∈ [0, L¯]|T | ×Qi and for all (L−i, Q−i) ∈ [0, L¯]|T |(|I|−1) ×Q−i.
Definition 9. A time allocation Li is a partial dominant strategy for
student i under ϕFω if (Li, Pi) is a dominant strategy under ϕFω .
In other words, a time allocation Li is a partial dominant strategy, if
the time allocation along with submitting the true preference is a dominant
strategy.
A Nash equilibrium (L,Q) is a strategy profile such that







for all i ∈ I and all (L′i, Q′i) ∈ [0, L¯]|T | ×Qi.
3.5 Promoting Diversity of Talents
In this section, I introduce four criteria of promoting diversity of talents:
respecting versatility of talents, respecting versatility of talents with mini-
mum efforts, respecting unique talents, and respecting unique talents with
minimum efforts.
29Since there is no confusion, in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6.2, I will refer the priority
system with endogenous efforts and the matching system with endogenous efforts as the
priority system and matching system, respectively.
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As mentioned in the introduction, these four criteria belong to two
groups: promoting versatility of talents and promoting unique talents. I
first introduce the notion of promoting versatility of talents. This notion
captures the idea of encouraging the “breadth” of students’ study. It says
that the marginal improvement on each skill category is the same. In par-
ticular, it means that all the learning possibilities are fulfilled. Consider a
student i with a time allocation Li. If Li makes the marginal improvement









In other words, when a student’s time allocation respects versatility of tal-
ents, then this time allocation maximizes the total scores. The following is
the first notion of promoting diversity of talents.
Definition 10. A matching system respects versatility of talents if it
is a partial dominant strategy for each student to allocate time so that the
total scores is maximized.
It is not unusual that a student is more talented in one skill category
than others. Denote such skill category as her unique talent.
Definition 11. A student i has an unique talent on skill category t, if
Lti(L¯) ≥ Lt
′
i (L¯) for all t
′ ∈ T \ {t}.
The next group, promoting unique talents, captures the idea of encour-
aging the “depth” of students’ study.
Definition 12. A matching system respects unique talents if it is a
partial dominant strategy for each student i to allocation all time to the
skill category of (one of) her unique talents.
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One can see that it may not be the best to a society’s interest, if all
students put most of their efforts on pursing the knowledge/skill in the skill
categories that they are relatively talented at but are ignorant in other skill
categories. An education planner might have an ideology that each student
should be encouraged to have minimum knowledge/skill in all (or a subset
of) skill categories. Let ηt be the threshold on skill category t, which
represents the minimum performance, or score, that an education planner
wants to induce a student to have. Denote η = (ηt)t∈T as the threshold.
Definition 13. A matching system promotes minimum effort η if it is
a partial dominant strategy for each student i to allocate time such that she
maximizes the number of skill categories that achieve the threshold.
The following two criteria are the combinations of respecting versatility
of talents (or respecting unique talents) and promoting minimum efforts.
Definition 14. A matching system promotes versatility of talents with
minimum efforts η if it is a partial dominant strategy for each student i to
allocate time Li such that (1) it maximizes the number of skill categories that
achieve the thresholds and (2) there does not exist another time allocation
L′i such that it results in the same number of skill categories that achieve
the thresholds and a higher total exam scores than the total exam scores
resulted from Li.
The above criterion encourage students to first maximize the number
of skill categories that achieve the thresholds and then maximize the total
scores.
Definition 15. A matching system promotes unique talents with min-
imum efforts η if it is a partial dominant strategy for each student i to
allocate time Li such that (1) it maximizes the number of subject that
achieves the threshold and (2) there does not exist another time allocation
L′i that results in the same number of skill categories that achieve the thresh-
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olds and higher scores in every subject of her unique talents than the scores
resulted from Li.
The above criterion encourages students to first maximize the number
of skill categories that achieve the thresholds and then maximize the score
in the skill category that she is talented at.
In the following, I propose several matching systems that achieves the
criteria mentioned above. A total score-based priority system is a
priority system that uses the total scores to determine students’ priorities
so that a student with higher total scores has a higher priority.
Denote ϕTSOSM (or ϕ
T
TTCM ) as the matching system where the priority
system is the total score-based priority system and the mechanism is the
SOSM (or the TTCM).




Next, I propose the Sequential Eating Algorithm (SEA) in order to create
a priority system that is used in a matching system that promoting unique
talents.
For any score profile τ , the Sequential Eating Algorithm works in
the following way.
Step 1 For each student i, pick the highest score from all categories. Denote
this score as τ(i).
Step 2 For each student, let pisi = τ(i) +m
s
i , for all s ∈ S.
In other words, for any τ , this algorithm creates (pisi )i∈I,s∈S . A deter-
ministic tie-breakerd is a complete ordering over students. One example
of such tie-breaking rule is an ordering of students based on students’ age.
The SEA priority system is a priority system that uses (pisi )i∈I,s∈S
and a deterministic tie-breaker d to create a priority structure fSEA such
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that fSEAs (i) < f
SEA










Denote ϕSEASOSM (or ϕ
SEA
TTCM ) as the matching system where the priority
system is the SEA priority system and the mechanism is the SOSM (or the
TTCM).




Before I introduce a construction that will be used in the design of match-
ing systems that promotes minimum efforts, I show that the total score-
based priority system does not promote minimum efforts. Denote ϕT,dω as a
matching system where the priority system is the total score-based priority
system, the tie-breaking rule is d, and the mechanism is ω.
Theorem 22. A matching system ϕT,dω , where ω is strategy-proof and stable
(or is the TTCM), does not promote minimum effort η.
A letter grade priority system is a priority system that it first trans-
forms a student’s score in each subject into letter grade, which has a numeric
value, and then sum up all the numeric values to determine student’s total
numeric values, so that a student with higher total numeric values has a
higher priority.
For simplicity, I assume that there are only two letter grades: A and B.
With the construction of two letter grades, a letter grade priority system
essentially gives priority to the students with more skill categories with letter
grade A. The actual numeric value that is assigned to the letter grade A or
30For example, consider two students i, j with two subjects t1, t2, and their scores are




j = 0 for all s ∈ S. The priority created
by the SEA priority system is
fSEAs : i, j.
104
B does not matter. Therefore, in the following analysis, I will not be specific
on the numeric values assigned to the letter grades.
A letter grade priority system with threshold η is a letter grade
priority system where the a student with a score on skill category τ ti ≥ ηt
receives an A in the skill category t and gives priority to the students who
have more As than other students. As mentioned in the introduction, such
a system could easily create ties and requires a tie-breaking rule.
Denote ϕη,dω as a matching system where the priority system is a letter
grade priority system with threshold η, the tie-breaking rule is d, and the
mechanism is ω.
Theorem 23. A matching system ϕη,dω , where ω is strategy-proof and stable
(or is the TTCM), promotes minimum effort η.
Finally, I incorporate this construction into the matching systems that
respects versatility of talents and respects unique talents, respectively, which
are introduced earlier.
A total score-based tie breaker is a tie-breaking rule hat uses the
total scores to break a tie.
Denote ϕη,TSOSM (or ϕ
η,T
TTCM ) as a matching system where the priority
system is a letter grade priority system with threshold η, the tie-breaking
rule is the total score-based tie breaker, and the mechanism is the SOSM
(or the TTCM).
Theorem 24. The matching systems ϕη,TSOSM and ϕ
η,T
TTCM respects versatil-
ity of talents with minimum effort η.
A SEA tie breaker is a tie-breaking rule that uses the priority in fSEA
to break a tie.
Denote ϕη,SEASOSM (or ϕ
η,SEA
TTCM ) be a matching system, where the priority
system is the letter grade system with threshold η, the tie breaking rule is
SEA tie breaker, and the mechanism is the SOSM (or the TTCM).
I make the following assumption for the next theorem.
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Assumption 2. For each student i, Lti(l) 6= Lt
′
i (l) for all l ∈ (0, L¯] and for all
t, t′ ∈ T . Moreover, for each student i and for all t, t′ ∈ T , if Lti(l) > Lt
′
i (l),
then Lti(l) > Lt
′
i (l) for all l ∈ (0, L¯].
Theorem 25. Under Assumption 2, the matching systems ϕη,SEASOSM and
ϕη,SEATTCM respect unique talents with minimum effort η.
3.6 The Analysis on the Taiwanese High School
Match
In this section, I analyze the Taiwanese High School Match. This section
is divided into two parts. In the first part, I analyze Feature 1 mentioned
in the introduction. In the second part, I analyze Feature 2 and Feature 3
mentioned in the introduction.
3.6.1 The Floating Priority System
I first analyze the effect of having a priority system that gives students
different priority in schools if they rank the schools differently. Throughout
this section, I assume that students’ score profile τ is given. In other words,
the strategy for a student in this section is the preference that she submits.
The priority of a student is determined by the sum of the total exam scores,
the merit score, and the numeric value given to the school choice according
to their rankings. If there is a tie, a deterministic tie breaker d is used.
Definition 16. A floating priority system v = {v1, ..., v|S|} is a sequence
of numbers such that vi ≥ vj for i < j and there exists vi, vj ∈ v such that
vi 6= vj .
A student i with a total exam scores τTi who ranks school s as the r-
th school choice in her submitted preference will have a numeric value of
τTi + m
s
i + vr for school choice s. A student i has a higher priority than
student j in school s if and only if (1) τTi +m
s












j + vr′ and i d j, where student i ranks school s as
the r-th school choice and student j ranks school s as the r′-th choice.
A mechanism ω associated with a floating priority system v is
a matching system where the matching is determined in the following se-
quence: (1) students submit their preferences, (2) the priority structure is
computed so that each student’s priority in schools is based on the sum
of her total exam scores, the merit score, and the numeric value given to
each school choice according to v, and (3) the mechanism ω uses the com-
puted priority structure and the submitted preference profile to determine
the matching.
Denote ϕv,dω as a matching system, where it uses a floating priority system
v, the tie-breaking rule is d, and the mechanism is ω. The next theorem
says that it is impossible for a mechanism associated with a floating priority
system to have some desirable properties. Theorem 26 shows that there is
a conflict between fairness and stability for a mechanism.
Theorem 26. There does not exist a mechanism ω associated with a floating
priority system v, ϕv,dω , that is fair and stable.
Next, I analyze the effect of having a floating priority system on the three
mechanisms: the SOSM, the TTCM, and the Boston mechanism. Denote
ϕdSOSM , ϕ
d
TTCM , and ϕ
d
BM , as the matching system that does not use a float-
ing priority system, where the tie-breaking rule is d, and the mechanism
is the SOSM, the TTCM, and the Boston mechanism, respectively.
We say that a matching system ϕ is equivalent to another matching
system ϕ′ if ϕ(Q) = ϕ′(Q) for any Q ∈ Q. In other words, if two match-
ing systems are equivalent, then for any submitted preference profile, both
matching systems produce the same matching. The following theorem says
that having a floating priority system does not have any impact on the
Boston mechanism.




As a result of Theorem 27, ϕvBM has the properties of efficiency, insta-
bility, and nonstrategy-proffness as ϕBM does.
Theorem 28. ϕv,dBM is efficient, but it unfair, unstable, nonstrategy-proof.
The next two theorems show that when the SOSM and TTCM are as-
sociated with a floating priority system, some desirable properties are lost.
Theorem 29. ϕv,dSOSM is stable, but it is unfair, inefficient and nonstrategy-
proof.
Theorem 30. ϕv,dTTCM is efficient, but it is unfair, unstable, and nonstrategy-
proof.
The following table summarizes the properties of all three mechanisms
when they are associated with and without a floating priority system.
Table 3.1: Comparison of the Six Matching Systems
Fair Stable Efficient Strategy-proof
ϕdSOSM Yes Yes No Yes
ϕv,dSOSM No Yes No No
ϕdTTCM No No Yes Yes
ϕv,dTTCM No No Yes No
ϕdBM No No Yes No
ϕv,dBM No No Yes No
Table 1 shows that the SOSM and the TTCM lose some of their desirable
properties when they are associated with a floating priority system, but they
do not gain any other desirable properties. Therefore, a policy suggestion
would be removing the floating priority system entirely, regardless of which
of the three mechanisms is used.
108
3.6.2 Incentive Distortion
In this section, I analyze a priority system that is letter grade system with
a lexicographic tie-breaker.31 Such priority system captures Feature 2 and
Feature 3 in the Taiwanese High School Match.
A lexicographic tie-breaker T is a tie-breaking rule, which is a com-
plete ordering over T , so that a tie is broken in the way that the priority
is given to the student who has a higher score in the subject with a higher
ordering. For example, suppose T= t1, t2, t3. If there is a tie between
students i, j, the student with a higher score in subject t1 has a higher pri-
ority. If there is a tie on the score in subject t1, the student with a higher
score in subject t2 has a higher priority, and so on. I assume that if after
comparing scores in all skill categories, a tie still exists, then a deterministic
tie-breaking rule d is used.
Denote ϕη,Tω as a matching system, where the priority system is the
letter grade system with threshold η, and the tie-breaking rule is T , and
the mechanism is ω.
The following theorem says that when the mechanism is strategy-proof
and stable (or the TTCM), the matching system does not respect versatility
of talents.
Theorem 31. A matching system ϕη,Tω , where ω is strategy-proof and sta-
ble (or is the TTCM), does not respect versatility of talents.
With a letter grade system, the matching system gives students incen-
tives to allocate time so that it maximizes the number of subjects that
achieve thresholds. Thus, it could cause some students to sacrifice the sub-
jects that they are comparatively good at and allocate more time on the
subjects that they could achieve minimum thresholds.
The following theorem says that when the mechanism is strategy-proof
and stable (or the TTCM) and the priority system is a letter grade sys-
31Note that the setting of the model is the same as in Section 3.5.
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tem with a lexicographic tie-breaker, the matching system does not respect
versatility of talents with minimum efforts.
Theorem 32. A matching system ϕη,Tω , where ω is strategy-proof and sta-
ble (or is the TTCM), does not respect versatility of talents with minimum
efforts η.
Although ϕη,Tω promotes minimum efforts η, it gives students incentives
to allocate time on the subject with a higher order in the lexicographic tie-
breaker. In other words, consider a student i with two time allocations Li
and L′i such that both the time allocations give the same number of subjects
that achieve the thresholds. Student i would favor the time allocation that
results in a higher score in the subject with a higher order in the lexico-
graphic tie-breaker, regardless of whether that subject is the subject that
she is comparatively good at.
The following theorem says that when the mechanism is strategy-proof
and stable (or is the TTCM) and the priority system is a letter grade sys-
tem with a lexicographic tie-breaker, the matching system does not respect
unique talents.
Theorem 33. A matching system ϕη,Tω , where ω is strategy-proof and sta-
ble (or is the TTCM), does not respect unique talents.
When there is a tie between students, the lexicographic tie-breaker gives
students incentives to allocate time on the subject with a higher order,
regardless of whether that subject is of their unique talents.
The following theorem says that when the mechanism is strategy-proof
and stable (or is the TTCM) and the priority system is a letter grade sys-
tem with a lexicographic tie-breaker, the matching system does not respect
unique talents with minimum efforts.
Theorem 34. A matching system ϕη,Tω , where ω is strategy-proof and sta-
ble (or is the TTCM), does not respect unique talents with minimum efforts
η.
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Despite ϕη promotes minimum efforts η, the lexicographic tie-breaker
gives students incentive to allocate on the time on the subject with a higher
order in the lexicographic tie-breaker. Consider a student i with two time
allocations Li and L
′
i that give student i the same number of subjects that
achieve thresholds. If Li results in a higher score in the subject with a
higher order in the lexicographic tie-breaker, then student i has an incentive
to choose Li, regardless of whether that subject is of her unique talents.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I consider a matching problem between students and schools
with an environment where students’ priority in schools is endogenous in
terms of students’ efforts or the way they rank schools. I show that the
consideration of the endogenous aspects of students’ priority has profound
effects on the performance of a matching system. In the first part of the
results, I propose four criteria of promoting diversity of talents. Then, I
propose four matching systems that achieve these four criteria. In the second
part of the results, I analyze the Taiwanese High School Match. First, I find
that a floating priority system does not have any benefits, regardless of
which of the SOSM, the TTCM or the Boston mechanism is used. Second,
I show that a matching system with the features of Feature 2 and Feature




In this section, I present three related literatures: choice of mechanism,
effort distortion and designing priority.
3.8.1 Choice of Mechanism
The Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism (SOSM) is proposed by Gale and
Shapley (1962). Gale and Shapley (1962) show that this mechanism pro-
duces a stable matching. Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982)
show that it is strategy-proof for students. Note that this mechanism is not
efficient.
The Top-Trading Cycles Mechanism (TTCM) is proposed by Abdulka-
dirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003). Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) show that
it is efficient, strategy-proof, but it is not stable.
The Boston mechanism is a widely used mechanism. Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez (2003) show that this mechanism is efficient, but it is not stable nor
strategy-proof. Ergin and So¨nmez (2006) show that the matching produced
by the dominant-strategy outcome Pareto dominates the matching produced
by the Nash equilibrium outcomes in the Boston mechanism. Pathak and
So¨nmez (2008) study an environment where some students are unaware of
the properties of the Boston mechanism and find that such students’ welfare
would be hurt due to the nonstrategy-proofness of the Boston mechanism.
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence to show that some
parents do not response to the Boston mechanism strategically in Boston.
Pathak and So¨nmez (2013) propose a method to measure the vulnerability to
manipulation and find many places in the world are replacing more manip-
ulable mechanisms to less manipulable mechanisms. Kumano (2013) shows
that for the Boston mechanism to be strategy-proof or stable, it has a very
restrictive requirement on the priority structure, which is very difficult to be
satisfied in reality. Hsu (2013) relaxes strategy-proofness to dominance solv-
ability and finds that for the Boston mechanism to be dominance-solvable,
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the requirement on the priority structure is still restrictive and suggests re-
placement of the Boston mechanism. Despite the deficiencies of the Boston
mechanism, it remains a very popular mechanism and therefore, it is worth-
while to understand the properties of the mechanism and how participants
behave in the mechanism. Kojima and U¨nver (2014) use an axiomatic ap-
proach to characterize the Boston mechanism. Hsu (2014) characterizes
the undominated strategies and weakly dominated strategies in the Boston
mechanism.
3.8.2 Effort Distortion
The design of a mechanism has effects on how much effort a participant is
willing to provide. A desirable mechanism should give incentives to par-
ticipants for them to improve their standings. For example, in the context
of student placement problem, students should not be punished for better
exam scores. This property is called respecting improvements.32
Many real-world mechanisms, however, do not have such properties.
Blinski and So¨nmez (1999) show that the mechanism used in Turkey college
admission does not respect improvements. So¨nmez and Switzer (2013) and
So¨nmez (2013) propose the cadet-branch matching problem that matches
cadets to branches, while cadets have options to provide additional service
years for increasing their priority in branches. So¨nmez and Switzer (2013)
and So¨nmez (2013) show that the mechanisms that are currently used in the
United States Military Academy (USMA) and the Reserved Officer Training
Corps (ROTC), respectively, do not respect improvements.
It is worthwhile to point out that the deficiency in the ROTC pointed
out in So¨nmez (2013) is resulted from the design of the priority, while the
deficiency in the Turkey college admission pointed out in Blinski and So¨nmez
(1999) and the deficiency in the USMA pointed out in So¨nmez and Switzer
(2013) are due to the design of mechanism.
32This property is introduced by Blinski and So¨nmez (1999).
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In above cases, the effort distortion refers to the situation that partici-
pants may have incentives to reduce their exam scores or their standings in
the order-of-merit list33. In this paper, I introduce another kind of effort dis-
tortion, which is the incentive distortion on the distribution of participants’
efforts on different subjects.
On the other hand, the choice of a matching mechanism also has an
effect on schools’ incentives. Hatfield et al. (2011) propose the criterion of
respecting improvement of school quality and show that any stable mecha-
nism approximately respects improvements of school quality when the school
district is large.
3.8.3 Designing Priority
As pointed out in Section 3.8.1, there are deficiencies in all three mecha-
nisms. One way to circumvent the deficiencies of a mechanism is to design
the priority structure so that the shortcomings would never occur. Ergin
(2002) shows the SOSM is efficient if and only if the priority structure is
Ergin-acyclic. Kesten (2006) shows that the TTCM is stable if and only if
the priority structure is Kesten-acyclic. Haeringer and Klijn (2009) consider
an environment where students’ submitted preferences have a limit on the
number of schools that can be included in the submitted preferences and
show that the Nash equilibrium outcomes in the TTCM are efficient if and
only if the priority structure is X-acyclic and that the Nash equilibrium out-
comes in the Boston mechanism (or the SOSM) are efficient if and only if
the priority structure is strongly X-acyclic. Kojima (2011) shows that the
SOSM is robustly stable if and only if the priority structure is Ergin-acyclic.
Hatfield et al. (2011) show the equivalence of the existence of a stable (or
efficient) mechanism and virtually homogeneous school preference profile.
Kumano (2013) shows that the Boston mechanism is stable and strategy-
proof if and only if the priority structure is Kumano-acyclic. Kojima (2013)
33The order-of-merit list is used to determine cadets’ priority in branches.
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considers an environment where agents have multi-unit demands and shows
the equivalence of existence of a stable and efficient mechanism, the exis-
tence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism, and the essentially homo-
geneous priority structure. Hsu (2013) shows that the Boston mechanism is
dominance-solvable if and only if the priority structure is acyclic.
3.9 The Priority System in the Taiwanese High
School Match
In this section, I present the priority system in Keelung and Taipei district.
Students’ priority in the centralized matching process is computed from the
sum of the numeric values in three grand categories: the Ranking Score, the
Diversified Learning Score, and the Exam Score. The maximum value in
each category is 30. The components in each category are as follows.
• Category 1: Ranking Score
– For school choices ranked from 1st to 10th: the first school choice
receives a numeric value of 30, the second 29, and so on.
– For school choices ranked from 11th to 20th: each school receives
a numeric value of 20.
– For school choices ranked from 21st to 30th: each school receives
a numeric value of 18.
• Category 2: Diversified Learning Score
– For the following criteria, only the last three semesters count.
– Each of the fields, sports, literature and general, receives a nu-
meric value of 6, if that field passes the minimum requirement for
three semesters.
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– Each of the three semester receives a numeric value of 4, if a
student provides campus or community service with a total hours
of 6 or more in that semester.
• Category 3: Exam Score
– There are five subjects. The raw (numerical) scores are trans-
formed into letter grades with A, B, and C.
– A subject with a letter grade A receives a numeric value of 6.
– A subject with a letter grade B receives a numeric value of 4.
– A subject with a letter grade C receives a numeric value of 2.
Notice that an important feature in the above system is that the eval-
uation of students in Category 2 and Category 3 is “coarse” in terms of
students’ efforts. For example, consider the evaluation of providing campus
or community service in the Category 2. A student who provides her campus
or community service with six hours receives a numeric value of 4. However,
if she provides her campus or community service with five and a half hours,
instead of receiving a fraction of 4, she receives zero. This observation holds
for all categories in Category 2 and Category 3.
If there is a tie, the following steps are used to break a tie.
Step 1 Use the numeric value from Diversified Learning Score to break the
tie.
Step 2 If there is still a tie, use the following order of subjects to break tie:
total, Chinese, Math, English, Social Science, Nature Science, Writing.
(Comparison is done with letter grades, A, B, and C.)
Step 3 If there is still a tie, use the Ranking Score to break the tie.
Step 4 If there is still a tie, the priority is given to the students who have skill
categories with grades A++, A+, B++, B+. The priority is given to the
students with more grades A++, then A+, then B++, and finally B+.
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Step 5 If there is still a tie, break the tie by comparing the grades in letter
grades with A++, A+, A, B++, B+, B, and C in the skill categories
with the following order: Chinese, Math, English, Social Science, Nat-
ural Science.
Step 6 If there is still a tie, use the following method for enrollment.
– For the schools that also hold individual entrant exams, transfer
the capacity for admission by individual entrant exams by at most
5% to the capacity for admission by centralized matching process.
If there are still more students than the capacity for admission by
centralized matching process, the jurisdiction is on the education
administration.
– For the schools the do not hold individual entrant exams, the
jurisdiction is on the education administration.
Notice that the above tie-breaking rule essentially employs a pre-determined
ordering over several skill categories so that a tie is broken in favor of a stu-
dent who has a higher evaluation in the skill category with a higher ordering.
3.10 Omitted Results and Proofs in the Main Text
3.10.1 Respecting Improvement
A desirable property of a mechanism is that it should not punish a student
if her priority is improved.
Definition 17 (Blinski and So¨nmez (1999)). A mechanism respects im-
provement of priority if a student’s priority in some schools improves,
then she will obtain a weakly better school.
Blinski and So¨nmez (1999) show that the SOSM respects improvements
of priority. The following theorem says that if a mechanism is strategy-proof
and stable, then it respects improvement of priority.
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Theorem 35. If a mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof and stable, then it respects
improvement of priority.
Proof. Consider a mechanism ϕ that is strategy-proof and stable. Suppose
it does not respect improvement of priority. Then there exists a student i
and two priority structures f and f ′, where (1) f ′s(i) ≤ fs(i) for all s ∈ S and
f ′s′(i) < fs′(i) for some s
′ ∈ S and (2) the relative rankings of all students
other than i are the same in both f and f ′, such that i obtains a worse
school under f ′ than under f . Denote the matching produced by ϕ under
(P, f, q) be µ1 and the matching under (P, f
′, q) be µ2. Let µ1(i) = s1 and
µ2(i) = s2. By construction, s1Pis2. Since ϕ is a stable matching, then µ1
is stable in the problem (P, f, q). Moreover, by construction, f ′s1(i) ≤ fs1(i).
Therefore, µ1 is stable in the problem (P, f
′, q). Consider the strategy Qi,
where
Qi : s1.
Note that the matching µ1 is stable in the problems (P
′, f, q) and (P ′, f ′, q),
where P ′ = (Qi, P−i). In the problem (P ′, f ′, q), the mechanism will match
i to s1. This is because of the rural hospital theorem
34 and the fact that µ1
is stable in the problem (P ′, f ′, q). Therefore, when the priority structure is
f ′, student i has incentive to deviate from reporting the true preference Pi.
This contradicts the assumption that the mechanism ϕ is strategy-proof.
The following theorem says that the TTCM respects improvement of
priority.
Theorem 36. The Top-Trading Cycles Mechanism respects improvement
of priority.
Proof. Consider a student i and two priority structures f and f ′, where (1)
f ′s(i) ≤ fs(i) for all s ∈ S and f ′s′(i) < fs′(i) for some s′ ∈ S and (2) the
34The rural hospital theorem says that for a given problem, a student who is matched to
some school in one stable matching will be matched to some school in all stable matchings.
See Theorem 5.12 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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relative rankings of all students other than i are the same in both f and f ′.
Assume that i is in a cycle at the iteration t in the problem (P, f, q), and
assume i is in a cycle at the iteration t′ in the problem (P, f ′, q). Since in the
problem (P, f ′, q), the number of schools that point to i before iteration t′
increases comparing to the problem (P, f, q), we have t′ ≤ t. Therefore, the
school that i obtains in the problem (P, f ′, q) weakly improves comparing
to the problem (P, f ′, q).
3.10.2 Proof of Theorem 20
By Blinski and So¨nmez (1999), the SOSM respects improvement of priority.
By Theorem 36, the TTCM respects improvement of priority. Since both the
SOSM and TTCM respects improvement of priority, it is a partial dominant
strategy for each student to maximize the final grade. Under ϕTSOSM or
ϕTTTCM , it is equivalent to maximize their total scores.
3.10.3 Lemma 16
Lemma 16. Consider i and two of her time allocations Li and L
′
i. Let





SEA be the prior-
ity structure generated by (Li, L−i), and let f˜SEA be the priority structure
generated by (L′i, L−i). If Lti(Li) = Ltˆi(L′i), then fSEAs (i) = f˜SEAs (i) for all
s,∈ S. Moreover, if Lti(Li) > Ltˆi(Li), then fSEAs (i) ≤ f˜SEAs (i) for all s ∈ S.
Proof. Let the highest score resulted from Li be τ(i) and the highest score
resulted from L′i be τ(i)
′. If Lti(Li) = Ltˆi(L′i), then τ(i) + msi = τ(i)′ + msi .
Therefore, fSEAs (i) = f˜
SEA
s (i). If Lti(Li) > Ltˆi(L′i), then τ(i) +msi > τ(i)′ +
msi . Therefore, f
SEA
s (i) ≤ f˜SEAs (i).
3.10.4 Proof of Theorem 21
Suppose each student has one unique talent. By Lemma 16, for any given
time allocation of her opponents L−i, if a student i allocates time Li such
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that she maximizes the score on the subject of her unique talent, then she
has the highest possible priority comparing to other time allocation L′i. By
Blinski and So¨nmez (1999), the SOSM respects improvement of priority. By
Theorem 36, the TTCM respects improvement of priority. Since the SOSM
and the TTCM respect improvement of priority, the time allocation Li is a
partial dominant strategy for student i. Suppose some students have more
than one unique talent. With a similar argument, it is a partial dominant
strategy for such a student to spend all her time one a skill category of her
unique talents.
3.10.5 Proof of Theorem 22
Consider the problem. Let I = {i1, i2}, S = {s1, s2}, and q = (1, 1). Let
msi = 0 for all i ∈ I and s ∈ S. The preference profile P is the following.
Pi1 :s1, s2
Pi2 :s1, s2
Let T = {t1, t2, t3}, L¯ = 1 and η = (0.12, 0.18, 0.3). The learning curves












































3). Note that L1 and L2 are the
unique time allocations that maximize total scores for i1 and i2, respectively.
Also note that i1 has a higher total scores than i2. The generated priority
structure is the following.
fsi1 :i2, i1
fsi2 :i2, i1
The unique stable matching µ is the following. (Note that it is also the







Based on Li1 and Li2 , i1 has no subjects that achieve the thresholds. If
i1 has a time allocation L
′
i1
= (0.5, 0.5, 0), then he will have two subjects





The unique stable matching µ′ is the following. (This is also the matching







Since i1’s welfare improves, Li1 is not a partial dominant strategy for
her. Therefore, ϕT,dω does not promote minimum efforts η.
3.10.6 Proof of Theorem 23
By Theorem 35 and Theorem 36, the mechanism ω respects improvement of
priority. Therefore, it is a partial dominant strategy to maximize the final
grade. Under ϕη,dω , it is equivalent to maximize the number of subjects that
achieve the thresholds.
3.10.7 Proof of Theorem 24
By Blinski and So¨nmez (1999), the SOSM respects improvement of priority.
By Theorem 36, the TTCM respects improvement of priority. Since both
the SOSM and the TTCM respect improvement of priority, it is a partial
dominant strategy for each student to maximize her final grade. Under
ϕη,TSOSM or ϕ
η,T
TTCM , it is equivalent for a student to allocate time such that it
maximizes the number of subjects that achieve the thresholds and there does
not exist another time allocation that results in the same number of subjects
achieving thresholds and has a higher total scores. Note that whenever there
is a tie in the number of subjects that achieve the thresholds, the score-
based tie-breaker breaks the tie in favor of the student who has a higher
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total scores. Therefore, it is a partial dominant strategy to allocate time as
described above.
3.10.8 Lemma 17
Lemma 17. Under Assumption 2, consider a student i with her unique
















i the highest score in subject t, comparing to other time allocation L̂i such
that L̂ 6= L˜ and ∑t∈T Lti +∑t∈T L˜ti ≤ L¯.
Proof. By Assumption 2, student i only has one unique talent. Moreover, by
Assumption 2, Lti(l) > Lt
′
i (l) for all l ∈ (0, L¯] and t′ ∈ T \ {t}. Therefore, if






i, the score in subject t is maximized.
3.10.9 Proof of Theorem 25
Under Assumption 2, each student has only one unique talent. Consider
student i with her unique talent t. Let Li be a time allocation such that (1) it
maximizes the number of subjects that achieve the thresholds and (2) there
does not exists another time allocation L˜i such that it achieves the same









With Assumption 2, such time allocation Li is unique.















Lemma 17, the time allocation Lˇi maximizes the score in subject t, given
Li.
By Blinski and So¨nmez (1999), the SOSM respects improvement of pri-
ority. By Theorem 36, the TTCM respects improvement. Since the SOSM
and the TTCM respect improvement of priority, then it is a partial dom-





respects unique talents with minimum efforts.
123
3.10.10 Proof of Theorem 26
Let I = {i1, i2, i3}, S = {s1, s2, s3}, q = (1, 1, 1). Students’ preferences are
the following.
Pi1 :s1, s2, s3
Pi2 :s1, s2, s3
Pi3 :s2, s1, s3
Let τT = (30, 20, 19) and v = (30, 20, 10). Moreover, let msi = 0 for
all i ∈ I and s ∈ S. The generated priority structure of students is the
following.
fs1 :i1, i2, i3
fs2 :i1, i3, i2
fs3 :i1, i2, i3







However, µ is not fair, since i2 has a higher total scores than i3 and
prefers s2 to s3, but i3 is matched to s2.
3.10.11 Proof of Theorem 27
Note that a student i is proposing to a school at iteration t in the both ϕdBM
and ϕv,dBM only if she is rejected by all schools that she ranks as the first t−1
schools. Therefore, for any two students i, j who are proposing to the same
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school s at iteration t in either ϕdBM or ϕ
v,d
BM , whether i or j is rejected by
school s depends on their priorities, which are τTi +m
s











j . In other words, ϕ
d
BM
is equivalent to ϕv,dBM .
3.10.12 Proof of Theorem 28
By Theorem 27, ϕv,dBM is efficient, but it is not stable nor strategy-proof.
To see that ϕv,dBM is not fair, consider the following example. Let I =
{i1, i2, i3}, S = {s1, s2, s3} and q = (1, 1, 1). The preferences of students are
the following.
Pi1 :i1, i2, i3
Pi2 :i1, i2, i3
Pi3 :i2, i2, i3
Let τT = (30, 20, 19) and v = (30, 20, 10). Moreover, let msi = 0 for i ∈ I
and s ∈ S. The generated priority structure is the following.
fs1 :i1, i2, i3
fs2 :i1, i3, i2
fs3 :i1, i2, i3







Since i2 has a higher total scores than i3 and i3 is admitted to a school
that is preferred to i2’s match, this is not a fair match.
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3.10.13 Proof of Theorem 29
To see that the ϕv,dSOSM is stable, note that the only different between
ϕv,dSOSM and ϕ
d
SOSM is that the priority of students in these two problems
are changed. In addition, Gale and Shapley (1962) shows that for any given
preferences of students and their priority, the ϕdSOSM produces a stable
matching. Therefore, ϕv,dSOSM produces a stable matching.
Tee see ϕv,dSOSM is not fair, consider a problem where I = {i1, i2, i3},
S = {s1, s2, s3}, and q = (1, 1, 1). The preferences of students are the
following.
Pi1 :s1, s2, s3
Pi2 :s1, s2, s3
Pi3 :s2, s1, s3
Let τT = (30, 20, 19) and v = (30, 25, 20). Moreover, let msi = 0 for all
i ∈ I and s ∈ S. The generated priority structure is the following.
fs1 :i1, i2, i3
fs2 :i1, i3, i2
fs3 :i1, i2, i3







The matching µ is not fair, because student i2 has higher total scores
than i3, while i3 is admitted to school s2, and i2 prefers s2 to her matched
school s3.
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Moreover, it also shows that ϕv,dSOSM is not strategy-proof. If i2 submits
Qi2 : s2, s1, s3,







Since i2 is better off by submitting Qi2 , ϕ
v,d
SOSM is not strategy-proof.
To see ϕv,dSOSM is not efficient, consider another problem. Let I = {i1, i2},
S = {s1, s2} and q = (1, 1).
The preferences of students are the following.
Pi1 :s1, s2
Pi2 :s2, s1
Let τT = (20, 20) and v = (20, 10). Moreover, let mi1 = (0, 20) and
mi2 = (20, 0). The matching µ














Therefore, ϕv,dSOSM is not efficient.
3.10.14 Proof of Theorem 30
To see that ϕv,dTTCM is efficient, note that the difference between ϕ
v,d
TTCM and
ϕdTTCM is that the priority of students in these two problems are different.
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Since Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) show that ϕdTTCM is efficient for
any preferences and priority of students, ϕv,dTTCM is efficient.
To see ϕv,dTTCM is not strategy-proof, consider the following problem. Let
I = {i1, i2, i3}, S = {s1, s2, s3} and q = (1, 1, 1). The preferences of students
are the following.
Pi1 :s1, s2, s3
Pi2 :s1, s2, s3
Pi3 :s1, s2, s3
Let τ = (30, 20, 19) and v = (30, 25, 20). Moreover, let msi = 0 for all
i ∈ I and s ∈ S.
The matching produced by ϕv,dTTCM when all students report the true







However, if i3 reports Qi3 , where
Qi3 : s2, s1, s3,







Since i3 is better off by reporting Qi3 , ϕ
v,d
TTCM is not strategy-proof.
To see ϕv,dTTCM is not fair, consider another problem. Let I = {i1, i2, i3, i4},
S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, and q = (1, 1, 1, 1). The preferences of students are the
following.
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Pi1 :s1, s2, s3, s4
Pi2 :s1, s2, s3, s4
Pi3 :s2, s1, s3, s4
Pi4 :s3, s1, s2, s4
Let τ = (30, 29, 28, 27) and v = (30, 25, 20, 15). Moreover, let msi = 0 for
all i ∈ I and s ∈ S.
The matching produced by ϕv,dTTCM when students submit the true pref-
erences is the following.
µ′′ =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4
i1 i3 i4 i2
)
.
Since i2 has a higher total scores than i3 and i3 obtains a school that i2
prefers to her match, the matching is not fair.
To see ϕv,dTTCM is not stable, consider the following example. Let I =




Let τT = (20, 20) and v = (20, 10). Moreover, let mi1 = (0, 20) and
mi2 = (20, 0). The matching µ







However, µ′′′ is not stable.
129
3.10.15 Proof of Theorem 31
Consider the problem in the proof of Theorem 22. Note that if ϕη,Tω pro-
motes versatility of talents, then (Li1 , Pi1) and (Li2 , Pi2) are the dominant
strategies for students i1 and i2, respectively. However, if student i1 uses




The unique stable matching µ′ is the following. (Note that it is also the







Therefore, (Li1 , Pi1) is not a dominant strategy for i1. In other words,
ϕη,Tω does not respect versatility of talents.
3.10.16 Proof of Theorem 32
Consider the case that ω is a strategy-proof and stable mechanism.





Let T = {t1, t2, t3}, L¯ = 10 and η = (0.4, 0.6, 0.9). Moreover, let msi = 0
for all i ∈ I and for all s ∈ S. Let the lexicographic tie-breaker to be































The time allocation Li1 = (4, 4, 2) and Li2 = (4, 6, 0) are the unique
time allocations that give i1 and i2, respectively, the maximal number of
subjects that achieve the thresholds and there does not exist another time
allocation that have the same number of subjects that achieve the thresholds
and results in a higher total scores.
The generated priority structure is the following.
fs1 :i1, i2
fs2 :i1, i2
The unique stable matching µ1 is the following. (Note that this is also








If ϕη,Tω respects versatility of talents with minimum efforts, then (Li1 , Pi1)
and (Li, Pi2) are the dominant strategies for i1 and i2, respectively. How-
ever, if i2 uses the time allocation L
′
i2
= (6, 4, 0), the generated priority
structure is the following.
fs1 :s2, s1
fs2 :s2, s1
The unique stable matching µ2 is the following. (Note that it is also the







Therefore, ϕη,Tω does not respect versatility of talents with minimum
efforts.
3.10.17 Proof of Theorem 33
Let I = {i1, i2}, S = {s1, s2} and q = (1, 1). The preference profile of
students is the following.
Pi1 :s1, s2
Pi2 :s1, s2
Let T = {t1, t2}, L¯ = 1 and η = (13 , 25). Moreover, let msi = 0 for all
i ∈ I and for all s ∈ S. Let the lexicographic tie-breaker to be T= t1, t2.






















Consider the time allocation Li1 = (1, 0) and Li2 = (0, 1). If ϕ
η,T
ω
respect unique talents, then (Li1 , Pi1) and (Li2 , Pi2) are dominant strategies
for student i1 and i2, respectively.
The generated priority structure is the following.
fs1 :i1, i2
fs2 :i1, i2
The unique stable matching µ is the following. (Note that it is also the







However, if i2 uses the time allocation L
′
i2
= (1, 0), the generated priority




The unique stable matching µ′ is the following. (Note that it is also the







Therefore, (Li2 , Pi2) is not the dominant strategy for i2. In other words,
ϕη,Tω does not respect unique talents.
3.10.18 Proof of Theorem 34
Consider the problem in the proof of Theorem 33. If ϕη,Tω respects unique
talents with minimum efforts, then the time allocations (Li1 , Pi1) and (Li2 , Pi2)
are the dominant strategies for i1 and i2, respectively, where Li1 = (1, 0)
and Li1 = (0, 1). However, as shown in the proof in Theorem 33, (Li2 , Pi2)
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4.1 Introduction
In many markets, intermediaries facilitate interactions between participants
across different sides. For example, dating websites such as eHarmony and
Match.com serve as matchmakers for men and women. Such markets are
characterized by “network effects”: users value participation by the other
side, and generate value to the other side from participating themselves.
The intermediaries in these markets, or platforms, capture value by enabling
coordination among users from each side.
We model platform markets in a two-sided matching setting. Agents are
separated into two groups, and interactions across groups require an inter-
mediary. A fundamental aspect of matching is that agents cannot simply
choose, but must also be chosen. Agents care about the identities of poten-
tial match partners, not just the number. In other words, users value the
quality of interactions and not just the quantity. Our approach thus com-
plements the existing literature on platform markets, in which users only
value the quantity of interactions.
Our analysis is based on the matching with contracts setting of Hatfield
and Milgrom (2005). Agents not only choose one another, but must also
agree on the terms of their relationship (e.g., wage, tasks, length of relation-
ship). A contract summarizes this relationship. In our model, the contract
terms specify an intermediary through which agents agree to interact, possi-
bly coupled with membership terms.3 Agents on each side mutually choose
one another and a platform.4 Platforms are thus objects of choice rather
3The “terms” are used loosely to mean the role an agent plays at a platform, and are
quite general. They may include standard membership terms, such as interaction fees,
length of contract, and cancellation penalties, as well as traits, such as political ideology,
religious zeal, and education, chosen by participants.
4We focus on markets with single-homing, in which agents choose at most one platform.
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than players, highlighting the role of a platform as a coordination device.
The solution concept of stability guarantees that no other matching is
mutually preferred by any group of agents. This property is desirable for
successful coordination, as it eliminates switching in equilibrium. Under
the standard assumption of substitutable preferences, a stable allocation of
contracts is guaranteed to exist. Moreover, the set of stable allocations has
a particular structure that we exploit to derive two key properties of the
equilibrium market structure: the seesaw principle and market tipping.
The seesaw principle roughly states that, in equilibrium, platforms sub-
sidize one side in order to attract the other side at a higher price. In our
setting, we use the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations to show
that side-optimal allocations “favor” that side, in the sense of providing
as many agents on that side with their most favorable terms, and as many
agents on the opposite side with their least favorable terms. Consider the ex-
ample of a nightclub: at the woman-optimal stable allocation, more women
enter for free and more men pay the highest cover than at any other stable
allocation. The result exploits the opposition of interests across sides with
respect to stable allocations, and in particular the side-optimality of the
allocations at the extreme points of the lattice.
Market tipping concerns the equilibrium balance of market power across
platforms. The competition for users and the strength of network effects
tends to result in most users allocated to one or a handful of platforms
which dominate the market. We extend Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)’s law
of aggregate demand (which roughly states that more contracts are better)
to derive results on market tipping. Roughly, if all agents prefer more inter-
actions with agents sharing similar attributes, then either agents with those
traits all sort into one platform or every platform has equal market power.
Consider, as an example, social media sites for sharing content such as pho-
tos, videos, and blogging with a general audience. Early on, users were
scattered across many sites. As adoption of social media increased, users
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sorted into a dominant platform (for example, YouTube), or into specialized
platforms (such as Tumblr and Pinterest).
Finally, we consider an environment in which agents who join the same
platform must agree to the same terms. An interpretation of such an en-
vironment is that agents who join the same platform must share the same
attributes. For example, an agent who wants to join a political interest
group must agree with the agenda the group advocates. In this example,
the preferences of agents are lexicographic: the political agenda is the most
important component in the preferences, followed by the group (or platform)
and the identities of the agents. When preferences are substitutable, a sta-
ble allocation is not guaranteed to exist. We show that a stable allocation
exists with the additional assumption of lexicographic preferences.
The setup is as follows. A two-sided market consists of disjoint sets of
users (e.g., men and women), platforms (e.g., dating websites), and sub-
scription terms (e.g., membership fees). Users directly choose a platform
(and terms), but indirectly choose users on the other side; see Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Many-to-one-to-many matching
a1 a2 a3 a4





We make this implicit choice explicit by defining contracts directly be-
tween users, with platforms and terms as objects of choice agreed upon in
the contract. Focusing on user choice of such contracts frames the problem
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in a many-to-many matching with contracts setting; see Figure 4.2.5 A key
difference from the standard two-sided matching setting is that users are
assumed to single-home (i.e., may only subscribe to one platform). Thus,
an allocation must bind a user to the same platform at every contract.
Figure 4.2: Many-to-many matching
a1, i2 a2, i2 a3, i1 a4, i1
b1, i1 b2, i2 b3, i1 b4, i2
A agent-Platform pairs
B agent-Platform pairs
The next section reviews the related literature. Section 4.3 introduces
the model. Section 4.4 presents the main results. Section 4.5 concludes.
Proofs are in Section 4.6.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Two-Sided Markets
The literature on platform markets is extensive. In general, the focus is on
platform pricing (rather than user interaction). The key feature of all these
models is that agents typically care about the number of agents from the
other side that join a platform and not about the identities of those agents.
5In our framework, agents can join a platform without interacting with all agents on
the other side of market. Thus platforms provide access but not necessarily interaction
with the other side. If we insist on interactions then stable allocations may not exist;
see Example 12 in the Section 4.7. This assumption is standard in the platform markets
literature; see Rochet and Tirole (2006), Weyl (2010).
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Our approach, on the other hand, focuses on users with interaction-specific
values rather than quantity-based values, taking platform behavior as given.
The following is a selective review of several representative papers and is by
no means exhaustive.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) model platforms competing for users that are
heterogeneous in their value for interactions. They argue that markets with
network effects are two-sided in the sense that interactions and profits de-
pend on the structure of prices charged to each side rather than on the total
price itself. In this sense, platforms compete by pricing to coordinate users.
Armstrong (2006) also models competing platforms, but with users differ-
entiated by how they value the platforms rather than interactions. Under
single homing, Armstrong (2006) shows there is a continuum of equilibria
when platforms use two-part tariffs that additionally charge users on one side
a marginal price for additional users on the other. Rochet and Tirole (2006)
present a ‘canonical’ monopoly platform model that incorporates both types
of user heterogeneity. A general version of the seesaw principle is observed,
arising from a linkage between both sides through the price.
Rather than analyzing pricing strategies explicitly, Weyl (2010) uses an
allocation approach in which a platform chooses participation rates on each
side. The prices, or “insulating tariffs,” support the allocation by coordi-
nating participation on each side so as to guarantee the platform its desired
network size. Each network size corresponds to a unique profit and wel-
fare, and so a flexible pricing mechanism is employed to sustain the network
as an equilibrium. The use of prices as a means to sustain allocations is
one of Weyl (2010)’s main contributions. White and Weyl (2012) extends
Weyl (2010)’s framework to a setting with an unrestricted number of imper-
fectly competing platforms. They propose the solution concept of insulated
equilibrium, the natural extension of Weyl (2010)’s allocation approach for
competing platforms. The model includes Rochet and Tirole (2003) and
Armstrong (2006) as special cases.
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In so far as we focus on the resulting allocation rather than pricing, our
approach shares some similarity to that of Weyl (2010) and White and Weyl
(2012). The similarities end there, however, as we focus on allocations de-
termined by agents’ incentives to switch platforms rather than by platform
objectives, and take prices as exogenous (i.e., stable allocations). The trade-
off from increasing the scope of user heterogeneity is that we reduce the role
of the platforms.
4.2.2 Two-Sided Matching
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) and Hatfield and Kojima (2008) formally in-
troduce the idea of a matching through biltaeral contracts, which fully sum-
marize the relationship between two agents at a match. The matching with
contracts framework generalizes preceding models of matching, including
models with endogenous salaries (e.g., Kelso and Crawford (1982), Roth
(1984)), and without, as special cases. Klaus and Walzl (2009) explore many-
to-many matching with contracts further, examining the relationships be-
tween different notions of stability and substitutability in this context. One
important result is that under substitutability, pairwise and setwise stability
are equivalent.6 Hatfield and Kominers (2012a) extends many of the results
of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) to the setting of many-to-many matching
with contracts. Hatfield and Kojima (2010) propose weaker conditions that
substitutes for recovering existence and other results in many-to-one match-
ing with contracts. In Fung and Hsu (2014), we propose weaker conditions
for existence in many-to-many matching with contracts.
6Echenique (2012) addresses the relationship between contracts and salaries in many-
to-one matching, establishing a one-to-one mapping between Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005)’s model of matching and contracts into Kelso and Crawford (1982)’s model of
matching with salaries. Substitutable preferences over contracts is sufficient for the map-
ping, as it allows a global pairwise mapping of contracts into salaries. Kominers (2012)
extends Echenique (2012)’s embedding to many-to-many matching with contracts, with a
slightly stronger sufficient condition.
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Ostrovsky (2008) extends the scope of (many-to-many) two-sided match-
ing to a supply chain setting, in which several tiers of agents may interact
with other agents, directly upstream or downstream or through intermedi-
aries. Under a suitable notion of substitutable preferences, Ostrovsky (2008)
shows the set of chain stable allocations is a nonempty finite lattice, extend-
ing classical results to more general setting. Hatfield and Kominers (2012b)
generalizes Ostrovsky (2008) further by extending the supply chain structure
to any network structure satisfying substitutes and an “acyclicity” condi-
tion. Moreover, they show chain stability is equivalent to stability. Hatfield
and Kominers (2013) explores the welfare consequences of exit by agents
at different tiers on stable allocations. Hatfield et al. (2013) dispenses with
network structure altogether by introducing a numeraire good.
Recently, So¨nmez and Switzer (2013) and So¨nmez (2013) provide two of
the first real-world applications of the matching with contracts framework,
illustrating its usefulness in environments that fail the substitutes condition
but nevertheless admit stable allocations.7 The matching with contracts
framework thus represents a significant step in the literature on matching.
4.3 Model
Let S = A ∪B be the finite set of all agents in the market, and I the finite
set of intermediaries, or platforms. Let a, b, and s denote generic agents in
the sets A, B, and S, respectively, and let i denote a generic platform in
the set I. Agents from A can only interact with agents from B through a
platform in I. In this paper we assume that each agent can participate in at
most one platform. In the language of the two-sided markets literature, both
sides are single-homing. Moreover, an agent can choose not to participate
in any platform.
7These settings satisfy Hatfield and Kojima (2010)’s weaker notion of unilateral sub-
stitutes, and are the first matching with contracts models that are not equivalent to Kelso
and Crawford (1982).
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When an agent s ∈ S joins a platform, she may be required to agree to
terms in a contract. The terms we consider here are rather broad. They
may be positive or negative membership or transaction fees, length of re-
lationship, or any other membership details specified by the platform. We
call ts the contract terms, or simply terms, imposed by a platform to agent
s. Let T ≡ TA×TB denote the finite set of possible terms, where TA are the
terms for side A and TB are the terms for side B. The sets TA and TB may
be identical, disjoint, or have elements in common. We also assume that the
set of available terms is the same for all platforms.
In the next subsections, we first describe how we incorporate platforms
into the contract terms. We then discuss allocations and the equilibrium
notion of stability. Finally, we introduce three classes of preferences: sub-
stitutable preferences, preferences that satisfy the law of aggregate demand,
and a class of lexicographic preferences.
4.3.1 Platforms as objects
Consider an agent’s choice of platform. When an agent chooses a platform
directly, she indirectly chooses agents on the other side. In this paper, we
treat platforms as objects of choice—that is, platforms do not have prefer-
ences. As such, the only relevant choices concern agents s ∈ S.
A contract x associates an agent from one side of the market to an
agent on the other side through a platform and associated contract terms.
Let X be the set of all contracts. Formally, a typical contract x ∈ X between
agents a ∈ A and b ∈ B takes the form
x = (a, b, i, ta, tb) ∈ X ≡ A×B × I × TA × TB.
For a contract x ∈ X, let xA ∈ A denote the side A agent, xB ∈ B denote
the side B agent, xI ∈ I denote the platform associated with contract x,
and xT = (xTA , xTB ) ∈ TA × TB denote the pair of terms associated with
contract x. Agents may sign any number of contracts in general but may
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not sign multiple contracts with the same agent. Kominers (2012) calls
such environments unitary. Moreover, agents are free to choose an outside
option instead of joining any platform, represented by the null contract,
∅. Thus, we are in a many-to-many matching with contracts setting.
For a given set of contracts Z ⊆ X, let Za ⊆ Z denote the contracts in
Z associated with agent a ∈ A. Analogous definitions hold for Zb ⊆ Z and
Zi ⊆ Z. Also, let ZA ⊆ A denote the set of side A agents associated with
Z. Analogous definitions hold for ZB ⊆ B,ZI ⊆ I, and ZT = ZTA × ZTB ⊆
TA × TB.
We write (Za)B ⊆ B to indicate the side B agents with contracts in Za.
A similar definition applies for (Za)I ⊆ I, (Za)T ⊆ TA × TB, and so on.
Before formally introducing agent preferences, several issues that are
unique to our model must be discussed.
Consider an agent a ∈ A. If a signs multiple contracts then by single-
homing, the platforms must be the same across all those contracts.
Formally, a set of contracts Z ⊆ X is feasible if
1. ∀a ∈ A: (i) zB = z′B ⇒ z = z′, ∀z, z′ ∈ Za, and (ii) (Za)I = {ia}
2. ∀b ∈ B: (i) zA = z′A ⇒ z = z′, ∀z, z′ ∈ Zb, and (ii) (Zb)I = {ib}
In other words, Z is feasible if each agent with contracts in Z holds contracts
that are (i) unitary and (ii) single-homing.
To illustrate feasibility, consider an agent a ∈ A and suppose B =
{b1, b2}, I = {i1, i2}, and the terms are TA = {tL, tH} and TB = ∅. The
set Z = {(a, b1, i1, tL), (a, b1, i1, tH)} is not unitary for any agent but satisfies
single-homing for both agents, while the set Z ′ = {(a, b1, i1, tL), (a, b2, i2, tL)}
is unitary for both agents but violates single-homing for a. On the other
hand, the set Z∗ = {(a, b1, i2, tL), (a, b2, i2, tL)} is feasible.
Let Ps denote s’s preference relation over feasible sets of contracts.
For ease of analysis, we assume this ordering is strict. Moreover, for an
agent s choosing between two contracts that only differ with respect to the
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terms for the agent on the other side, we assume s breaks ties with respect
to the other agent’s preferences. This is reasonable since the terms are set
to facilitate coordination along a platform, and are not internalized by the
agents themselves. For instance, if we interpret terms as membership fees,
then these are paid to the platform and not the agent on the other side. Let
P ≡ (Ps)s∈S denote the profile of strict preferences over sets contracts. For
a given set of available contracts Z ⊆ X, agent s’s choice set is defined as
Cs(Z) ≡ {Z ′ ⊆ Z : Z ′PsZ ′′, ∀Z ′′ ⊆ Z feasible and Z ′ feasible}
In other words, when agent s ∈ A ∪ B is offered a set of contracts Z, she
chooses the feasible subset from Z that she most prefers with respect to her
preferences, Ps.
It is also useful to define s’s rejected set,
Rs(Z) ≡ Z \ Cs(Z).
Let CA(Z) ≡ ∪a∈ACa(Z) and CB(Z) ≡ ∪b∈BCb(Z) denote the set of con-
tracts from Z chosen by all a ∈ A and all b ∈ B, respectively. The rejected
sets for each side are then RA(Z) ≡ Z \ CA(Z) and RB(Z) ≡ Z \ CB(Z).
4.3.2 Stable allocations
An allocation Y ⊆ X is a feasible set of contracts. That is, each s ∈ S
signs unitary contracts associated with the same platform. Preferences over
allocations correspond directly to the underlying preferences over sets of
contracts.
The fundamental solution concept for matching is stability. Our notion
of stability follows from the notion of weak setwise stability in the matching
with contracts literature (Klaus and Walzl (2009), Hatfield and Kominers
(2012a)).
An allocation Y is stable if the following holds:
1. Individual rationality: Cs(Y ) = Y
s, for s ∈ S.
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2. No blocking set of contracts: 6 ∃Y ′ ⊆ X such that Y s ⊆ Cs(Y ∪Y ′),
for all s ∈ (Y )S .
Individual rationality requires that an agent s voluntarily participates in
allocation Y by accepting all available contracts in Y . Intuitively, an agent
s who drops some or all of the contracts in Y s is dissatisfied with some of
the agents on the other side or his platform. A set Y ′ is a blocking set for
Y if some or all of the contracts in Y are replaced by Y ′ for some group of
users. Intuitively, users on opposite sides of a platform mutually agree to
switch to another platform, to update their subscription terms, or to swap
match partners.
Let S(P ) be the set of all stable allocations with respect to preferences
P . An allocation Y is pairwise stable if it is individually rational and
6 ∃z ∈ X \ Y such that z ∈ CzA(Y ∪ {z}) ∩ CzB (Y ∪ {z}). The term
“pairwise” highlights the fact that an agent pair (a, b) ∈ A × B associated
with z can block an allocation Y . Let PS(P ) denote the set of pairwise
stable allocations.
A desirable property for successful coordination in equilibrium is that
agents are not constantly switching, be it their platform, subscription terms,
or match partners. Stability captures this very notion and is thus a reason-
able criterion for allocations in platform markets.
4.3.3 Preferences
Substitutable preferences
In order to guarantee existence of a stable allocation, it is standard in the
matching literature to assume a preference domain that rules out certain
complementarities over contracts. Preferences of s ∈ S over contracts are
substitutable if
Z ⊆ Z ′ ⊆ X ⇒ Rs(Z) ⊆ Rs(Z ′).
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In other words, offering new contracts does not create complementarities
with previously rejected contracts. The latter continue to be rejected. An
equivalent definition is that z ∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x, z}) ⇒ z ∈ Cs(Y ∪ {z}), ∀x, z,
and Y ⊆ X. In other words, the choice of a contract z does not depend on
the availability of another contract x. Under substitutability, weak setwise
stability coincides with pairwise stability.8 Checking pairwise deviations is
enough. Moreover, substitutes guarantees existence, and a unique structure,
of the set of stable allocations:
Result 1 (Hatfield and Kominers (2012a)). When preferences are substi-
tutable, the set of stable allocations is nonempty and forms a lattice.
The lattice structure implies that there exists a partial ordering over
stable allocations, where stable allocations more preferred by one side are
less preferred by the other side. Moreover, the extreme points of the lattice
are optimal in this sense. In particular, there exists a stable allocation that
side A agents prefer to all other stable allocations, the A-optimal stable
allocation, and this allocation is the least preferred stable allocation for side
B agents, the B-pessimal stable allocation. Similarly, the most preferred
stable allocation for side B agents, the B-optimal stable allocation, is the
least preferred stable allocation for side A agents, the A-pessimal stable
allocation.
Law of Aggregate Demand
Following Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) for many-to-one matching markets
and Hatfield and Kominers (2012a) for many-to-many matching markets,
we say that preferences satisfy the law of aggregate demand, if for agent
s ∈ S, and X ′ ⊆ X ′′ ⊆ X, we have |Cs(X ′)| ≤ |Cs(X ′′)|.
Intuitively, if more contracts become available, agent s demands weakly
more contracts. The law of aggregate demand has a natural interpretation
8See Theorem 2(i) in Klaus and Walzl (2009), and Lemma 7 of Hatfield and Kominers
(2012a).
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in two-sided markets, which is the network externality generated purely by
having more agents to interact with. In other words, more contracts are
better. In section 4.4.2, we introduce an extension of the law of aggregate
demand that is defined only with respect to the subscription terms.9
Lexicographic Preferences
We introduce a class of preferences that is particularly relevant to platform
markets: the class of lexicographic preferences. We say that preferences are
lexicographic if agents consider the desirability of contracts in a particular
order with respect to the components of the contracts: the agents from the
other side, the choice of platform, and the subscription terms. In particular,
we consider an environment where each agent first considers the set of agents
on the other side, followed by the platform, and finally the terms.10
Definition 18. Consider an agent a ∈ A. Preferences of a are lexico-
graphic if whenever any of the following conditions hold,
1. B1 = (Y
a
1 )B = (Y˜
a
1 )B 6= (Y a2 )B = (Y˜ a2 )B = B2,
2. B1 = B2 and i1 = (Y
a
1 )I = (Y˜
a
1 )I 6= (Y a2 )I = (Y˜ a2 )I = i2,
3. (B1, i1) = (B2, i2) and t1 = (Y
a
1 )T = (Y˜
a
1 )T 6= (Y a2 )T = (Y˜ a2 )T = t2.
for any sets Y1, Y2, Y˜1, Y˜2 ⊆ X, then
Ca(Y1 ∪ Y2) = Y1 ⇒ Ca(Y˜1 ∪ Y˜2) = Y˜1. (4.1)
Moreover, for any Yˆ ⊆ X such that (Yˆ a)B,I = (Bˆ, iˆ),
Ca(Yˆ )B,I = (Bˆ, iˆ)⇒ Ca(Y )B,I = (Bˆ, iˆ), ∀Y ⊆ X such that (Y a)B,I = (Bˆ, iˆ).
(4.2)
9The law of aggregate demand is used to prove a version of the rural hospitals theorem
for matching with contracts; see Section 4.7.1 for details and a related result.
10Our results also hold if we define the lexicographic ordering with platforms as most
important, followed by the agents from the other side, and finally the contract terms.
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The first equation requires that an agent evaluates any set of contracts
lexicographically, first in terms of the set of agents on the other side, followed
by the platform, and finally by the contract terms. The second equation
requires that if an agent finds a (Bˆ, iˆ)-combination acceptable at some set
of contracts Yˆ , then the agent finds this combination acceptable at any set
of contracts Y ; that is, at any t ∈ T .
Note that it is possible that Ca(Y1 ∪ Y2) = ∅ in equation (4.1). In
particular, we do not require that every (B′, i′, t′) combination be acceptable
to a, only that any t′ ∈ T is acceptable.
Lexicographic preferences may be relevant in several natural settings.
Consider the example of a nightclub for men and women. Men might rea-
sonably consider the group of women in the club above the club itself or the
cover charge. Similarly, agents joining dating websites, religious organiza-
tions, or political groups, may evaluate choices lexicographically based on
a desire for shared attributes. Lexicographic preferences play an important
role in section 4.4.3 when stable allocations have an additional constraint.
4.4 Main Results
In this section, we use the structure of the set of stable allocations to study
equilibrium market structure. In particular, we exploit the lattice structure
to derive two key properties in platform markets: the seesaw principle and
market tipping. Later, we consider an environment in which agents who join
the same platform must agree to the same subscription terms.
4.4.1 The seesaw principle
Consider platform markets where the only subscription terms are prices, and
suppose there are only two prices: high and low. Rochet and Tirole (2006)
observe a tendency for all agents on one side to pay the low price while
agents on the other side pay the high price. The intuition is that platforms
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may subsidize one side in order to attract the other and thus capture a larger
overall market share. This result is sometimes called the “seesaw principle.”
In this section, we use our framework to capture this phenomenon.
Nightclubs sometimes promote “Ladies’ Night” events, which allow women
to enter for free while men pay a cover charge. Dating websites provide an-
other example where this is observed. What’s Your Price allows men (“Gen-
erous Members”) to bid for dates with women (“Beautiful Members”), who
may accept incoming bids or make explicit asks. Men must purchase credits,
in addition to having an offer accepted, in order to read and send messages.
Ashley Madison, which caters to married men and women, requires men to
buy credits to initiate contact with women on the site. Women may also
buy credits, but in addition can initiate contact and have the men pay.
Suppose the set of subscription terms is TA = TB = {t1, . . . , tn}, where
t1 < · · · < tn. We interpret such ordered terms as “fees” and assume agents
prefer low fees tr to high fees ts, where r < s, all else equal. The next
result shows that when preferences are substitutable, the number of side-A
agents who sign the lowest fee t1 at the A-optimal stable allocation is weakly
larger than in any other stable allocation. The opposite holds for the side-B
agents.
Theorem 37. Suppose preferences are substitutable. Then at the A-optimal
stable allocation,
1. the number of side-A agents that sign t1-contracts is weakly higher
than at any stable allocation, and
2. the number of side-B agents that sign tn-contracts is weakly higher
than at any stable allocation.
By symmetry, the number of side-A agents that sign tn-contracts is
weakly higher at the B-optimal stable allocation than at any other sta-
ble allocation, and so on. The proof, in Section 4.6, exploits the lattice
structure and in particular side optimality.
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In the example of dating websites, the result is interpreted as saying that
at the woman-optimal stable allocation more women join for free and more
men pay for premium membership (or message credits) than at any other
stable allocation. This seems to be reflected in practice for some sites.
4.4.2 Market Tipping
In some situations, an agent may prefer to join a platform that draws agents
from the other side with similar interests or attributes. Consider the exam-
ple of social media sites for sharing content, such as Instagram for photos,
YouTube for videos, and WordPress for blogging. Such sites not only host
content, but provide a general audience for users generating their own con-
tent. While YouTube has come to dominate video sharing, photo sharing
sites such as Instagram, Imgur, and Pinterest, each draw different types of
users. Thus some markets may “tip” toward a single platform, while others
may share a portion of the market based on niches. Another interpreta-
tion is that tipping occurs other platforms fail differentiate themselves with
respect to “network effects” driven by user traits.
In this section, we interpret subscription terms as “traits.” Let x =
(a, b, i, ta, tb), where ta is the trait of agent a and tb is the trait of agent
b. Let TA be the set of traits for agents on side A and TB be the set of
traits for agents on side B. Assume that (Xa)TA = ta for all a ∈ A and
(Xb)TB = tb for all b ∈ B. In other words, each agent has only one trait.
Moreover, assume that TA = TB. The following condition on preferences
says that agents prefer agents from other side with the same trait.
Definition 19. We say that preferences satisfy the law of aggregate de-
mand for similar traits, if for an agent a with trait ta and two sets of
contracts Y and Y ′, we have the following.
|{x ∈ Y : xTB = ta}| ≥ |{x ∈ Y ′ : xTB = ta}| ⇒ Y RaY ′;
|{x ∈ Y : xTB = ta}| > |{x ∈ Y ′ : xTB = ta}| ⇒ Y PaY ′.
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Theorem 38. Suppose preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggre-
gate demand for similar traits. Consider a trait t. In any stable allocation,
either (1) all agents with trait t are associated with one platform or (2) they
are associated with multiple platforms such that each platform has the same
number of agents with trait t from each side.
In the example of social media, all agents with the same trait t will join
a dominant platform or else the market share of t agents will be distributed
uniformly across platforms.
4.4.3 Trait-Constrained Stable Allocations
Our setting allows two agents on the same side to join the same platform at
different subscription terms. In this section, we consider an environment in
which agents from the same side joining the same platform must agree to
the same subscription terms.
A natural interpretation of such environment is based on traits, as in the
previous section. Recall each agent had a single trait at any contract. Sup-
pose now each agent may be associated with several traits. The constraint
on subscription terms is interpreted as requiring that agents who join the
same platform have the same trait in any allocation.
Consider the example of political interest groups. Agents on one side
are staff and active members, leading lobbying, fundraising, and outreach
activities, while agents on the other side are potential donors and sponsors,
such as businesses. Here, the platform is a group advocating a shared polit-
ical agenda, which may be very narrow or consist of several related issues.
For example, it may be an environmental organization focused specifically
on promoting ethanol as a biofuel, or more broadly on advocating for green
energy. The traits may specify such distinctions over issues, as well intensity
of participation within the platform, say high and low.
The example has two important features that distinguish it from the pre-
vious examples. First, there is an additional restriction on an allocation that
152
requires agents joining the same platform to advocate the same issue or set
of issues, that is, the group’s political agenda. Second, agents’ preferences
naturally express lexicographic order on several components. The most im-
portant component in their preferences is the political agenda, which we call
a trait. The second most important component may be the platform, fol-
lowed by the agents on the other side. This may occur if the interest group
has a recognizable name, or is well established.
Note that the lexicographic ordering may be different. For instance,
members and donors may be most drawn to platforms and issues advocated
by individuals with strong political ties and businesses with a large public
presence. In this case, agents are most important, followed perhaps by the
agenda and the platform.
To allow flexibility of this interpretation, we again refer to subscription
terms as traits in this section. In the example above, the traits are the
various sets of issues a group advocates. A shared political agenda is thus a
constraint on traits. Let TA be the set of traits for side A and let TB be the
set traits for side B. In contrast to the previous section, we do not assume
agents have only one trait. That is, ∃s ∈ A ∪ B and z, z′ ∈ Xs such that
ts 6= t′s, where ts, t′s are the traits associated with agent s at contracts z, z′,
respectively.
We define the notion of a trait-constrained stable allocation as follows.
Definition 20. A set of contracts Y ⊆ X is trait-constrained feasible
if for x, x′ ∈ Y , if xI = x′I then xTA,TB = x′TA,TB . Let X˜ denote the trait-
constrained feasible set. An allocation Y is trait-constrained stable, if
the following holds:
1. Feasibility: Y ∈ X˜.
2. Individual rationality: Cs(Y ) = Y
s, for s ∈ A ∪B.
3. No feasible blocking set of contracts: 6 ∃Y ′ ∈ X˜, such that Y ′s =
Cs(Y ∪ Y ′), for all s ∈ (Y ′)S .
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The requirement of individual rationality is the same, but now we impose
feasibility on both the allocation Y and any potential blocking set Y ’.
The following result states that a trait-constrained stable may not exist
when the preferences of agents are substitutable.
Theorem 39. When preferences are substitutable, the set of trait-constrained
stable allocations may be empty.
The proof is by the following example.
Let A = {a1, a2}, B = {b1, b2}, I = {i}, TA = {t1, t2}, and TB = ∅.
Suppose preferences over contracts are as follows:11
Pa1 : {(a1, b1, t1)}, {(a1, b2, t1)}
Pa2 : {(a2, b2, t2)}, {(a2, b1, t2)}
Pb1 : {(a2, b1, t2)}, {(a1, b1, t1)}
Pb2 : {(a1, b2, t1)}, {(a2, b2, t2)}
Note the preferences satisfy substitutes. When agents joining the same side
must share the same trait, there are only four possible feasible and individual
rational allocations, and one can easily check that none of these is stable:
Y1 = {(a2, b1, t2)} → blocked by Y2
Y2 = {(a2, b2, t2)} → blocked by Y3
Y3 = {(a1, b2, t1)} → blocked by Y4
Y4 = {(a1, b1, t1)} → blocked by Y1
Thus, there is no trait-constrained stable allocation. It is worth noting that
these preferences also (trivially) satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Intu-
itively, the latter assumption would not help because it makes no demands
on the contract terms.
11Since there is one platform and side B agents do not face a trait, we suppress the
notation of platform i and the trait for side B in the listed contracts.
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However, if we allow agents who join the same platform to have different
traits, then there are two (unconstrained) stable allocations:
Y5 = {(a1, b1, t1), (a2, b2, t2)}
Y6 = {(a1, b2, t1), (a2, b1, t2)}
As mentioned above, in the example of a political interest group, it is
natural that agents’ preferences express a lexicographic order over several
components. Other examples include charities, religious organizations, and
professional associations. Under the additional assumption of lexicographic
preferences, we have the following.
Theorem 40. When preferences are substitutable and lexicographic, a trait-
constrained stable allocation exists.
4.5 Concluding remarks
The solution concept of stability is a reasonable equilibrium criterion as it
eliminates switching. We use the structure of the set of stable allocations to
analyze equilibrium market structure. The seesaw principle and market tip-
ping arise as a consequence of users having match-specific values for agents
on the other side. Finally, we show that under substitutable preferences,
trait-constrained stable allocations may not exist. Using a modified cumu-
lative offer algorithm, we show existence under the additional assumption
of lexicographic preferences.
The main contribution of this paper is a new application of two-sided
matching that provides a complementary perspective for analyzing certain
platform markets. Our focus is on users rather than platforms, and the
“microstructure” of interactions at platforms. This allows users to have
preferences over the quality of interactions with agents on the other side,
and not just the quantity. As Weyl (2010) points out, there is a gulf between
the standard platform (“two-sided”) markets literature, and the two-sided
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matching (and more broadly, market design) literature, though it would
seem their intersection may be quite fruitful. This paper is a first attempt
at bridging that gap.
4.6 Proofs
4.6.1 Proof of Theorem 37
Without loss of generality, let the set of terms be TA = TB = {tL, tH}, with
tL < tH . The extension to TA = TB = {t1, . . . , tn} is straightforward.
Let Y denote the A-optimal stable allocation. Suppose |{a ∈ A :
(Y
a
)TA = tL}| < |{a ∈ A : (Y a)TA = tL}|, for some stable allocation Y .
Then there is some agent a ∈ A that has either: (i) no contracts at Y , or
(ii) only tH -contracts at Y .
Consider case (i). If some b ∈ (Y a)B has no contracts at Y then (a, b)
form a blocking pair for Y . So all b ∈ (Y a)B have contracts with some side
A agents in Y . Moreover, these contracts must be preferred to those in Y
or they can block Y with a. But this contradicts Y as the B-pessimal stable
allocation.
Consider case (ii). Let y ∈ Y a such that yTA = tL. Suppose yB ∈ (Y
a
)B,
and let y ∈ Y a be the associated contract. Suppose yI = yI . By the
assumption that all agents prefer tL-contracts to tH -contracts, and that ties
with respect to terms on the other side are broken with respect to that side’s
preferences, y ∈ Ca(Y ∪ Y ) 6= Y a, regardless of yTB , yTB . This contradicts
A-optimality of Y . So yI 6= yI , and there exists z ∈ Xa that coincides
with y except zTA,TB = (tL, tL). Then a and yB mutually prefer z to y,
contradicting stability of Y .
Therefore yB ∈ Y a ⇒ yB 6∈ (Y a)B. Moreover, such agents yB must have
contracts in Y or they can form a blocking pair for Y with a. Thus such
agents yB have contracts with different side-A agents at Y . These contracts
are preferred by yB to y, otherwise they can block Y with a. But this
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contradicts Y as B-pessimal stable.
An analogous argument shows that the number of side-B agents that sign
tH -contracts at Y is weakly higher than at any other stable allocation.
4.6.2 Proof of Theorem 38
Consider an allocation X ′. Without loss of generality, assume agents are
associated with two platforms i and i′ such that |{a ∈ A : (X ′a)I =
i and (X ′a)TA = t}| > |{a ∈ A : (X ′a)I = i′ and (X ′a)TA = t}| > 0. Con-
sider an agent b ∈ B such that (Xb)TB = t. Suppose (X ′b)I 6= i. Let the set
of side A agents whose trait is t and who are associated with platform i be
A′. Let Y = {x ∈ X : xB = b, xA ∈ A′, and xI = i}. Then Y ′ = X ′A′ ∪ Y
forms a blocking set of contracts.
Therefore, X ′ is not a stable allocation. Next, suppose all side B agents
whose traits are t are associated with platform i. Using a similar argument
as above, we can construct a blocking set of contracts in which a side A
agent whose trait is t and who is associated with platform i′ is included.
Therefore, when agents with trait t are associated with multiple platforms,
the number of agents with trait t is the same across these platforms on each
side.
4.6.3 Proof of Theorem 40
The proof below incorporates the following algorithm, an extension of Hat-
field and Milgrom (2005)’s cumulative offer algorithm to the many-to-many
setting introduced in Fung and Hsu (2014).
The many-to-many cumulative offer algorithm
The (side A-proposing) many-to-many cumulative offer algorithm works as
follows.
• Step 1: Let Oa(1) = Xa for all a ∈ A. An arbitrary side A agent a1
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proposes Y (1) = Ca1(Oa1(1)). Side B agents hold Cb(Yb(1)) for all
b ∈ B.
– Let Ob(1) = Yb(1) for all b ∈ B.
– Let OB(1) = ∪b∈BOb(1) = Y (1).
• Step t: Let Oa(t) = Xa − RB(OB(t − 1)) for all a ∈ A. An arbitrary
side A agent at such that Cat(Oat(t)) 6⊂ CB(OB(t−1)) proposes Y (t) =
Cat(Oat(t)). Hospitals hold Cb(Ob(t− 1) ∪ Yb(t)) for all b ∈ B.
– Let Ob(t) = Ob(t− 1) ∪ Yb(t) for all b ∈ B.
– Let OB(t) = ∪b∈BOb(t) = OB(t− 1) ∪ Y (t).
The algorithm terminates in some step T such that Ca(Oa(T )) ⊂ CB(OB(T−
1)) for all a ∈ A. The final allocation is X ′ ≡ CA(OA(T )).
In Fung and Hsu (2014), we show the algorithm produces a stable al-
location in unitary many-to-many matching with contracts markets, under
substitutes as well as under weaker preference assumptions. We now prove
Theorem 40.
Proof. Suppose the preferences are lexicographic. Consider the following
construction.
For any X, construct a reduced problem X¯ such that for any x¯ ∈ X¯ we
have
x¯ = (a, b, i),
where a ∈ A, b ∈ B and i ∈ I. For any agent a ∈ A, we can construct
a reduced preference P¯a such that if x¯P¯ax¯
′ for any x¯, x¯′ ∈ X¯, then xPax′
for some x, x′ ∈ X, where x¯A = x¯′A = xA = x′A = a, x¯B = xB, x¯′B = x′B,





We use the following algorithm to produce a trait-constrained stable
allocation. There are three steps.
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• Step 1: For the reduced problem X¯ and reduced preferences P¯s∈A∪B,
run the many-to-many cumulative offere algorithm. The outcome is
X¯ ′.
• Step 2: For each platform i that has a positive number of agents
associated with it, let the side B agent with the smallest index, say
b, chooses his favorite trait among X. In other words, let the trait
assocaited with a platform i be (Cb(X))TA,TB .
For each platform i that has a positive number of agents associated
with it, let i(tA, tB) be the trait that is produced by the above method.
• Step 3: Let X ′ ⊆ X be such that
1. (X ′a)B = (X¯ ′a)B, (X ′a)I = (X¯ ′a)I := i, and (X ′a)TA,TB =
i(tA, tB),∀a ∈ X ′A;
2. (X ′b)A = (X¯ ′
b
)A, (X
′b)I = (X¯ ′b)I := j, and (X ′b)TA,TB = j(tA, tB),∀b ∈
X ′B.
We claim that X ′ is a trait-constrained stable allocation. Note that if
the preference is not substitutable nor lexicogrpahic, the algorithm may not
produce a feasible allocation.
In the following, we show that X ′ is trait-constrained stable.
1. The allocation X ′ is feasible: By lexicographic preference, for any
allocaiton X¯ ′ ⊆ X¯, if we create an allocation Y ⊆ X by assigning some traits
(tA, tB) to each platform i, so that for agents associated with platform i, they
also have the traits in their contracts, then the allocation Y is feasible. This
is precisely what the three-step algorithm does.
2. The allocation X ′ is IR: Implied by lexicogrpahic preference, for any
allocation X¯ ′ ⊆ X¯, if we create an allocation Y ⊆ X by assigning some traits
(tA, tB) to each paltform i, so that for agents assocaited with platform i, they
also have the traits in their contracts, then the allocation Y is IR. Therefore,
X ′ is IR.
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3. The allocation does not have feasible blocking set: Since preferences
are substitutable, X¯ ′ is a stable allocation in the reduced problem. In other
words, no agents would jointly change the contracts so that they can switch
platforms or be matched with different agents in the reduced problem.
Since preferences are lexicographic, for each agent, the set of agents on
the other side and the platform in the contracts are more important than
the traits. No agents would jointly change the contracts so that they can
switch platforms or be matched with different agents. Within a platform i,
the trait is chosen by the side B agent with the smallest index. In other
words, agents associated with i cannot jointly change the contracts so that
they can have different traits in their contracts, since there is at least one
agent who would disagree.
Based on the above argument, the allocation X ′ is trait-constrained sta-
ble allocation.
4.7 Miscellaneous results
4.7.1 Rural Hospitals Theorem
The rural hospitals theorem is a classic result in two-sided matching con-
cerning the distribution of agents at stable allocations. The interpretation
for our setting is that if agent s does not sign any contracts at some stable
allocation, and thus does not join a platform, then s does not join any plat-
form at any other stable allocation. Consider the example of mobile phone
carriers. If a user chooses no mobile carrier at some stable allocation then
at every stable allocation the user chooses no mobile carrier. A platform’s
objective is thus not to get a user to increase interactions at stable alloca-
tions, but to entice a user to switch from another platform (perhaps through
more attractive terms).
Result 2 (Hatfield and Kominers (2012a)). Suppose preferences are substi-
tutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Then at every stable alloca-
160
tion Y, Y ′ and for every a ∈ A and every b ∈ B, we have |Ca(Y )| = |Ca(Y ′)|
and |Cb(Y )| = |Cb(Y ′)| that is, each agent signs the same number of con-
tracts, at every stable allocation.
Result 2 follows directly from substitutability and the law of aggregate
demand.
An immediate question is, if a platform has no agents associated with it
in one stable allocation, does the platform have no agents associated with
it in any other stable allocation? The answer is negative. The following
example shows that if a platform i is unmatched at a stable allocation Y ,
in the sense that contracts with i are not in Y , then it is not the case that
i is unmatched at every stable allocation.
Example 11. Let A = {a1, a2}, B = {b1, b2}, I = {i, i′}, F = ∅, and con-
sider the following contracts,
x1 = (a1, b1, i) y1 = (a2, b2, i)
x2 = (a1, b1, i
′) y2 = (a2, b2, i′)
Agents have the following preferences over the contracts:
Pa1 : {x1}, {x2} Pb1 : {x2}, {x1}
Pa2 : {y1}, {y2} Pb2 : {y2}, {y1}
The A-optimal stable allocation is Y1 = {x1, y1}, and the B-optimal stable
allocation is Y2 = {x2, y2}. Preferences are clearly substitutable and trivially
satisfy the law of aggregate demand. All agents subscribe to i at Y1, and all
agents subscribe to i′ at Y2. While i′ is unmatched in the former, i′ is not
unmatched in the latter. Similarly for i.
In the following proposition, we show that when preferences are subsi-
tutable and lexicographic, then if there is a platform that is not matched
with any agents in a stable allocation, then it is not matched with any agent
in any stable allocation.
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Theorem 41. Suppose preferences for all agents are substitutable and lex-
icographic. Consider a platform i ∈ I such that:
1. agents prefer contracts with other platforms over contracts with i, or
2. contracts with i are unacceptable.
Then i 6∈ YI , ∀Y ∈ S(P ). That is, contracts with i are not part of a stable
allocation.
Proof. Suppose a profile P of preferences is substitutable and lexicographic.
Suppose ∃Y ∈ S(P ) such that i ∈ YI . Then ∃A′ ⊆ A and B′ ⊆ B such
that (Y i)A = A
′ and (Y i)B = B′. By stability, contracts in Y must be
individually rational, so condition 2 holds.
Consider x /∈ Y such that (xA, xB) = (a, b) ∈ A′ × B′. By stability and
pairwise blocking, x /∈ Ca(Y ∪{x})∩Cb(Y ∪{x}). That is, x ∈
(
X \Ca(Y ∪
{x})) ∪ (X \ Cb(Y ∪ {x})). So x /∈ Cs(Y ∪ {x}) for some s ∈ {a, b}. Since
x /∈ Y and xA = a and xB = b, it follows that xI 6= i. Then s prefers i to
xI , contradicting condition 1.
Theorem 41 and Example 11 establish necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of a platform with no agents associated with it in any stable
allocation.
4.7.2 Access versus interaction at stable allocations
Example 12. The following example illustrates that, at a stable allocation,
an agent may join a platform and gain access to users on the other side but
only interact with a subset. This assumption is standard in the platform
markets models of Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Weyl (2010).
Let A = {a1, a2, a3}, B = {b1, b2}, I = {i}, F = ∅. Consider the following
contracts,
x1 = (a1, b1, i) x2 = (a1, b2, i)
y1 = (a2, b1, i) y2 = (a2, b2, i)
z1 = (a3, b1, i) z2 = (a3, b2, i)
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and preferences over sets of these contracts,
Pa1 : {x1, x2}, {x1}, {x2}
Pa2 : {y1, y2}, {y1}, {y2}
Pa3 : {z1, z2}, {z1}, {z2}
Pb1 : {x1, y1, z1}, {x1, y1}, {x1, z1}, {y1, z1}{x1}, {y1}, {z1}
Pb2 : {x2, y2}, {x2}, {y2}
Note that preferences are substitutable.
The A-optimal stable allocation is Y = {x1, y1, z1, x2, y2}. Note that at
Y , b1 is linked to a1, a2, and a3 through i, while b2 only links to a1 and a2.
However, b2 has access to a3 via platform i. Thus at a stable allocation,
users may share a platform without actually interacting. For example, a
mobile phone user does not contract with every mobile device offered by the
carrier. See Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Access versus Interaction: b2 has access to a3 but only interacts
with a1, a2.
a1, i a2, i a3, i
b1, i b2, i
Now, suppose we require full interaction at stable allocations. Then
substitutes does not guarantee the set of “full-interaction stable” allocations
is empty. In particular, b2 does not want to interact with a3, and so a3 cannot
be part of an allocation. However, a3 and b1 mutually prefer interacting to
not interacting, blocking full-interaction stability.
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